A study of the role of workers' representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland by Walters, David et al.
 
Final Report 
- 2 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A study of the role of workers’ representatives in 
health and safety arrangements in coal mines in 
Queensland 
 
 
 
Research supported by the 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) Mining and Energy Division 
 
 
FINAL REPORT 
 
 
David Walters1 
Emma Wadsworth1 
Richard Johnstone2 
Michael Quinlan3 
 
 
 
January 2014 
 
 
 
 
Contact: Prof David Walters 
WaltersD@Cardiff.ac.uk 
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre 
Cardiff University 
59 Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3AT 
Tel. +44 (0)29 2087 0013, Fax. +44 (0)29 2087 4759 
 
 
1
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre, Cardiff University, 
2
Griffith Law School, Griffith University, 
3
Australian 
Business School, University of New South Wales 
A study of the role of workers’ representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland 
i 
 
Contents 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................ iii 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ iv 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... v 
 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background and context .......................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 The structure of the report ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
 
2 Health and safety outcomes and the practices that lead to them in the coal mines of 
Queensland ..................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Some features of health and safety outcomes in coal mines .......................................................................... 6 
2.2 Health and safety regulation and management ................................................................................................. 8 
2.3 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................ 11 
 
3 Representative participation on health and safety — experience elsewhere and the 
situation in Queensland .............................................................................................................. 13 
3.1 Representative participation in arrangements for health and safety management .................................. 13 
3.1.1 Worker representation on health and safety — the evidence of effectiveness ............................... 14 
3.1.2 What supports effectiveness? ..................................................................................................................... 17 
3.2 The situation in coal mines .................................................................................................................................... 19 
3.2.1 Research evidence on the effectiveness of arrangements for worker representation in coal        
mines ............................................................................................................................................................... 20 
3.2.2 Historical observation and commentary on the effectiveness of provisions for worker   
representation in coal mines....................................................................................................................... 21 
3.3 Perspectives on current arrangements for worker representation in Queensland coal mines.............. 24 
3.3.1 The regulatory framework for representative participation on OHS in Queensland coal mines 24 
3.4 Representative participation — summary and contentious issues .............................................................. 26 
 
4 Research design and methods .............................................................................................. 28 
4.1 Study design ............................................................................................................................................................ 28 
4.2 Research methods .................................................................................................................................................. 29 
4.2.1 The literature review .................................................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.2 Analysis of records of the work of site and industry safety and health representatives in selected 
mines ............................................................................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.3 Non-participant observation ..................................................................................................................... 32 
4.2.4 Interviews with key informants .................................................................................................................. 33 
 
 
Final Report 
ii 
 
5 The practice of worker representation on health and safety in Queensland coal mines: 
OHS management systems, communications and supports .................................................. 35 
5.1 Who are the worker representatives? ................................................................................................................ 35 
5.2 Worker representation and the system for managing OHS in Queensland coal mines ......................... 38 
5.3 Communications between representatives, workers, managers and inspectors during inspections ... 43 
5.4 Support for worker representation in health and safety arrangements on site ........................................ 45 
5.4.1 Support from trades unions and the ISHRs ............................................................................................ 46 
5.4.2 Support from workers ................................................................................................................................. 50 
5.4.3 Support for representation provided by mining company management ........................................ 51 
5.4.4 Support from the inspectorate .................................................................................................................. 55 
5.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................57 
 
6 The practice of worker representation on health and safety in Queensland coal mines: 
serious risks, incidents and the use of statutory powers ....................................................... 59 
6.1 Serious risks and the role of the worker representatives in prevention ...................................................... 59 
6.2 Investigating accidents .......................................................................................................................................... 60 
6.3 Investigating high potential incidents ................................................................................................................. 62 
6.4 Dealing with complaints ........................................................................................................................................ 65 
6.5 Using statutory powers ...........................................................................................................................................67 
6.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................... 77 
 
7 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 78 
7.1 Measures of success ................................................................................................................................................78 
7.2 Some challenges and contexts for worker representation on health and safety...................................... 80 
7.2.1 Representative participation and styles of OHS management............................................................ 81 
7.2.2 Labour relations climate ............................................................................................................................. 82 
7.2.3 Organisational change ................................................................................................................................ 85 
7.3 Ways forward ........................................................................................................................................................... 86 
 
References .................................................................................................................................... 88 
Annexe .......................................................................................................................................... 94 
 
A study of the role of workers’ representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland 
iii 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Lost time injury frequency rates per million hours worked for Queensland coal mines 
1996/1997 to 2011/2012* ............................................................................................................................ 5 
Figure 2.2: Hours worked in Queensland coal mines 2007/2008 to 2011/2012* ............................................. 6 
Table 4.1: Summary of mines included in the documentary analysis and corresponding Site Safety 
and Health Representative interviewees ............................................................................................ 29 
Table 4.2: Documents supplied by CFMEU .............................................................................................................. 30 
Figure 4.1: Timespan of documents supplied by CFMEU ..................................................................................... 30 
Table 4.3: Typology coding for union health and safety representative and inspectorate activity 
records .......................................................................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 5.1: Relative levels of physical and documentary inspection for ISHRs, SSHRs and MI 
inspectors ..................................................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 5.1: Documentary inspection during site visits ............................................................................................. 40 
Figure 5.2: Comparing relative levels of physical and documentary inspection among ISHRs, SSHRs 
and MI inspectors over time: before the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, 
between 1999 and 2008, and in the last five years ......................................................................... 42 
Figure 5.3: Comparing relative levels of physical and documentary inspection among ISHRs, SSHRs 
and MI inspectors by mine type: open cut and underground .................................................... 43 
Figure 5.4: Differences in discussion during site visits among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI inspectors .............. 44 
Figure 5.5: Differences in discussion with workers among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI inspectors over time . 44 
Figure 5.6: Differences in discussion with managers among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI inspectors over 
time ................................................................................................................................................................ 45 
Figure 5.7: Differences in discussion with reps among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI inspectors over time ....... 45 
Figure 5.8: Reference to SSHR presence during inspectorate mine visits over time.................................... 55 
Figure 6.1: Inspection of fatal risks ............................................................................................................................... 59 
Text box 6.1: Reasons for and extent of suspensions of operations by ISHRs ............................................... 68 
Text box 6.2: Reasons for and extent of suspensions of operations by SSHRs and MI inspectors .......... 69 
Text box 6.3: Reasons for formal notifications by ISHRs in which inadequate SHMS or related matters 
are mentioned ............................................................................................................................................. 71 
Final Report 
iv 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
BBS Behaviour-Based Safety 
 
CFMEU Construction Forestry and Mining and 
Energy Union 
 
ERT Emergency Rescue Team 
 
ERZC Explosion Risk Zone Controllers 
 
HPIs High potential incidents 
 
HSW Health and Safety at Work 
 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
 
ISHRs Industry safety and health 
representatives 
 
JHSC Joint health and safety committees 
 
JSA Job Safety Analysis 
 
LTIFR Lost time injury frequency rate 
 
MI Mines Inspectorate 
 
MS Management System 
 
NSW New South Wales 
 
OHS Occupational health and safety 
 
PHMPs Principal Hazard Management Plans 
 
PIN Provisional improvement notice 
 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
 
Qld Queensland 
 
SHMS Safety and Health Management System 
 
SOP Standard operating procedure 
 
SSE Senior site executive 
 
SSHRs Site safety and health representatives 
 
SSRC Safety Representatives and Safety 
Committee 
 
TARPS Trigger Action Response Plans 
 
UMM Underground Mine Manager 
 
WERS Workplace Employment Relations 
Surveys 
 
WIRS Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
 
A study of the role of workers’ representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland 
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are very grateful to all those who took part in 
the project and were so generous with their 
assistance, insight and, most particularly, their 
time. We also thank Vicky Parkin for her help in 
preparing this report, all those who transcribed 
our interviews, and Lilis Surienty Abd. Talib for 
her assistance with the documentary material. In 
addition our thanks go to Theo Nichols for his 
very perceptive and helpful comments on this 
report. 
 
A study of the role of workers’ representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland 
1 
 
1 Introduction  
 
This study is a preliminary investigation of the 
role and effectiveness of site and industry safety 
and health representatives in Queensland Coal 
Mines. It aims to review the evidence of the role 
and activities of these representatives with a 
detailed analysis of the records of their activities 
in a selection of coal mines in Queensland during 
a period of approximately 15 years and links this 
with detailed semi-structured interviews with a 
sample of site safety and health representatives, 
past and present industry safety and health and 
representatives, and a representative of the 
Queensland Mines Inspectorate. It is intended to 
inform policy discussions concerning the role and 
effectiveness of both site and industry safety and 
health representatives. 
 
The study has been undertaken on behalf of the 
Construction Forestry and Mining and Energy 
Union (CFMEU), which funded the work. It is, 
however, an independent investigation. Its 
findings, their discussion and the conclusions 
drawn, are those of the researchers and neither 
represent nor necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of the funding organisation.  
 
While significant improvements in arrangements 
for health and safety in coal mines have occurred 
over time, and the position in Queensland is 
relatively good in comparison with elsewhere, it is 
widely accepted that coal mining remains a 
dangerous industry and strong emphasis must 
continue to be placed on securing the most 
effective means to protect miners’ health, safety 
and well-being at work. The aim of the present 
study is to contribute further knowledge 
concerning this effectiveness.  
 
1.1 Background and context 
Site and industry safety and health 
representatives are workers’ health and safety 
representatives who operate under statutory 
provisions governing their functions and powers 
in coal mines in Queensland. Similar (but not 
identical) regulatory measures are found in some 
other Australian states, such as New South Wales 
(NSW). These statutory measures have been in 
place with relatively minor modifications for some 
considerable time ─ in Queensland they date 
from 1915. 
 
Site and industry safety and health 
representatives were originally known as check 
inspectors. They were first appointed by trade 
unions in the Hunter Valley, NSW coalfields in the 
early 1870s, before being adopted on the 
southern and western NSW coalfields. From the 
very outset check inspectors – who were 
experienced miners elected in a ballot – 
conducted detailed inspections of mines, 
prepared reports, identified serious hazards 
(relating to issues like ventilation and ground 
conditions) and became highly respected 
members of mining communities. The check 
inspector system spread to other states (and 
encompassed both coal and metalliferous 
mining) in the first decades of the 20
th
 century, 
including Queensland by 1915. Formal statutory 
recognition of the check inspector role in mine 
safety legislation was granted and then 
progressively strengthened, often in response to 
serious mine disasters like the 1912 Mount Lyell 
mine disaster in Tasmania and the 1921 Mount 
Mulligan coal mine disaster in Queensland. These 
disasters highlighted the need for miners to be 
able to take a more proactive role in ensuring 
their own safety. The provisions also drew 
inspiration from similar measures found in the UK 
and France.  
 
Despite their longevity, there has been little 
independent evaluation of the role or 
effectiveness of these measures and there are 
differing views concerning their effects. On the 
one hand, trades unions and regulators have 
been at pains to emphasise the value they attach 
to the role of trade union representatives 
appointed under statute in securing and 
sustaining improved arrangements for health and 
safety in coal mines. Indeed, the Royal 
Commission inquiry into the Pike River tragedy in 
New Zealand echoed these views in its 
recommendations to adopt similar provisions to 
help prevent disasters such as Pike River. 
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Research more widely has pointed to the role of 
statutory support for such forms of 
representation in improving health and safety 
outcomes, as we detail below. On the other 
hand, spokespersons for the mining industry in 
Queensland have argued that the powers 
granted to workers’ representatives under the 
regulatory provisions that apply in the state are 
excessive and unwarranted and that they may 
threaten productivity if acted upon over-
zealously by trade union representatives.  
 
This difference of opinion concerning the use and 
effectiveness of the statutory measures means 
there is a good case to be made for undertaking 
empirical research to explore how the statutory 
provisions for site and industry representatives 
operate in practice and to gather evidence 
concerning their effects. In addition, there are 
further issues to be explored in the nature of the 
statutory provisions themselves and their 
relationship to measures found in wider 
regulation of arrangements for the 
representation of workers’ interests in 
occupational health and safety (OHS) in Australia 
more generally. The exploration of these issues is 
particularly relevant currently in relation to 
discourse surrounding the harmonisation of mine 
health and safety measures at state level with 
those found in the harmonised general Work 
Health and Safety Acts.  
 
The regulation of health and safety in the mining 
industry has developed separately from 
protective health and safety regulation in other 
industries in Queensland. This is not unusual. 
Indeed, it is the common experience in relation to 
mining in many countries. This is, to a large 
extent, a reflection of the very particular and 
serious risks of mining and the organisational, 
engineering and technological aspects of 
managing those risks to ensure the health and 
safety of miners. Measures concerning worker 
representation on health and safety in mining 
generally have also tended to follow this separate 
trajectory in their development, often predating 
those in industry more generally and arguably 
extending representational rights further in 
mining than is the case elsewhere (though strong 
representative regimes are also found in other 
high hazard industries such as offshore oil 
production). It is obviously important to 
understand the effect of these differences and at 
the same time to consider whether they continue 
to offer significant advantage in mining over 
provisions that apply more generally, or whether 
recent developments in the latter actually reverse 
this position and suggest ways in which 
provisions on worker representation on health 
and safety in mining could be improved.  
 
1.2 The structure of the report 
In the first chapter of the report following this 
Introduction we outline current indicators of the 
nature and extent of risk in coal mines and 
comment briefly on both the regulatory 
approach and the record of effective risk 
management in Queensland coal mines.  
 
Requirements concerning the protection of 
workers and the management of the risks to their 
health and safety follow a broadly similar pattern 
in most industries and in most advanced 
economies nowadays. That is, modern regulatory 
arrangements adopt a process-based approach 
towards the management of occupational safety 
and health risks in which participative 
arrangements for representative worker 
involvement are a common feature. Research 
evidence indicates there is good reason for this 
since, broadly speaking, such arrangements have 
a positive effect on health and safety outcomes. 
This has been demonstrated in a range of studies 
internationally and we will explore the evidence 
this research provides for the effectiveness of 
these approaches in Chapter 3.It should be noted 
in passing that mining and other high hazard 
industries also continue to include substantial 
prescriptive regulation dealing with well-known 
hazards like explosions. However, here too safety 
representatives are engaged in monitoring 
compliance. 
 
Our investigation is specifically focused on the 
experience of representative participation in 
Queensland coal mines and, therefore, following 
our overview of representative participation and 
its effectiveness, we concentrate on research that 
has examined the effectiveness of such 
arrangements in coal mines generally, before 
narrowing our review to focus on the evidence of 
the effectiveness of the arrangements that apply 
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to coal mines in Queensland specifically. We 
could find no directly relevant and robust 
research that has properly evaluated this situation 
and therefore in this section we first examine the 
regulatory requirements on representative worker 
participation in arrangements for OHS 
management in Queensland coal mines and note 
points of similarity and difference with those 
applying elsewhere. We then consider literature 
that has offered commentary on the effectiveness 
of the regulatory requirements along with the 
findings of research on mining more generally in 
order to help to identify the key issues which we 
aim to explore in our own study of these matters.  
 
This leads us to the presentation of our own 
preliminary empirical study of the present 
experience of worker representation on OHS in 
Queensland coal mines, the subject of the 
remainder of the report. In Chapter 4 we outline 
the methods adopted in the study. Essentially, we 
have used a mixed-method approach in which, 
as well an extensive review of the literature, we 
have: 
a) Analysed documentary evidence of the 
activities of worker representatives in a 
selection of Queensland coal mines 
during the last 15 years and, 
b) Undertaken: (i) a number of in-depth 
interviews with a sample of site safety 
and health representatives (SSHRs), all 
three current industry safety and health 
representatives (ISHRs), two former 
ISHRs and a senior mines inspector; and 
(ii) some non-participant observation of 
SSHR training.  
 
In the case of SSHRs our analysis has focused on 
their role in injury and ill-health prevention, 
including their main activities, perceived 
outcomes, and their relations with workers, 
managers, inspectors and others. We pay 
particular attention to their perceptions of the 
support received from ISHRs, as well as 
considering other sources of support and the 
extent to which they receive time off to undertake 
functions, receive training etc. For the ISHRs, the 
evidence from the documentary analysis and in-
depth interviews enables us to address their role 
in injury and ill-health prevention, including the 
activities they undertake and the outcomes they 
perceive them to have. Through our analysis of 
the OHS documentation from the selected mines 
we are able to scrutinise the perceptions of the 
representatives against the background of 
documented actions. ISHRs relations with 
managers, and their other activities, including the 
support they provide for SSHRs and their work 
with the industry more generally, including their 
input to government policy and liaison with the 
inspectorate, are also investigated.  
 
We are concerned with understanding how the 
regulatory provisions shape the activities of both 
types of representative, how statutory powers are 
used, and how useful they are found to be. We 
consider the supports and constraints to the roles 
of SSHRs and ISHRs, as well as the challenges 
they encounter and what they perceive would be 
necessary to help make things work better.  
 
The findings derived from our mixed-methods 
approach allow us to present an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the arrangements for worker 
representation on OHS in Queensland coal mines 
and to throw some light on ‘what works and why 
it works’. We discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of the arrangements for 
representative participation and the roles of both 
the ISHRs and SSHRs. We situate this within a 
wider discussion of the evidence for the role and 
effectiveness of worker representation in 
arrangements for OHS management and the 
preconditions for its success. This discussion 
includes an account of problems identified in the 
present research relating to the high turnover of 
managers, issues with time off and facilities, the 
role of regulation, including the appropriateness 
of the regulatory provisions, and further allows 
some comparison with measures in the 
harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts. In 
situating these issues in relation to the wider 
literature we are able to comment on how the 
system in place in Queensland coal mines 
compares with a more global view of worker 
representation in OHS as well as the extent to 
which it supports existing documented views 
concerning its efficacy. 
 
Our conclusions concern the role and 
effectiveness of the worker representatives whose 
activities have been the main focus of the study, 
the efficacy of the statutory arrangements that 
provide the regulatory basis for these activities, 
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the support for their activities and the barriers to 
them in practice, as well as the implications these 
have for the possible reform of the regulatory 
arrangements that are currently in place.  
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2 Health and safety outcomes and the practices that lead 
to them in the coal mines of Queensland  
 
Measures of health and safety outcomes in coal 
mining in Australia during the period broadly 
embraced by our investigation suggest that while 
there was improvement in lost time injury and in 
fatalities, especially during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, this improving trend has slowed in 
recent years both in Australia generally and in 
Queensland specifically, while man hours worked 
have increased, in particular in the last two to 
three years (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). As Gunningham 
and Sinclair observe concerning mining in the 
state: 
 
Over the five years to 2008/09, a broad 
range of indicators (these include a 
combination of severity, duration and 
disabling rates for both lost time and 
disabling injuries, covering both coal 
mining and mining in general) have 
either held relatively steady or shown 
only gradual improvement. … Over the 
same period for coal and for mining in 
general, Queensland fatalities have 
shown no clear trends but there has 
been an upward trend in the 
permanent incapacity frequency rate. 
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 2012:15-16) 
This chapter of the report is in two parts. The first 
part presents an outline of the general picture of 
health and safety outcomes in coal mines, 
drawing on published literature reviewing coal 
mine health and safety outcomes in a variety of 
countries in recent years. We compare this 
picture with the available evidence of trends in 
OHS outcomes in coal mining in Queensland 
during the same period. This allows both an 
understanding of the extent to which the 
approach to managing the risks to safety and 
health in coal mining in Queensland has been 
successful and also provides an indication of the 
continuing challenges to improvement 
experienced in the industry. In the second part of 
the chapter the approach to regulating the 
management of OHS risks in coal mines is 
explored. In particular we examine the broad 
character of the approach and the type of 
management systems for health and safety that 
have been mainly adopted in the industry. 
Referring to studies of the strengths and 
weaknesses of such systems in Queensland and 
more generally, we pose some questions 
concerning the compatibility of these approaches 
with the arrangements for worker representation 
on health and safety that are required by law in 
the Queensland mines.  
 
Figure 2.1: Lost time injury frequency rates per million hours worked for Queensland coal 
mines 1996/1997 to 2011/2012* 
 
*Data source: Queensland Mines and Quarries Safety Performance and Health Reports (2000 - 2001 through to 
2011 - 2012) 
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Figure 2.2: Hours worked in Queensland coal mines 2007/2008 to 2011/2012* 
 
*Data source: Queensland Mines and Quarries Safety Performance and Health Reports (2007 - 2008 through to 
2011 - 2012) 
 
2.1 Some features of health and 
safety outcomes in coal mines  
Mining is correctly regarded as a high hazard 
industry. Its reputation is built on a litany of 
catastrophic events stretching back hundreds of 
years. In Australia notable disasters include those 
at the New Australia Gold Mine, 1882; Bulli 
colliery, 1887; Mount Kembla, 1902; Mount Lyell, 
1912; Mount Mulligan, 1921; Bellbird colliery, 1923; 
Collinsville, 1954; Box Flat, 1972; Kianga, 1975; 
Appin colliery, 1979; Moura No.4, 1986 and 
Moura No.2, 1994. Even disregarding its 
propensity for disaster (unmatched by any other 
industry with the exception of maritime 
transport), mining has also been marked by a 
high incidence of fatal injury. For example, 
notwithstanding improvements over time, US and 
Australian data show that mining remains 
amongst four occupations with an incidence of 
fatal injury conspicuously higher than all other 
industries – the other three industries being road 
transport, construction and 
forestry/fishing/farming (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2013; Safe Work Australia, 2013).  
 
Mine workers can encounter an array of hazards 
capable of causing fatal injuries including 
fire/explosions; inundation/inrush of water or 
materials (and drowning from other causes); falls 
of ground; outbursts of poisonous gas; contact 
with dangerous machinery or equipment 
(including transport incidents and pressure vessel 
explosions); electrocution; falls from height; and 
entrapment underground or in confined spaces. 
Coal mining is, in general, more hazardous than 
metalliferous mining because the material being 
mined is inflammable (and may spontaneously 
combust) and more unstable; the gases 
associated with mining coal (most notably 
methane but also including others like hydrogen) 
can explode; and mine fires can be propagated 
by accumulations of highly inflammable coal dust. 
Fire and explosion have long been and remain 
the most common sources of mass fatality 
incidents in coal mines. Accumulations of noxious 
gases (including carbon monoxide arising from 
spontaneous combustion often referred to as a 
heating) or noxious gases collecting in faults and 
expelled by pressure (outbursts) can also cause 
death. Underground coal mining is more 
dangerous than open cut mining due to the 
problems of confinement. However, open cut 
mining still encounters most of the hazards just 
mentioned as well as other hazards such as the 
failure of dams and, if anything, greater potential 
for transport incidents involving collisions 
between vehicles and between vehicles and 
pedestrians, as well as vehicles slipping off 
roadways or tipping points (and sometimes 
falling hundreds of metres in large open cut pits).  
 
As noted earlier, the shift to process standards 
has not meant the abandonment of specification 
standards. Rather, prescription has been retained 
with regard to well-known major hazards 
(responsible for numerous mine worker deaths 
over the years) and known effective measures in 
relation to monitoring and controlling these 
0
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hazards (e.g. setting maximum methane levels, 
requiring fire suppressing machinery, 
requirements to notify specified events etc.). 
What the Queensland (and NSW) regimes also 
do, however, is integrate these requirements 
within the broader framework of a 
process/systems approach (e.g. they are 
incorporated into major hazard plans developed 
by a mine and then monitored and enforced by 
the inspectorate). These regulatory regimes were 
introduced into both Queensland and NSW in 
late 1990s (and further strengthened 
subsequently) in response to catastrophic 
disasters (the Moura No. 2 mine explosion in 
1994 in Queensland and an inrush of water at the 
Gretley colliery in NSW in 1996). In both states the 
implementation of the new regime (especially 
inspectorate oversight) was strengthened 
following critical reports in the mid-2000s. While 
other Australian states (like Tasmania and 
Western Australia) also overhauled their laws, 
these changes were more modest (including 
worker participation provisions) than Queensland 
and NSW. Drawing on an international 
comparison of mine regulatory regimes the Pike 
River Royal Commission found that Queensland 
and NSW represented world’s best practice in 
mine safety regulation and they were 
subsequently used as the template for the 
complete overhaul of New Zealand’s mine safety 
legislation (including requirements for major 
hazard plans and both ISHRs and SSHRs).  
 
The hazards just mentioned, along with a number 
of others, are also responsible for serious (acute 
and chronic) non-fatal injuries in mines, including 
amputations and crushing resulting from contact 
with moving machinery; slips, trips and falls; and 
sprains and strains (Biswas and Zipf, 2000; Karra, 
2005; Burgess-Limerick, 2011). Heat exhaustion 
and sun stroke (in open cut mines) as well as 
fatigue are additional safety issues. 
 
Mining also entails serious risks to health. Dust 
diseases, including silicosis amongst metalliferous 
miners and pneumoconiosis or black lung 
amongst coal miners, were responsible for the 
deaths of thousands of mine workers in Australia 
alone in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century. While 
these dust hazards have been mitigated in 
Australia and other rich countries (though note 
that post-mortems found that a number of the 
victims of the Upper Big Branch mine disaster in 
the USA in 2010 showed evidence of dust-related 
lung damage), miners are exposed to other 
harmful substances, most notably diesel fumes, 
which are now listed as a human carcinogen (see, 
for example, Stewart et al, 2012). Reflecting 
imbalances in health and safety more generally, 
the health effects of mine work are less well 
recorded than injuries (Quinlan et al, 2010). The 
increased use of contract workers together with 
workforce turnover in the mining industry (and at 
particular mines) make it difficult to track the 
long-term health effects of exposure to harmful 
substances, long hours and other health hazards. 
Mines are required to monitor conditions and 
mine inspectors and health and safety 
representatives also routinely monitor conditions 
in mines pertaining to health and other risks 
(such as recording ventilation and dust levels). 
 
While increased attention is being given to health 
issues and a more elaborate set of OHS outcome 
indicators is being used for at least some mining 
operations in Australia, for many years the key 
safety performance indicators used in the 
industry were lost time (including fatalities) and 
medically treated injuries. While injury frequency 
rates have value in preventing routine injuries 
they are, as incidents such as the Moura mine 
explosion in 1994 and the Beaconsfield mine 
incident in 2006 demonstrated, of little value in 
preventing low frequency high impact events 
such as fatalities and disasters (Hopkins, 2000). 
Indeed, there has been some recognition of this 
within the industry itself, most apparent in the 
fact that the decline in lost-time injuries in mining 
was not accompanied by a proportionate decline 
in fatalities (Towsey, 2003). Nonetheless, the 
influence of behaviour-based safety within the 
mining industry and its focus on unsafe acts or 
behaviours has not helped because these 
approaches offer at best a limited insight into low 
frequency high impact events. Workers’ 
compensation claims data are also better suited 
to tracking ‘routine’ injuries of the more serious 
type.  
 
There is evidence that the need to look to 
outcome measures other than lost time and 
medical treatment has been better understood 
by mine safety inspectorates. In particular, mine 
inspectorates recognise that near miss/near hit 
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incidents with the potential to be a lot more 
serious (what in Queensland are termed high 
potential incidents or HPIs) should form an 
important element of OHS outcome 
performance, especially when it comes to 
preventing fatal/catastrophic events. This is 
because past investigations have revealed that 
such incidents can and have been the precursor 
to a fatal event. In other words, HPIs are good 
predictors or warning signs of the potential for 
fatal incidents. This is not a new connection. Mine 
health and safety legislation in Queensland and 
elsewhere typically sets out a range of incidents 
(excessive methane levels, falls of ground, 
ignitions, machinery faults and the like) which 
must be reported to the inspectorate (and also to 
the site and industry safety representatives in the 
case of Queensland). Australian mines also 
typically record near misses, including HPIs. The 
critical issue is what use is made of this 
information. In this regard, the mines 
inspectorate in Queensland (and elsewhere like 
NSW) has become more proactive in reviewing 
reports, visiting mines following an incident to 
ensure an adequate investigation is carried out 
and suitable remedial measures are 
implemented, and following up on interventions 
more generally. Failure to report a HPI or to do 
so in a timely fashion is regarded as a serious 
breach of mine health and safety legislation 
which may lead to serious penalties being 
imposed (including suspending the mining 
operation for a period of time) or at least 
threatened. The inspectorate will also track HPI 
trends over time to gauge a mine’s performance 
and inform management of incidents at other 
mines which raise issues requiring attention. In 
some cases a single incident will be of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant significant follow up, 
whereas in other cases it may be a worrying 
trend or the failure of investigation or remedial 
measures to address root causes (for example, 
repeatedly attributing HPIs to a failure in 
training). Inspectorates also collate data on HPIs 
across the industry to identify trends with regard 
to various HPIs, for example falls of ground.  
 
As will be noted later in this report, the higher 
profile of these incidents, and legislative 
requirements to report them, has also meant that 
site and industry safety representatives are 
notified and respond to HPIs, including becoming 
involved in the investigation, monitoring 
responses and where it is felt justified, even 
suspending operations.  
 
2.2 Health and safety regulation 
and management  
The substantial improvements that occurred in 
Australia (especially Queensland and NSW), 
especially in safety outcomes, in the period from 
the 1990s onwards coincided with a shift in the 
approach embraced by both external and 
internal regulation of health and safety in the coal 
mining industry. The results of the approach and 
the reasons for them have been favourably 
compared internationally (see, for example, Yang 
(2012) for comparison with the US). Characteristic 
of this change was a greater focus on the process 
of managing health and safety as opposed to the 
introduction and maintenance of specification 
standards. In such process-based approaches the 
central elements of concern are the management 
systems and corporate architecture used to 
achieve improved health and safety outcomes. 
They are customarily accompanied by more 
prominence of aspirations towards improvement 
in OHS outcomes in corporate policy statements 
and in the pronouncements of corporate 
leadership (such as ‘zero harm’ objectives in 
corporate mission statements, and notions of 
greater centrality for health and safety in 
organisational arrangements). Management 
strategies attendant to such corporate efforts 
emphasise greater accountability for health and 
safety performance at all levels of management 
and supervision and a greater focus on changing 
the attitudes and behaviours of workers to 
achieve safer work practices, leading to 
measurable improvement in safety outcomes. 
Such approaches also pay considerable attention 
to monitoring and evaluation, continuous 
improvement and worker engagement. It is with 
the latter that we are primarily concerned in this 
report — but, as the review of the research 
literature on this subject in Chapter 3 makes 
clear, not only are forms of such engagement 
varied, but one precondition for their 
effectiveness is the degree of support they 
receive from organisational management. An 
important issue, therefore, is the extent to which 
the ‘new’ approach to health and safety 
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management strategy evident in Queensland 
coal mines during the past 15 years relates to and 
integrates representative forms of worker 
participation in its approach.  
 
In parallel with these developments have been 
those taking place external to the organisation in 
both public regulation and in the bodies 
responsible for developing voluntary standards. 
While it is sometimes difficult to determine the 
order of their influence, it is obvious that external 
and internal developments in both voluntary and 
compulsory approaches to process-based 
regulation of health and safety arrangements are 
related and have an effect on one another. For 
example, an emphasis on OHS management 
systems in the strategies of coal mining 
corporations in Queensland is clearly reinforced 
by the same emphasis in current approaches to 
regulation. Moreover, the scrutiny of company 
OHS management systems by regulatory 
inspectors and their use as indicators of 
compliance with regulatory standards clearly 
serves to reinforce their adoption by the 
companies concerned — even if they claim to 
have adopted them independently of public 
regulation. The shift to process-based regulation 
in legislative measures in Queensland was 
heralded by the Coal Mining Safety and Health 
Act 1999 in which there are several key 
requirements concerning systematic risk 
management, including the introduction of safety 
and health management systems and hazard 
management plans. Emphasis in the Act is on the 
control and management of risk and there is an 
absolute obligation to achieve an ‘acceptable 
level of risk’. This emphasis and the absence of 
overarching ‘general duties’ sections in the Act, 
however, has caused some scholars to suggest 
that the absence of general duties sections is a 
significant weakness that should be remedied 
(Gunningham, 2007).  
 
Safety and health management systems are 
required by the Coal Mining Safety and Health 
Act 1999 (see sections 41, 42 and 62) and in the 
regulations made under the Act (Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Regulations 2001). Importantly 
for our purposes, they require that procedures 
and practices be established in consultation with 
mine workers. The mine operator is obliged to 
appoint a senior site executive (SSE) who has 
responsibility to develop and implement a safety 
and health management system. The safety and 
health management system must incorporate risk 
management practices to ensure the safety and 
health of persons who may be affected by the 
mining operation. The management system must 
be auditable, documented and include an 
organisational structure, planning activities, 
responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes 
and resources for developing, implementing, 
renewing and maintaining a safety and health 
policy. In particular it must define this policy for 
the mine and set out a plan for its 
implementation, state how the mine operator 
intends to develop capacity to implement the 
policy, include principal hazard management 
plans and standard operating procedures, 
contain a way to measure, monitor and evaluate 
the system as well as to implement corrective 
measures and contain a plan for the continual 
improvement of the system as well as for 
immediate review in the case of significant 
change in operations. The regulator must be 
supplied with a copy and contractors have duties 
to ensure that both the provisions of the Act and 
the safety and health management system are 
complied with in relation to their work.  
 
Characteristic of both the Queensland mining 
provisions, and the regulation of systematic 
approaches to OHS management more widely, is 
the link they make between risk management 
and worker participation in which not only is 
there a general requirement concerning worker 
participation but also specific requirements 
concerning representative participation detailing, 
for example, the functions and powers of worker 
representatives, trade unions, joint safety 
committees and so on. We will consider these in 
greater detail in Chapter 3. It will suffice to note 
here that the 1999 Act and its regulations provide 
for significant engagement of workers’ 
representatives. 
 
However, a further important point of note in 
relation to OHS management systems is that the 
style of such systems does not always wholly 
embrace such representative forms of 
participation, but instead may focus more in 
practice on achieving more direct forms of 
participation. This is what seems to occur at least 
in part Queensland coal mines where, as 
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Gunningham and Sinclair (2012:26) have pointed 
out, the mining companies they studied all 
actively pursued worker engagement through a 
variety of means including: ‘… regular meetings 
and consultations between workers and senior 
mine management (both formal and informal 
and including WHS
1
 committees); worker 
involvement in risk assessments and accident 
investigations; feedback through incident 
reporting and WHS suggestion programmes; and 
participation in internal audits’. They did so in an 
environment in which the development of the 
corporate architecture and systems of OHS 
management was characterised by a particular 
approach to worker engagement through the 
application of Behaviour-Based Safety (BBS). BBS 
systems strongly emphasise methods of direct 
participation in which managerial prerogatives 
and control are maintained in relation to OHS 
requirements and where the capacity for 
autonomous participatory action by workers and 
their representatives may be constrained. Such 
systems are not necessarily oppositional to forms 
of representative participation and the two can 
co-exist effectively within the same organisation; 
however, an excessive focus on the former may 
serve to marginalise representative participation 
(Walters and Frick, 2000; Walters and Nichols, 
2007). Moreover, as we discuss on some detail in 
Chapter 3, while there is good evidence of the 
effectiveness of representative participation in 
arrangements for health and safety management, 
it is far less clear how successful are systems that 
emphasise other forms of worker participation. 
 
BBS systems for managing health and safety are 
commonly adopted by large organisations. Such 
systems are controversial. At the extreme ends of 
the spectrum of views on their usefulness are 
those who regard them as a panacea to solve all 
the problems of preventing injury and ill-health at 
work, while an opposite, but equally well-
established view, sees them more as insidious 
ways in which some companies try to exert 
unilateral control over their workforce and avoid 
making arrangements to facilitate consultation 
with workers’ representatives. There is a 
substantial literature in which these perspectives 
are aired (see for example, Dalrymple et al, 1998; 
                                                        
1
 WHS — Workplace Health and Safety.  
Frick et al, 2000; Frick and Kempa, 2011; Hopkins, 
2000, 2005a and 2005b; Kogi, 2002; Dejoy, 2005, 
to name but a few). It points to several main 
concerns. For example, there are concerns with 
recording and reporting systems emphasising 
more visible safety incidents and thus reinforcing 
an organisation’s focus on safety issues at the 
expense of less visible work-related health. 
Moreover, most reporting systems are to some 
extent flawed, with under-reporting or miss-
reporting a common experience (Zoller, 2003; 
Rosenmann et al, 2006). Where improved 
performance in these matters is a monitored 
objective, an unintended consequence may be 
that emphasis shifts to the requirement to 
produce documented evidence of the activity, 
rather than remaining focused on the reason for 
the activity itself, thus leading to both over-
bureaucratisation and further distortion of the 
outcomes (Knudsen, 2009).  
 
An important element in the successful adoption 
of effective reporting systems as well as other 
elements of BBS management is the amount of 
trust that exists between workers and their 
management concerning their purpose and the 
use made of the information reported (Conchie 
et al, 2006). Where trust is low, as Gunningham 
and Sinclair (2012) have argued to be the case in 
coal mines, research evidence indicates that 
outcomes are likely to be poor. This is even more 
the case in relation to monitoring safe 
behaviours. Such monitoring and its 
encouragement are fundamental to BBS 
programmes and researchers have noted it to be 
much in evidence in the management of safety in 
coal mines. But where monitoring unsafe 
behaviour, and requiring workers to monitor and 
report the unsafe behaviour of other workers, 
takes place in situations in which trust between 
workers and managers is already low, there is a 
likelihood that it will fail to achieve the beneficial 
effects intended. Indeed, as Hopkins (2005a) 
concludes in relation to behavioural safety 
programmes generally: ‘Where such distrust 
exists it is pointless for employers to seek to 
introduce such programmes. The evidence is that 
they will fail.’ 
  
The limitations of BBS management are also 
displayed in its approach to the investigation of 
accidents and incidents. Research literature 
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indicates that the focus of accident and incident 
investigation in such programmes tends to be at 
the point at which the accident occurred. That is, 
it establishes the unsafe behaviour that was its 
proximal cause. Yet virtually all of the serious 
literature on injury and ill-health prevention 
argues for two basic principles that should apply 
in any investigation of a harmful incident if its 
causes are to be properly understood. The first is 
that there is seldom a single cause of an incident 
leading to injury or death. Such incidents are the 
result of multiple-causality and to understand 
them properly requires investigation of deeper 
causes including issues of work organisation and 
payment systems
2
 (see, for example, Bohle and 
Quinlan, 2000; Hopkins, 2000 and 2005b; Nichols, 
1997; Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997). Second, there 
is a widely accepted hierarchy of control for 
addressing prevention in which the most effective 
control is to entirely eliminate the hazard in 
question. Further down the hierarchy, in order of 
decreasing effectiveness, come engineering 
controls, still further down are managerial and 
administrative control and the hierarchy ends 
with behavioural ‘safe person’ requirements, to 
use personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
follow safety procedures, that are placed on 
individuals. These are acknowledged to be the 
least effective form of control, yet they are the 
ones often perceived to be most emphasised by 
BBS management systems. 
 
In summary, Frick and Kempa (2011) write of BBS 
systems: 
 
Safety is given much more attention 
than health, despite the fact that 
diseases cause far more ill-health than 
accidents do. The prevention described 
more often revolves around control of 
‘safe’ procedures than the prescribed 
upstream prevention of eliminating 
risks at the design stage. And the 
worker participation described in these 
                                                        
2
 For example, the Royal Commission into the Pike 
River mine explosion found a bonus payment scheme 
(which reduced as time targets weren’t met) 
contributed to the incident by encouraging mine 
workers to subordinate safety to production, including 
over-riding methane trip meters on machinery. 
examples is more a top down 
communication on why and how to 
obey management safety procedures 
than a genuine dialogue between 
management and workers on ends and 
means in a MS [Management System] 
which aims to reduce occupational risk. 
(Frick and Kempa, 2011:10) 
 
This description resonates well with the systems 
described by Gunningham and Sinclair in their 
(2012) study, in which they argue persuasively 
that the absence of trust represents a major 
obstacle to further improvement of OHS systems 
and outcomes in Australian coal mines, including 
those in Queensland. As we detail in Chapter 5 it 
is also one with which the ISHRs and SSHRs 
interviewed in the present study were familiar.  
 
2.3 Conclusions  
This section demonstrates that while data on 
OHS outcomes in Queensland coal mines 
showed a distinct improving trend that can be 
correlated with moves towards the introduction 
of more systematic approaches to OHS 
management in mines, this trend has slowed in 
recent years. Researchers have suggested that 
part of the reason for the lack of continued 
progress may be found in the limitations of the 
health and safety management systems in place 
to achieve the desired continuous improvement. 
They have variously argued that these limitations 
result from the combined effects of several main 
elements including: the limited corporate level 
understanding of what is required to operate 
management-based regulation exemplified by 
systematic OHS management; the inertia of 
middle management and the unwillingness of line 
management to take responsibility for 
implementing OHS management systems, 
especially in situations in which mine 
management express distrust of corporate level 
management; and general managerial inflexibility 
alongside organisational restructuring in which 
decentralisation is prioritised.  
 
All these factors operate in an organisational 
climate in which there is limited trust between 
workers and management resulting from a long 
history of conflict in labour relations which, 
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according to Gunningham and Sinclair (2012) 
does little to promote the participative 
engagement in OHS management which is 
widely held to be an important element of the 
successful application of systematic OHS 
management. They also ‘emphasise the fact that 
although the industrial relations history of the 
mining industry is one salient factor, there is a 
variety of other mine-specific factors
3
 that have 
also played important roles in nurturing mistrust’ 
(2012:209). This latter element is of interest in the 
present research for, as we document in the 
following Chapter, research in many other sectors 
has found the will and capacity of the 
management of organisations to engage with 
and support arrangements for the representation 
of workers interests in OHS to be among the 
most important prerequisites for its effectiveness. 
If, as we have pointed out above, the kinds of 
management systems adopted in the 
                                                        
3
 Emphasis in the original. 
Queensland mines, in which behaviour-based 
safety strategies are emphasised, are themselves 
counterproductive in stimulating trust between 
workers and managers, this in turn may 
contribute barriers to effective representative 
participation. In this study we are, therefore, 
particularly interested in exploring how these 
seemingly contradictory strategies for achieving 
improved OHS support or limit the effectiveness 
of the forms of representative worker 
participation required by law in Queensland coal 
mines.  
 
To understand these issues in context we first 
turn to the wider evidence of the effectiveness of 
systems for representing the interests of workers 
in OHS and examine what the research literature 
has to say about the preconditions for the 
success of worker representation on OHS in 
general and in coal mining in particular. 
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3 Representative participation on health and safety — 
experience elsewhere and the situation in Queensland  
 
Before exploring the particular situation in 
Queensland coal mines, we think it is helpful to 
review what is known about worker 
representation on health and safety more widely, 
especially concerning the operation of such 
arrangements, analysis of their effectiveness and 
what previous research suggests supports or 
constrains it in practice. Such knowledge is 
helpful in explaining how things work in 
Queensland and more significantly why they work 
in the way they do, as well as also perhaps 
understanding how they might work better. 
Therefore, this chapter first presents a brief 
review of the key findings drawn from 
experiences in other industries and countries. It 
then considers findings on worker representation 
on health and safety in coal mines, before turning 
to the situation in Queensland. 
 
3.1 Representative participation in 
arrangements for health and 
safety management  
Worker representation on health and safety has 
been the subject of statutory arrangements in 
some countries for many years. Such 
requirements existed in most national jurisdictions 
by the end of the 1980s and were also given 
further international effect by being included in 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention 155. It is widely acknowledged that, 
along with employers’ obligations and the 
deployment of competent expertise on OHS, they 
were among the central tenets around which 
process-based requirements concerning 
systematic management of OHS were developed 
from the 1980s onwards. Statutory provisions in 
different countries are largely based around a 
similar model in which workers and/or their trade 
unions are given rights to select workplace 
representatives to represent workers’ health and 
safety interests and in some cases to establish 
further arrangements for representation through 
joint health and safety committees at 
establishment level. As well as governing the 
appointment of such representatives and/or joint 
committees, the provisions generally include 
measures establishing their rights to carry out 
inspections and investigations, to receive 
information and make representations, as well as 
to receive appropriate time off and training to 
enable them to undertake these activities. 
Employers have obligations to facilitate and 
support such arrangements. 
 
Statutory measures generally provide for a 
number of minimum legal rights for worker 
representation through: 
 Selection of representatives on health 
and safety by workers 
 Protection of representatives from 
victimisation or discrimination as a result 
of their representative role 
 Paid time off to be allowed to carry out 
the function of health and safety 
representative 
 Paid time off to be trained in order to 
function as a health and safety 
representative 
 The right to receive adequate 
information from the employer on 
current and future hazards to the health 
and safety of workers at the workplace 
 The right to inspect the workplace 
 The right to investigate complaints from 
workers on health and safety matters 
 The right to make representations to the 
employer on these matters 
 The right to be consulted over health 
and safety arrangements, including 
future plans 
 The right to be consulted about the use 
of specialists in health and safety by the 
employer 
 The right to accompany health and 
safety authority inspectors when they 
inspect the workplace and to make 
complaints to them when necessary. 
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In some countries there are other rights, such as 
the right to seek assistance, or be present at an 
interview between a worker and an employer or 
inspector, and additional measures such as the 
right to stop dangerous work or, as is the case in 
Australia, to serve provisional improvement 
notices on employers. In some countries there 
are minimum sizes of workplace below which 
rights to representation on health and safety do 
not apply, while conversely, in others there are 
measures explicitly supporting peripatetic 
activities of representatives in representing the 
interests of workers in such small and micro-sized 
workplaces.  
 
3.1.1 Worker representation on health 
and safety — the evidence of 
effectiveness 
The key question concerning these measures is 
how effective are they? Curiously, much of the 
research literature on the role and activities of 
health and safety representatives and joint health 
and safety committees does not address 
effectiveness directly. When it does, it tends 
mostly to focus more on relationships between 
representation and proxy indicators of health and 
safety outcomes, such as ‘good management 
practices’, than on objective measures of 
outcomes, such as work-related injuries, ill-health 
or mortality. There are some good reasons for 
this, which are to do with the availability, reliability 
and interpretation of data.  
 
Studies that consider the relationship between 
representative worker participation and better 
OHS management activities tend to consider 
such things as the presence of health and safety 
policies and their communication to workers, 
provision of improved health and safety 
information and training, the use of health and 
safety practitioners, the presence of written 
evidence of risk assessment, the existence of 
health and safety audits and inspections, accident 
investigations and so on. Generally, they indicate 
that participatory workplace arrangements are 
associated with improved OHS management 
practices, and many claim this might be expected 
to lead to improved OHS performance outcomes. 
In an early review of this research, which included 
investigations in the UK (Beaumont et al, 1982; 
Coyle and Leopold, 1981) and in other countries, 
(Bryce and Manga, 1985, for Canada; Roustang, 
1983; Cassou and Pissaro, 1988, for France; 
Assennato and Navarro, 1980, for Italy), Walters 
(1996a) found they showed an overall association 
between the presence of arrangements for 
worker representation and improved health and 
safety management practices. A series of early 
Australian studies also generally supported the 
positive relationship between the presence of 
representative participation and better health and 
safety management arrangements as well as 
raised awareness of health and safety matters 
(Biggins et al, 1991; Biggins and Phillips, 1991a and 
1991b; Gaines and Biggins, 1992; Biggins and 
Holland, 1995; Warren-Langford et al, 1993). In 
Canada, one study found that non-unionised 
workplaces had lower levels of compliance than 
unionised ones which had procedural 
requirements for joint health and safety 
committees and that, in addition, worker 
members of joint health and safety committees 
who had completed core certificated training 
were more likely than those who had not begun 
such training to report improvements in a wide 
range of OHS conditions (SPR, 1994:33, 56). 
Studies in the UK further indicated that (trained) 
representatives participated in and stimulated 
workplace OHS activity through engagement with 
management structures and procedures, tackling 
new OHS issues and ‘getting things done’ to help 
resolve health and safety problems (Walters et al, 
2001).  
 
In small workplaces, regional health and safety 
representatives have been found to stimulate 
‘activation’ of health and safety as well as 
engaging in more prescriptive aspects of their 
tasks such as inspecting workplaces, as is shown 
in reviews of the Swedish experience (Frick and 
Walters, 1998; Walters, 2002a). In the UK, the 
evaluation of the Worker Safety Advisor pilot 
scheme provided detailed evidence on how ‘the 
activity of Workers’ Safety Advisors made a 
difference to perceived standards of health and 
safety practice at small workplaces’ (Shaw and 
Turner, 2003). Such findings are further 
supported by reviews of experiences in other 
European countries, such as Norway, Italy and 
Spain, where the engagement of trade unions 
and peripatetic workers’ representatives have 
been found to be influential in raising awareness 
and contributing to the establishment of better 
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OHS arrangements in small firms (Walters, 2001 
and 2002a).  
 
There is also evidence that the presence of 
workplace trade union organisation influences 
the enforcement of OHS regulation (for example, 
Robinson, 1991; Weil, 1991 and 1992). 
 
The Europe-wide ESENER (2009) project broadly 
confirmed the positive association between the 
presence of arrangements for worker 
representation on OHS and management 
procedures to support prevention. Its findings 
concerning perceptions of effectiveness of 
arrangements for formal representation suggest 
that health and safety representatives and joint 
health and safety committees are influential in 
promoting good safety management practices 
(ESENER, 2009). Detailed secondary analysis of 
the survey results lent further support to 
conclusions concerning the benefits of the 
presence of arrangements for worker 
representation, not only in relation to general 
workplace risk management, but also in terms of 
managing psychosocial risks more effectively and 
supporting the involvement of individual workers 
in this process too (Walters et al, 2012).  
 
Research attempting to establish a more direct 
relationship between the role of worker 
representation and indicators of improved health 
and safety performance, such as injury or illness 
rates, includes studies of specific exposures, 
where incidences of ill-effects have been shown 
to be greater in non-unionised situations. For 
example, Fuller and Suruda (2000) show that 
deaths from hydrogen sulphide poisoning were 
more frequent in non-unionised workplaces than 
unionised ones in the United States. Further 
examples include a comparison of health and 
safety outcomes for unionised and non-unionised 
construction workers in the US (Dedobbleer et al, 
1990) and Grunberg’s (1983) early work on safety 
in manufacturing in Britain and France. Both 
studies indicated that better standards of health 
and safety were achieved in unionised workplaces 
than in non-unionised ones.  
 
Older studies of joint arrangements and their 
relationship to OHS performance present 
somewhat mixed findings concerning the 
beneficial effects of such arrangements. In the US, 
for example, Cooke and Gautschi (1981) 
researched manufacturing plants in Maine and 
found that joint management-union safety 
programmes in larger companies reduced days 
lost and that such plant-specific arrangements 
were more effective than external regulation. 
Another American study based on 
manufacturing, this time in New York State, 
concluded that major safety improvements were 
less a function of union participation in safety 
committees than a direct consequence of 
external regulations (Kochan et al, 1977:72). A 
comparative study on the North American 
logging industry found that, although joint safety 
committees were associated with improved 
fatality rates, they were only one of a number of 
factors associated with such improvements. Other 
factors included training, enforcement and 
changes in managerial practices (Havlovic, 1991). 
In Canada, Lewchuk et al (1996) found that where 
management and labour had some sympathy for 
the co-management of health and safety through 
joint committees, the shift to mandatory joint 
health and safety committees was associated with 
reduced lost-time injuries. Also in Canada, 
Havlovic and McShane (1997) concluded that 
‘there was some support for the idea that 
structured joint health and safety committees’ 
activities help to reduce accident rates’. A further 
Canadian study by Shannon et al (1996) found 
that ‘participation of the workforce in health and 
safety decisions’ was one of several factors 
related to lower claims’ rates. 
 
A later study of US OHS committees conducted 
in public sector workplaces in New Jersey, 
however, found that ‘there was little consistent 
evidence for any significant effect of the simple 
existence of a committee on reports of illness or 
injury cases’, but that ‘committees with more 
involvement of non-management members, both 
in sheer numbers and in agenda setting, are 
associated with fewer reported and perhaps 
fewer actual illnesses and injuries’ (Eaton and 
Nocerino, 2000:288-89).  
 
An overview of Canadian work on this subject 
further suggested that ‘empowerment of the 
workforce’ was one of a number of organisational 
factors consistently related to lower injury rates 
(Shannon et al, 1997). In an earlier study Shannon 
et al (1992) had indicated that such 
Final Report 
16 
 
‘empowerment’ included the presence of unions 
and shop stewards, union support for worker 
members of joint health and safety committees 
and general worker participation in decision-
making. A later extensive review of the literature, 
again conducted in Canada, pointed to ‘a 
correlation between unionisation and the 
effectiveness of the internal responsibility system’ 
and that joint health and safety committees were 
‘more likely to be found in unionised workplaces 
and [to be] more active in those workplaces’ 
(O’Grady, 2000:191). Most recently, Yassi et al 
(2013) in a wide ranging review concluded that 
joint health and safety committees (JHSC) are 
only effective where ‘empowerment mechanisms’ 
ensure workers have a real voice. At the same 
time they argue that JHSCs are not a substitute 
for effective regulation, and note that the ‘only 
strong conclusion that can be made is that JHSCs 
cannot take the place of regulation and 
government enforcement due to the nature of 
power relations in the workplace.’ 
 
Exceptionally in the UK it has been possible to 
undertake multivariate regression analyses of the 
relationship between various workplace 
employment relations’ structures, such as the 
presence of trades unions, safety representatives 
and safety committees, and the incidence of 
injury and ill-health, by using data collected in the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS), 
which later became known as the Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) 1990-
2004. What can be achieved with these methods 
is somewhat constrained by the range and quality 
of available data. Moreover, such multivariate 
analyses also face methodological problems. For 
example, the effects of trade unions on health 
and safety at work are difficult to disentangle 
because of the possibility that union presence 
may itself increase reporting, at least for certain 
types of injury, and because adverse conditions 
of work may bring trade unions into workplaces 
and result in the appointment of health and 
safety representatives in the first place (Nichols, 
1997). Either one of these processes could lead to 
the result that trade union presence correlates 
with higher injury rates, not vice versa, and they 
are probably responsible for several British 
studies using the WIRS/WER achieving mixed and 
inconsistent results. These include, for example, 
Reilly et al 1995 (where a strong union effect was 
found) Robinson and Smallman 2000 (where this 
effect extended to health issues) and Fenn and 
Ashby 2004 (who, in contrast, found no effect). 
Studies from some in other countries that used 
similar surveys have had similarly mixed results 
(such as, Currington, 1986, in the United States; 
and Wooden, 1989, and Wooden and Robertson, 
1997, in Australia).  
 
Such lack of consistency prompted Walters and 
Nichols (see Nichols et al, 2007; Walters and 
Nichols, 2007:30-40) to conduct a statistical re-
analysis of 1990 WIRS data as part of their larger 
study to investigate the effectiveness of health 
and safety representatives in the UK (Walters et 
al, 2005). This sought to improve technically on 
previous multiple regression analyses.
4
 Their 
results suggest with a fair degree of robustness 
that, as judged by serious injury rates in 
manufacturing, it is significantly better to have 
health and safety committees with at least some 
members selected by trade unions than to have 
such committees with no members selected by 
trade unions, which further suggests that there is 
a mediated trade union effect on safety; and that 
the presence of health and safety representatives 
also has a beneficial effect – and this after 
controls had been made for a number of 
variables including the percentages of manual 
and female employees, industry and region, 
union density and also size of establishment 
(which, as in many other studies, was found to 
have a negative relation to injury rate).  
 
Such findings are confirmed and further 
developed in a recent analysis of data from WERS 
2004 (Robinson and Smallman, 2013). Its authors 
conclude:  
 
The empirical modelling of workplace 
injuries also reveals that representative 
participation matters. Participation is 
associated with lower levels of injuries 
                                                        
4
 Briefly, as compared to Reilly et al 1995, they reduced 
the large number of regional and industry dummies to 
make a more robust model; reduced the number of 
independent variables, some of which rested on fine 
and unclear distinctions; used a Poisson count method 
instead of a Cox zero corrected method (which 
entailed adding a bit to the many zero observations); 
and tested for endogeneity and interaction effects. 
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and conversely, non-participation is 
associated with a higher incidence of 
injuries… this adds to the empirical 
literature on institutional arrangements 
by linking union effectiveness to the 
level and access to participation they 
enjoy vis-a-vis management. 
Specifically this perspective reveals that 
some participation is better than none, 
higher is better than lower and that the 
alignment of voice between 
management and unions is 
fundamental to success. 
(Robinson and Smallman, 2013:689) 
 
In sum, therefore, the weight of the evidence on 
the effectiveness of worker representation on 
health and safety is in line with the idea that 
better health and safety outcomes are likely when 
employers manage OHS with representative 
worker participation and that, in various ways, 
joint arrangements, trade unions and worker 
representation on health and safety at the 
workplace are likely to be positively associated 
with such outcomes.  
 
3.1.2 What supports effectiveness? 
A problem with such statistical analysis of 
outcomes such as injury and fatality data, 
however, is that it stands at some distance from 
the daily experience of representing workers’ 
interests at the workplace. It can tell us relatively 
little about the quality of experiences in this 
respect, or the kinds of conditions that support or 
constrain these observed positive effects on 
health and safety outcomes. To better 
understand this we need to turn again to more 
qualitative studies.  
 
These frequently point to the importance of 
training in making representatives more effective 
and indicate a strong correlation between the 
nature and level of activities in which trade union 
safety representatives are engaged and their 
experience of training (see, for example, 
Beaumont et al, 1982; Coyle and Leopold, 1981; 
Biggins and Phillips, 1991a and 1991b; Warren-
Langford et al, 1993; SPR, 1994; Raulier and 
Walters, 1995; Walters, 1997; Walters, 2001; 
Walters et al, 2001; Walters and Kirby, 2002). But 
there are other important supports for their 
activities too. In early studies Walters (1987) and 
Walters and Gourlay (1990) showed the 
importance of management commitment to 
participative arrangements for health and safety 
in supporting the actions of safety 
representatives, as well as the role of industrial 
relations’ factors such as the extent of trade 
union workplace organisation. They argued, 
along with a host of other researchers in this field 
then and subsequently, that their qualitative 
studies suggested that good industrial relations’ 
factors were helpful in facilitating co-operative 
approaches to improving health and safety. This 
acknowledges that the practice of participation 
on health and safety involves the interplay of 
power, trust and responsibility, the balance 
between which helps determine the nature and 
direction of OHS outcomes in the same ways as it 
does in relation to other aspects of 
representation and consultation on conditions of 
employment.  
 
In a large study in the UK, Walters and Nichols 
examined the detailed practices of worker 
representation and the factors that supported 
and constrained them (see also Walters et al, 
2005; Walters and Nichols, 2006; Nichols et al, 
2007; Nichols and Walters, 2009). As a result they 
were able to identify a set of preconditions 
necessary for effective worker representation and 
consultation on health and safety, which they also 
found supported by studies previously 
undertaken in other sectors and countries. These 
included: 
 A strong legislative steer 
 Effective external inspection and control 
 Demonstrable senior management 
commitment to both OHS and a 
participative approach and sufficient 
capacity to adopt and support 
participative OHS management  
 Competent management of hazard/risk 
evaluation and control  
 Effective autonomous worker 
representation at the workplace and 
external trade union support  
 Consultation and communication 
between worker representatives and 
their constituencies. 
 
Where combinations of these preconditions were 
found, their study showed that worker 
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representation and consultation made a 
significant contribution to improved health and 
safety arrangements, awareness and 
performance, thus confirming observations 
reported in earlier studies. For example, statutory 
rights are clearly important and in Walters’ and 
Nichols’ case studies both health and safety 
representatives and managers based their ideas 
on what they were entitled to do and how they 
were supported in their role, and on their 
knowledge of the requirements of the statutory 
provisions governing them. Representatives also 
made reference to these provisions when 
requesting additional facilities or information to 
enable them to conduct their representative 
functions. There were seldom cases where 
representatives had undertaken activities that 
went beyond these requirements. Similar findings 
are reported in studies in other countries (see, for 
example, Frick, 2009; Coutrot, 2009; Garcia et al, 
2007).  
 
Clearly, the question of regulatory compliance is 
also important in relation to statutory provisions 
for worker representation and consultation. Here 
for the most part the international evidence 
suggests that, while labour inspectors may be 
prepared to advise on the operation of these 
measures, they do not generally seek to enforce 
them (see, for example, Walters and Nichols, 
2007 and 2009). Sometimes inspectors do not 
even consult with workers’ representatives when 
they carry out inspections (Walters et al, 2011). 
This is, of course, another reason why the strong 
presence of trade unions in workplaces to which 
these measures are applied is important since it is 
possible, through this presence, to ensure that 
appropriate participative arrangements are 
followed, and further that workers’ 
representatives are consulted and involved when 
regulatory inspections take place (see also Weil, 
1991).  
 
However, while statutory rights and support for 
their application in workplaces are important 
preconditions for successful representative 
participation, on their own they are insufficient 
guarantees of effectiveness. Researchers have 
pointed to the importance of management will 
and capacity in making for the success of self-
regulatory strategies that characterise modern 
approaches to regulating risk management at 
work. Such employer ‘will and capacity’ are 
essential in driving the ‘prevention triangle’ of 
competent employer engagement, worker 
representation and consultation and regulatory 
inspection, widely argued to be the basis for 
effective management of workplace risks in all 
sectors, including coal mining (see, for example, 
Dawson et al, 1988). Many studies of worker 
representation in health and safety have 
emphasised the considerable importance of the 
full engagement of management in facilitating 
representation and consultation on health and 
safety if it is to operate effectively (discussed at 
some length by Walters and Frick (2000), for 
example, with reference to previous studies). 
Other studies of the activities of joint health and 
safety committees have pointed to the important 
role of senior management leadership of the 
committee, identifying, for example, the need for 
representation on the committee of sufficiently 
senior and appropriate levels of management to 
help to ensure that decisions made by the 
committee are subsequently acted upon (see, for 
example, Kochan et al, 1977; Coyle and Leopold, 
1981).  
 
In all the cases studied by Walters and Nichols 
(2007) the importance of managerial support was 
clearly in evidence. Where representational and 
consultative practices on health and safety issues 
worked to the satisfaction of the health and 
safety representatives and the workers involved, 
they were where there was also strong evidence 
of a conspicuous commitment to such 
approaches on the part of senior management. 
More recently the same strong association was 
reported in the Europe-wide ESENER survey 
(Walters et al, 2012). Arrangements to facilitate 
consultation in these cases included:  
 Properly constituted joint health and 
safety committees at site and 
departmental levels  
 Accountability of managers to the joint 
health and safety committee  
 Engagement of health and safety 
representatives with health and safety 
practitioners from the safety, health and 
environment departments 
 Dialogue between local area and line 
managers within the establishment and 
health and safety representatives  
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 The provision of time to undertake 
health and safety representative 
functions such as joint health and safety 
inspections, investigations of workers’ 
complaints, making representations to 
managers and so on, without loss of pay 
 Involvement of health and safety 
representatives in risk assessment 
 Involvement of health and safety 
representatives in reporting and 
monitoring on OHS 
 Health and safety representatives’ access 
to workers  
 Access to training for health and safety 
representatives. 
 
Walters and Nichols’ (2007) research 
demonstrated that in cases where management 
commitment to participatory approaches was 
poorly developed, these kinds of arrangements 
were either absent or set up in very limited ways. 
Moreover, workers’ perceptions were that OHS 
outcomes in these situations were poorer than in 
situations in which such arrangements were 
operational. Again, a similar finding emerged on 
a much wider scale in the analysis of the ESENER 
survey (Walters et al, 2012).  
 
Further process-based pre-conditions supportive 
of worker representation and consultation on 
OHS include the presence of effective means of 
autonomous worker representation at the 
workplace and the support for it from trades 
unions outside the workplace, as well as the 
practice of consultation and communication 
between worker representatives and their 
constituencies (Walters and Nichols, 2007). In this 
respect, Walters and Nichols (2007) note that, 
while there is seldom any dissent from the notion 
that worker participation improves health and 
safety outcomes, what distinguishes worker 
representation and consultation from employer 
and management led initiatives to achieve 
greater ‘worker engagement’ with health and 
safety issues is the independence of the former 
from an employer dominated approach and they 
point out that there are sound reasons and much 
evidence, both historical and current, to argue 
that such independence is valuable.  
 
Arrangements for autonomous representation 
bring with them opportunities to construct a 
conceptualisation of occupational risk and its 
consequences that is grounded in the 
experiences of workers and which may be 
different from that of employers and their 
advisers. As many of the studies cited here attest, 
workers’ representatives benefit from the support 
of trades unions outside workplaces to develop, 
sustain and apply this independent 
conceptualisation in their workplaces. They do so 
specifically through training delivered by trade 
unions and through its use of the pedagogical 
techniques common in labour education. Trade 
unions play the major role in the provision of 
training and other forms of support for the 
majority of health and safety representatives in 
most countries (Raulier and Walters, 1995) and 
the advantages of its pedagogical model have 
been demonstrated (Biggins and Holland, 1995; 
Culvenor et al, 2003; Walters, 1996b; Walters et 
al, 2001). Trade unions further support workplace 
representatives through the extensive and 
independent OHS information they provide. In 
these ways they contribute to building and 
sustaining an understanding of occupational 
health that is independent of that developed by 
their employer and which helps to strengthen the 
knowledge, skills and confidence of 
representatives to be able to represent the 
interests of their fellow workers in pluralist 
consultations with their management.  
 
In summary then, overall the research findings 
internationally support the view that statutory 
provisions, and the facilitation of their 
implementation by management, support 
effective representative participation, and in a 
host of both direct and indirect ways, trade union 
representation plays a key role in improving 
health and safety management practice and 
outcomes.  
 
3.2 The situation in coal mines 
Despite the acknowledged risks of coal mining, 
the relatively extensive unionisation of the 
industry and the longstanding presence of 
regulatory provisions on worker representation, 
there is relatively little robust research that 
directly addresses the operation and effectiveness 
of these participatory arrangements. In the 
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following section we first review the findings of 
such research as exists.  
 
3.2.1 Research evidence on the 
effectiveness of arrangements 
for worker representation in coal 
mines  
Research in the US is exceptional in as much as 
there is a series of research papers concerning 
the relationship between trades unions and safety 
outcomes over quite a long period. Early studies 
in this series present mixed findings on the effects 
of trades unions and joint arrangements on 
health and safety outcomes. Appleton and Baker 
(1984), using data from the 1970s, claimed unions 
had the effect of increasing accidents. However, 
this study was subject to considerable criticism 
concerning the limitations of its method (Bennett 
and Passmore, 1985; Weeks, 1985). Indeed, a 
study undertaken for the National Research 
Council (1982) showed the effect disappeared 
when analysis focused solely on injuries that were 
least susceptible to reporting bias, such as fatal 
and serious injuries. In a later paper focused on 
the same period Reardon also failed to establish 
that the United Mine Workers of America had an 
effect on reducing injuries in coal mines. 
However, his analysis did not compare union and 
non-union settings and remains unconvincing.  
 
In contrast, a recent historical study focused on 
the early part of the 20
th
 century demonstrated 
that the presence of trade unionism in mining, as 
measured both by membership and contract 
coverage, reduced fatal accidents by around 40 
per cent — an effect the author further 
demonstrated to be highly statistically significant. 
He argued that the ‘union effect’ probably 
operated at the mine level by unionised miners 
supporting one another in refusing to work in 
unsafe situations (Boal, 2009). This finding is to an 
extent supported by British qualitative historical 
research using the testaments of Scottish coal 
miners (McIvor and Johnston, 2002).  
 
More importantly, however, Morantz’s (2011) 
recent analysis of more contemporary data, 
which is both methodologically more rigorous 
than any of the previous studies and also takes 
account of a much wider set of circumstances, 
variables and possible influences, concludes that 
its results:  
 
… are broadly consistent with the 
hypothesis that unionisation improved 
real mine safety levels (as reflected in 
traumatic and fatal injury rates) around 
the turn of the twenty first century; that 
reporting bias confounds empirical 
identification of the union safety effect, 
especially when outcome measures 
examined include minor and non-
traumatic injuries; and that the union 
safety effect has become more 
pronounced since the early 1990s. 
(Morantz, 2011:13) 
 
In short, the research evidence on the effects of 
trade unions on injuries and fatalities in coal 
mining in the US is consistent with that for other 
sectors across a range of countries and 
demonstrates, as far as it has been possible to do 
so, that their presence is more likely than not to 
have a positive effect on health and safety 
outcomes. However, on the whole, the studies 
that demonstrate this association in relation to US 
coal mines are themselves limited to the 
investigation of possible associations between 
unionisation and injury rates and do not 
investigate the how or why such an association 
occurs.  
 
Findings from elsewhere are more limited. 
Generally research has not concerned 
quantitative analysis of large data sets, such as 
has been the case in the US. Indeed any form of 
research on the actions of workers’ 
representatives and arrangements for 
consultation on health and safety in coal mines is 
scarce and inconclusive. In contrast, in countries 
in which such arrangements have been in place 
in mining for some time there is a fair degree of 
expert opinion concerning their effectiveness. 
This provides some indications of perceived 
positive relationships between arrangements for 
representation on health and safety and 
improved health and safety practices. In this 
respect, both the Australian and British 
antecedents of the statutory arrangements for 
worker representation in Queensland coal mines 
are worth a short digression. 
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3.2.2 Historical observation and 
commentary on the 
effectiveness of provisions for 
worker representation in coal 
mines 
The UK provisions for workers’ inspectors had 
their origins in the Coal Mines Regulation Act of 
1872. A further development of these measures in 
section 16 of the 1911 Coal Mines Act entitled 
workers in coal mines to appoint two mine 
workers with at least five years’ work experience 
to inspect the mine in which they worked. The 
same provisions obliged employers to allow them 
the facilities to do so. They were entitled to 
inspect the mine at least once a month, have 
access to any part of it, to examine statutory 
safety documentation in this respect and to 
investigate the causes of accidents. They were 
further required to report the findings of the 
mine inspections (but not inspections of 
accidents) in a record book kept at the mine for 
this purpose. While there is little historical 
research on the effectiveness of these measures, 
observers have generally noted their positive 
effects. Indeed, their activities caused the 1938 
Royal Commission on Safety in Mines to 
comment: 
 
… it was the opinion of the Mines 
Department that safety can be 
promoted by the workmen and their 
representatives taking an active part in 
matters of safety through the medium 
of these inspections and suggested as 
an important matter for our 
consideration, the question of how such 
inspections can be made more general 
and still more effective.  
(Mines Commission, 1938:140) 
 
The Royal Commission was itself in little doubt of 
the value of such inspection and the need for its 
promotion:  
 
All the evidence we heard supported 
the view that periodic inspection of a 
mine by representatives of the 
workmen is a desirable safeguard 
which ought to be encouraged in every 
way … 
(Mines Commission, 1938:142)  
 
As Williams (1960) notes, in Annual Reports from 
1932 onwards the Chief Inspector of Mines 
frequently commented favourably on their role, 
claiming their inspections ‘served a useful 
purpose’ (1939:6). Williams quotes the Chief 
Inspector writing with approval of the inspections 
undertaken by workmen’s inspectors in 1947: 
 
All these inspections….made by 
workmen’s examiners are welcomed by 
and are of considerable value to the 
Inspectors of Mines and managers for 
not infrequently they bring to light 
defects which might otherwise have 
remained undetected and unremedied 
and which might well have seriously 
affected the safety of the mine. 
(Annual Report of HM Chief 
Inspector of Mines, 1947:5) 
 
Such expression of approval and support for the 
activities of workers’ health and safety inspectors 
appointed under section 16 of the Coal Mines Act 
1911 on health and safety in British coal mines 
continued to appear regularly in the Annual 
Reports of the Chief Inspector in subsequent 
years.  
 
In addition to the section 16 provisions there were 
voluntary arrangements known as District Safety 
Boards that were set up initially under collective 
agreements between the miners’ unions and the 
coal owners and continued after the 
nationalisation of the coal industry. They included 
qualified mines inspectors appointed by the 
miners’ unions who had the right to visit the 
mines in their district to undertake inspections.  
 
Like the presence of the workmen’s inspectors, 
the coverage of these arrangements was 
somewhat patchy across the industry as a whole. 
Williams gives estimates of workmen’s inspectors 
appointed under section 16 covering about 30 
per cent of coal mines and compares this with 
estimates of inspection as a result of the activities 
of the District Boards in about 50 per cent of 
mines. He argues that the main reason for this 
incomplete coverage was employer hostility 
(Williams, 1960:154), but acknowledges that a 
further reason was the cost of such arrangements 
for the trade unions involved. He illustrates this 
by quoting the words of a miner from South 
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Wales from a source published in the 1930s 
5
— 
which was one of the more active regions for 
workers inspections: 
 
… we send Workmen’s Examiners down 
occasionally, but our financial position 
is such that we cannot afford to keep 
this up. 
(Williams, 1960:162)  
 
The Mines and Quarries Act 1954 made some 
modifications to the provisions for representation 
on health and safety in which an attempt seems 
to have been made to bring together features of 
the two systems of statutory workmen’s 
inspectors and voluntary District Safety Boards. 
Under section 123 it provided that a panel of 
persons with at least 5 years’ experience be 
appointed by the miners’ union for each mine or 
quarry and it also obliged employers to allow two 
members of this panel to inspect mines at least 
once a month. All the members of the panel 
need not be employed at the mine covered, 
although when two were inspecting a mine one 
needed to be employed there. They were also 
allowed to be accompanied by ‘advisers’ and to 
inspect documents, take samples of air, dust or 
water from the mine, be informed of plans for 
future work and, in a further development of the 
previous provisions, were entitled to investigate 
accidents. Interestingly, like the arrangements 
under the 1911 Act, there was provision for 
inspections to be recorded in a book provided 
for this purpose. Theoretically, therefore, it should 
have been possible to examine these records to 
ascertain the role and effectiveness of such 
inspections, but it appears that such research was 
never undertaken.  
 
Therefore, published evidence of effectiveness is 
again limited to expert opinion, but here there is 
a continuation of positive reports. From 1955 
onwards the Chief Inspector, summarising the 
information to be found in each of the reports of 
the district mines inspectors, continued his 
repeated acknowledgement of the usefulness of 
the inspections by workmen’s inspectors. He also 
                                                        
5
 The quote had originally appeared in Hutt, A, (1933) 
The Condition of the Working Class in Britain, London, 
Martine Lawrence Ltd, page 24.  
reported the overall number that had taken place 
each year as well as sometimes including 
information on the number of inspections by 
(trade union) appointees of the District Boards. 
This continued until 1978 after which all mention 
of both types of inspections ceased. As required 
by the Mines and Quarries Act, the Annual 
Reports also contained information on Quarries, 
Metalliferous and miscellaneous mines but there 
is no mention of workmen’s inspections in these 
mines (even though the section 123 rights 
applied). Comments in some of the district 
inspectors’ reports indicate that there were few 
such inspections in these workplaces. Later 
reports express hopes that following the Health 
and Safety at Work (HSW) Act in 1974 and the 
application of the Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committee (SSRC) Regulations in all 
workplaces, representation in such workplaces 
might increase. The reports of the district mines 
inspectors are more informative on the activities 
of workers’ inspectors than the summary 
information in the report of the Chief Inspector. 
There is considerable variation between them 
with regard to such detail and, even within the 
same districts, little consistency year on year as to 
what is included beyond recording the number of 
inspections, but such information reflects the 
different kinds of inspections undertaken by 
workmen’s inspectors as well as the proportions 
of inspections that led to follow-up by the mines 
inspectors.  
 
The section 123 provisions have remained in force 
after the demise of the British coal industry 
following the mines closures and privatisations of 
the 1980s and 1990s, although it is far from clear 
how much they continue to be used in the 
privatised remnants of the industry. The 
aggressively anti-trade union policies pursued in 
the privatised coal mines in the UK from the late 
1980s (see, for example, the account by Parry et 
al, 1997) would suggest their use is likely to have 
been minimal and, as Wallis’s (2000) account 
makes clear, many miners themselves felt that 
their role and the protection offered for safety 
was substantially reduced. Ironically, there are 
signs that recent fatal incidents in British coal 
mines may have led to a resurgence of employer 
and inspectorate interest in the supporting role of 
workmen’s inspectors in UK mines (Hazards, 
2011). However, the current pursuit of reducing 
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regulation on OHS more widely means that the 
future of the section 123 provisions is parlous. 
The most likely result of these changes is the 
merging of the provisions with those under the 
Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations 1977 and the Health and Safety 
(Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 
that apply more generally in other sectors of 
employment. Whether the enhanced rights for 
miners’ representatives found in section 123 are 
kept remains to be seen.  
 
This digression on the British antecedents of 
statutory arrangements for worker representation 
on health and safety in Queensland is significant 
in several respects. First, because it suggests that 
in the UK such arrangements were held to make 
an important contribution to improved health 
and safety practice, and demonstrates that claims 
made to a similar effect in Queensland are shared 
elsewhere (note too New Zealand also had 
workmen inspectors and has reinstituted the 
system based on the Queensland model 
following Pike River).  
 
Second, there are parallels between the British 
system and that in Queensland which suggest 
that in the case of ISHRs, for example, the 
development of the British equivalent of this role 
(in the form of full-time inspectors employed by 
the miners’ union who undertook mines 
inspections on behalf of the District Safety 
Boards) was regarded as a particularly helpful 
improvement to the existing system.  
 
Third, acknowledgement of the importance of 
trade union support for the role of workers’ 
inspection features prominently in observations 
on the British experience, which again anticipates 
parallels with current Queensland experiences. 
We will return to some of these issues in the 
following discussion of the current debate 
concerning the system in Queensland.  
 
There is a similar body of historical commentary 
on the role of workmen’s inspectors in the coal 
mines of Queensland and New South Wales (the 
system also developed in metalliferous mining, 
beginning in Broken Hill before being adopted 
elsewhere in NSW and Queensland). For 
example, independent of union records the 
activities of district and mine check inspectors 
were extensively reported in Australian 
newspapers. At the time of writing there were 
well over 9,000 reports referring to mine check 
inspectors in the digitalised newspaper collection 
held by the National Library of Australia (trove) 
covering the period 1871 to 1995 and all states 
(though the majority of reports relate to NSW 
and Queensland).
6
 The reports refer to elections 
of district and mine check inspectors; often 
detailed summaries of their inspection reports; 
their involvement in health and safety issues 
including injuries, deaths, disasters and rescue 
operations; annual reports of safety activities to 
the union; and also their prominence in local 
community activities. Newspapers in mining 
regions, and especially coal mining regions (such 
as the Newcastle Herald, Maitland Mercury, 
Illawarra Mercury and Queenslander, Queensland 
Times) carried frequent reports (even weekly) of 
their activities. Check inspectors also feature in 
the reports of major metropolitan newspapers 
(like the Courier Mail and Sydney Morning 
Herald), both with regard to local activities but 
more typically with regard to serious safety 
incidents, health concerns (for example relating 
to coal dust) and reforms to mine safety 
legislation. 
 
Check inspectors were elected from the most 
experienced and knowledgeable miners, 
especially district check inspectors (a number of 
early appointees had held the position of union 
branch president). The progressive strengthening 
of their statutory recognition and powers over 
time (and particularly following serious 
deficiencies identified in the wake of mine 
disasters) was an indication of growing 
acceptance of the importance of the role. In 
addition to the activities already mentioned, on 
occasion check inspectors were at the forefront 
of calls for investigation of incidents or conditions 
at particular mines as well as reviews of legislative 
provisions (for example those relating to 
preventing disease in mines). Given their 
                                                        
6
 The number of reports is continuously growing as 
further newspapers are digitalised and added to the 
collection. The trove collection also makes reference to 
other records, including photos, memoirs, biographies 
and check inspector reports but most of these are not 
accessible online. 
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inspection activities and knowledge check 
inspectors were in good position to identify gaps 
in regulation or support calls for more wide-
ranging reviews of mine safety (such as Royal 
Commissions) – something government 
inspectors couldn’t do (see for example, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 14 September 1923). It was also 
not unusual for check inspectors and government 
inspectors to conduct joint inspections following 
a serious incident, including assessing hazards or 
in deciding rescue/recovery efforts.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this report to try and 
summarise the abundant evidence attesting to 
the importance of the check inspectors’ role and 
the wide acceptance of this within the mining 
community that can be found in the newspaper 
records. Rather, in addition to the foregoing 
observations several illustrative examples are 
worth citing. First, in November 1921 the half 
yearly report of the QCEU check inspector 
reported on ventilation trends based on 62 
inspections of mines in the district. While 
describing conditions as generally satisfactory the 
check inspector noted that bad conditions in one 
mine had been reported to the inspectorate and 
remedial actions had been taken although 
conditions would remain hazardous until a new 
ventilation shaft was completed (Queensland 
Times, 10 November 1921).  
 
Second, with regard to the Bellbird colliery 
disaster in the Hunter Valley in 1923 a check 
inspector’s report had warned of dangerous 
levels of coal dust prior to the explosion and 
check inspectors played an active role in the 
rescue and recovery efforts, the coronial inquest, 
and joint meetings with management and 
government inspectors to consider re-opening 
the mine (Maitland Mercury, 23 September, 1923; 
Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May 1924). Third, union 
check inspectors were involved jointly with 
government safety inspectors in assessing the 
safety of re-timbering activities in the affected 
area following a gas outburst that killed seven 
miners at the Collinsville State Coal in 
Queensland in 1954 (Courier Mail, 19 October 
1954). 
 
3.3 Perspectives on current 
arrangements for worker 
representation in Queensland 
coal mines 
Previous sections of this chapter made plain the 
evidence to suggest that unionised coal mines 
may have better health and safety outcomes than 
non-union ones. However, there is little 
consideration in this research of the specific 
contribution of trade union representatives to 
these effects in coal mines and, in particular, of 
the role of enhanced representational rights such 
as those found in Australian states, especially 
Queensland and New South Wales. Assessment 
of this contribution, while generally positive, is 
restricted to the opinions and observations of 
informed participants in regulation such as mines 
inspectors, trade union officials and OHS experts. 
A consequence of this is that mining companies 
continue to question the appropriateness of the 
actions of mining union representatives on health 
and safety matters, and the details of statutory 
measures defining the functions and powers of 
such representatives remain contentious. 
Moreover, while there is much to be learned from 
qualitative studies in other sectors concerning the 
role of workers’ representatives in contributing to 
such positive effects, as well as the preconditions 
necessary to achieve them, here again the 
absence of concrete evidence of these effects in 
coal mining makes extrapolation controversial 
and unproven.  
 
Bearing this in mind, therefore, in the following 
sub-sections we first examine the regulatory 
framework for representation of workers’ interests 
in health and safety in Queensland coal mines 
and then, following scrutiny of the published 
commentary on such representation, we identify 
some of the key issues in the current discourse 
concerning the provisions and their use.  
 
3.3.1 The regulatory framework for 
representative participation on 
OHS in Queensland coal mines  
The current provisions on worker representation 
in Queensland coal mines are found in the Coal 
Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, Parts 7 and 8. 
Those in Part 7 refer to site safety and health 
representatives (SSHRs) and require the election 
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of up to two for each mine. The SSHR needs to 
hold certain competencies recognised by the 
Coal Mining Safety and Health Advisory Council, 
in applied risk management (RIIRIS301B), 
conducting safety and health investigations 
(RIIOHS301A) and communication (RIICOM301B). 
They have a number of functions under section 
99(1), including the right to inspect the coal mine 
to assess the level of risk, to review procedures 
concerning the control of risk, to detect unsafe 
practices and conditions and to undertake 
appropriate actions to protect the safety and 
health of coal miners, and to investigate 
complaints regarding safety and health. They also 
have powers to enter any area of the coal mine 
at any time to carry out the functions of the 
SSHR, if reasonable notice is given to the site 
senior executive (SSE), and to examine any 
documents relevant to safety and health held by 
the SSE under this Act (section 100). The SSE is 
obliged to inform the SSHR concerning the 
occurrence of work injuries and illnesses, high 
potential incidents, changes to the mine that 
might affect OHS and the visits and actions of 
mines inspectors (section 106). SSHRs must be 
given reasonable assistance to carry out an 
inspection and they are required to make a 
written report following the inspection, providing 
a copy to the site senior executive (sub-sections 
99(2) and (4)). If the inspection indicates an 
existing or possible danger the representative 
must notify the senior site executive or the 
responsible supervisor and provide a copy of the 
report to the mines inspector (sub-section 99(4)). 
If the representative believes that the health and 
safety management system is ineffective or 
inadequate they must inform the site senior 
executive. If not satisfied that appropriate action 
has been taken to correct the problem then the 
representative must inform the mines inspector 
who is then obliged to make an inspection and 
record the results of the investigation in the mine 
record (sub-sections 99(5)-(6)).  
 
Section 101 provides SSHRs with authority to 
order the suspension of mining operations by 
means of a written report to the SSE. The SSE 
must comply (section 102) and must not to restart 
operations until risk levels are acceptable (section 
103)). If the SSHR reasonably believes there is an 
immediate danger, the SSHR may stop 
operations or require a supervisor to stop them 
and then to provide the SSHR with a written 
report detailing the action and the reasons for 
taking it (sub-sections 101(3)-(4)).  
 
Section 95(3) stipulates that a SSHR must perform 
the functions and exercise the powers of a SSHR 
for safety and health purposes and for no other 
purpose, and section 104 provides that the SSHR 
must not ‘unnecessarily impede production’.  
 
Part 8 addresses the rights and functions of 
industry health and safety representatives. They 
provide that the CFMEU may, after a ballot of its 
members, appoint and pay up to three 
appropriately qualified persons (they must be 
holders of a first or second class certificate of 
competency or a deputy’s certificate of 
competency: subsection 109(3)), each to act as 
full-time ISHRs for a period four years. The 
functions of ISHRs are listed in section 118 and 
include the functions of participating in 
investigations into serious accidents, HPIs and 
other OHS matters and coal mines, of helping in 
relation to initiatives to improve OHS at coal 
mines, as well as the functions given to SSHRs. 
Section 119 sets out their powers which include 
the powers given to SSHRS, and in addition the 
powers to make inquiries about the operations of 
coal mines relevant to the safety or health of coal 
mine workers, to copy safety and health 
management system documents, including 
principal hazard management plans, standard 
operating procedures and training records, and 
to require the person in control or temporarily in 
control of a coal mine to give the ISHR 
reasonable help in the exercise of these powers. 
Section 121 specifies that an ISHR who believes a 
mine’s safety and health management system to 
be inadequate or ineffective must inform the SSE 
with the reasons for this belief and that if action is 
not taken to correct the problem they must 
inform the mines inspector, who is required to 
investigate. Section 167 empowers ISHRs to issue 
a directive (by notice or orally later confirmed by 
notice – but the directive is not invalid if there is 
no later notice) to suspend operations in all or 
part of the mine if the ISHR believes the risk from 
coal mining operations is not at an acceptable 
level. 
 
Section 117 indicates that it is a requirement that 
ISHRs exercise their statutory powers and 
Final Report 
26 
 
functions solely ‘for a safety and health purpose’, 
while section 120, like section 104 for SSHRs, 
provides that they should not ‘unnecessarily 
impede production’.  
 
These measures are different from those applying 
more generally to worker representation on OHS 
in other sectors in several respects. The 
provisions for ISHRs set out quite unique 
measures governing the appointment of full-time 
health and safety officials by a trade union with 
what appear at first sight to be fairly extensive 
powers of entry into workplaces to make 
inspections and investigations across a wide 
spectrum of OHS management practices and to 
require the suspension of operations where they 
believe there to be sufficient risk to warrant this. 
There are few such similar statutory 
arrangements outside the mining industry, either 
in Australia or elsewhere (although there are 
arguably certain parallels between these 
requirements and those relating to health and 
safety technicians in Spain and for trade union 
regional representatives for workers in small firms 
in Sweden). Similarly, in the appointment of 
SSHRs, local representatives are given quite 
extensive powers to inspect and investigate OHS 
issues as well as to require the suspension of 
operations in cases where they believe the risks 
involved to justify such action. However, neither 
SSHRs nor ISHRs have the power to issue 
Provisional Improvement Notices and the 
apparently quite extensive powers of both SSHRs 
and ISHRs are qualified by other caveats in the 
Act which demand cognisance of impeding 
productivity and a clear separation between OHS 
issues and those concerning other matters — 
with an explicit requirement not to perform 
functions or exercise powers in relation to 
anything other than safety or health purposes. 
There exists some controversy around these 
issues in the mining industry in Queensland and 
this has helped to shape the approach we have 
taken to the present investigation.  
It is worth noting in passing that similar provisions 
operate in NSW, where ISHRs and SSHRs 
(previously called check inspectors) have been 
seen as an important element in mine safety by 
the relevant government department. Site check 
inspectors are required to undergo training that 
includes the legislative framework, their role, OHS 
management systems, general hazard 
management, major hazard management, 
emergency response and safety and health 
investigations. Their knowledge base and 
capacity to network ideas and issues with other 
check inspectors, experts, mine inspectors and 
industry has been enhanced by annual check 
inspector conferences. Presentations at these 
conferences cover a range of relevant issues 
(some examples include updates on mine rescue 
[and reference to recent events like the Sago 
mine disaster in this regard] and the role and 
activities of the Mine Safety Advisory Council). As 
in Queensland, the ISHR and SSHR role is 
formally tied to the relevant union (the CFMEU) 
which pays ISHRs and provides essential logistical 
support to SSHRs. 
 
3.4 Representative participation — 
summary and contentious 
issues 
This chapter has demonstrated that research in 
other sectors and in other countries supports the 
conclusion that worker representation, especially 
when supported by trades unions, is beneficial for 
health and safety. It further shows that there are 
several preconditions that help to determine the 
effectiveness of the arrangements made to 
achieve such representation in OHS 
management. They include a statutory 
framework, its regulatory surveillance, employer 
and trade union commitment and support, as 
well as trained and well-informed representatives. 
The regulatory framework governing the 
operation of worker representation on health and 
safety provides a useful baseline against which to 
measure practice. Such an evaluation in turn is 
helpful in considering the appropriateness of the 
regulatory provisions.  
 
It is likely that this is also true of the provisions on 
coal mining in Queensland. OHS arrangements 
that apply in coal mining are often the subject of 
a separate legislative history to that of similar 
arrangements found in other sectors. This is the 
case for those on worker representation on 
health and safety in Queensland. Therefore, the 
Queensland provisions on OHS representation in 
coal mining are different in a number of respects 
to those found in other sectors. Such differences 
are argued to provide enhanced functions and 
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powers for worker health and safety 
representatives in mines. At the same time they 
have fuelled the development of policy discourse 
with, on the one hand, recommendations for the 
application of similar measures elsewhere, and on 
the other, continued debate between regulators, 
trade unions and employers concerning their 
supposed effects.  
 
Rapid structural and organisational change in the 
way in which work is done and business 
conducted in the sector makes it important to ask 
whether, in the face of this, the qualitatively 
different arrangements that apply to workers’ 
representation in mining, which arguably arose in 
response to the risks of a very differently 
organised and structured industry, continue to be 
fit for purpose in relation to the predominant 
features of the current industry. In particular, the 
provisions for SSHRs look quite sparse when 
compared with the corresponding provisions in 
the harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts, 
where elected health and safety representatives 
(HSRs) are given a broader array of rights and 
powers, including the right to assistance from 
experts, the right to be present at interviews 
between workers and the employer or inspector, 
the power to issue infringement notices, and the 
power to issue provisional improvement notices; 
and where persons conducting businesses and 
undertakings have clearer obligations to HSRs. 
HSRs are also better protected against 
victimisation, and from disqualification. 
 
It is to help address these questions that the 
preliminary study described in the following 
chapters was undertaken. 
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4 Research design and methods 
 
In this section we outline the aims and methods 
of the study and present a brief account of the 
rationale behind its design.  
 
4.1 Study design 
Since the aim of the study is to consider evidence 
of the role and activities of site and industry 
safety and health representatives in Queensland 
mines and the contexts in which they occur, the 
project was designed to focus on documentary 
records of some of these activities, together with 
a number of semi-structured interviews with site 
safety and health representatives (SSHRs), 
industry safety and health representatives (ISHRs) 
and other key informants. The documentary 
analysis concerns records of activities undertaken 
mostly during the past fifteen years (although a 
somewhat longer period has been examined in 
some mines) and in the main by ISHRs (though 
some SSHR and inspectorate records are also 
considered), while the sample of interviewees 
includes past and present ISHRs, and current 
SSHRs, the majority of whom work in the coal 
mines providing the records for documentary 
analysis.  
 
To provide context for our fieldwork we have 
undertaken a review of the available international 
research literature as well as that of relevant 
regulation and regulatory policy, which helps to 
contextualise the local discourse around the 
subjects of the research. This latter discourse has 
also been reviewed through scrutiny of the 
appropriate grey literature and regulatory texts in 
Queensland. While Queensland, like other 
Australian states, has traditionally exercised 
substantial autonomy in relation to OHS 
regulation, recent national developments in both 
labour law and health and safety regulation have 
significant implications and we have found it 
necessary to take account of these developments 
in the present research. Similarly, the coal mining 
industry in Australia (as is frequently also the case 
elsewhere) is itself considerably autonomous in 
terms of regulation, with provisions enjoying a 
separate history of development to those 
covering other sectors. This is true of the situation 
in Queensland, but here too this separate 
trajectory has been somewhat complicated by 
developments in regulation that apply more 
generally across all sectors and we have, 
therefore, also found it necessary to take account 
of these wider developments in our review. 
 
The fieldwork methods have two main strands, in 
which analysis of the content of the records of 
the actions of workers’ representatives at the 
industry (and, to a lesser extent) site level is 
supported by detailed interviews both with ISHRs 
and, principally, with representatives at the site 
level to further test and explore emergent key 
issues. We also undertook some non-participant 
observation of the training of the SSHRs which 
helped further inform findings from the 
interviews. Further interviews with other key 
players such as regulatory inspectors of mines 
concern the same issues but seen from different 
perspectives.  
 
It is important to note that all the work has been 
undertaken by experienced researchers who have 
previously found the methods adopted here to 
be effective when undertaking preliminary studies 
in which it is necessary rapidly to generate and 
test reasonably robust indicators of the key issues 
in a given situation in order to produce indicative 
results that are sufficiently strong to inform policy. 
Thus the mixed-methods approach is similar to 
that used successfully in previous studies 
concerning worker representation in 
arrangements for OHS management (see, for 
example Walters et al, 2012; Walters and Nichols, 
2007). Its strength is that it allows some 
corroboration of findings originating from 
different sources of data.  
 
Caution is nevertheless warranted in how far the 
findings can be said to represent robust data that 
provide definitive analysis of the situations 
investigated. While conclusions thus generated 
are, in the short term, often sufficient to inform 
policy needs, they are suggestive of a number of 
areas in which more detailed research is required 
to produce definitive findings.  
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4.2 Research methods 
4.2.1 The literature review 
There were three main focuses for the literature 
review presented in the previous two chapters. 
The first concerned recent literature on mining 
hazards, health and safety outcomes and current 
methods to regulate and manage the risks of 
mining more effectively. Conventional search 
techniques were employed to undertake the 
review and the previous experience of working 
on reviews of OHS in coal mining in Australia by 
some members of the research team was helpful 
in this respect. The second focus for the review 
was on recent literature on worker representation 
in OHS. A comprehensive review has been 
undertaken of the international research literature 
on this subject across all sectors of employment 
and in mining in particular. Much of this work was 
already underway, the subject of several 
publications and submissions to inquiries before 
the start of the project, and internationally 
acknowledged expertise on the subject is a 
strength of the research team. The third focus 
was on regulation itself and on the discourse that 
has surrounded that of requirements concerning 
the representation of workers’ interests. This was 
especially the case for Queensland, partly 
because this is where the project is situated, but 
also because, as we discovered, there is a dearth 
of research on the practice of worker 
representation in health and safety in Queensland 
coal mines. In addition, to help to contextualise 
the development of the regulatory provisions and 
their operation in Queensland, we reviewed 
reports on workmen’s inspectors in UK coal mines 
on which the regulatory approach that applies in 
Queensland seems to have been largely based.  
 
4.2.2 Analysis of records of the work 
of site and industry safety and 
health representatives in 
selected mines 
The Mining and Energy Division of the 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(CFMEU) supplied relevant documents they held 
in relation to 19 Queensland mines. These mines 
included 12 open cut and seven underground 
mines, most of which were large or medium-
sized (nine and eight respectively) (Table 4.1). 
Whilst the document set and timeframe covered 
for each mine varied, these were mainly Industry 
Safety and Health Representative (ISHR) and 
Department of Mines and Energy Safety and 
Health Mines Inspectorate (MI) reports (Table 
4.2). The earliest was written in 1984, but most 
(over 75%) were written in the last 13 years 
(Figure 4.1). Most of the ISHR and MI reports 
were written as a result of a site visit (85% and 
92% respectively (all of the SSHR reports were 
written following an on-site inspection)), with 
those that were not being predominantly postal 
mine records (for example, reporting on a review 
of documents supplied, arising from 
correspondence or contact from mine managers 
or workers, or following an incident at a similar 
mine elsewhere). 
Table 4.1: Summary of mines included in the documentary analysis and corresponding Site 
Safety and Health Representative interviewees 
Type Size 
CFMEU 
estimated Union 
density 
CFMEU 
subjective OHS 
Assessment 
Number of SSHR 
interviewees 
Underground: 
N=7 
Large 98% Marginal 1 
Large 100% Good 1 
Large 100% Good 1 
Large 100% Good 1 
Medium 3% Marginal 0 
Medium 100% Marginal 1 
Medium 100% Problematic 0 
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Type Size 
CFMEU 
estimated Union 
density 
CFMEU 
subjective OHS 
Assessment 
Number of SSHR 
interviewees 
Open cut: 
N=12 
 
Large 45% Good 0 
Large 45% Marginal 1 
Large 100%  1 
Large 100% Good 2 
Large 100% Marginal 1 
Medium 3% Marginal 0 
Medium 30% Marginal 1 
Medium 40% Good 0 
Medium 75% Good 1 
Medium 100% Good 1 
Small 3% Marginal 0 
Small 100% Good 1 
 
Table 4.2: Documents supplied by CFMEU 
Document type Number % 
ISHR report 473 41% 
MI report 605 52% 
SSHR report 50 4% 
Other* 37 3% 
Total 1165 100% 
*These included: visit notifications; correspondence between ISHRs and mine managers; and other documents 
(e.g. photos, plans, mine health and safety documentation) 
 
Figure 4.1: Timespan of documents supplied by CFMEU 
 
 
As far as was appropriate, each of these 
documents was considered in order to identify 
what was recorded in relation to four main areas: 
1. Inspections: including why an inspection 
was made, what was inspected and the 
outcome of the inspection; 
2. Fulfilment of functions defined in the 
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999;
7
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3. Other information: such as reference to 
relevant background detail; 
4. Fatal risks: As part of our analysis of 
inspections by ISHRs, SSHRs and 
government mine inspectors we paid 
particular attention to those hazards that 
can give rise to single and multiple 
fatality incidents (including disasters) in 
mines. Each mechanism leading to 
fatality in mines was recorded separately 
in the database. This was important in 
assessing the extent to which inspections 
considered or focused on hazards 
known to lead to serious and more 
especially fatal injury. In mining, the 
capacity of a regulatory regime to deal 
with these hazards is judged as 
especially important given the high 
hazard nature of the industry.  
 
The mechanisms that can result in fatalities in 
mining have been extensively documented and 
are well-known, many having being recorded 
over hundreds of years.
8
 Broadly, these are: 
 Fire and explosions (including both 
machinery fires as well as methane and 
coal dust fires). 
 Inundation/inrush of water (often from 
old workings but also due to excessive 
rain or breaking into bodies of water like 
rivers or underground aquifers) into 
mine workings ─ though mainly 
associated with underground mines, the 
failure of tailings dams are a hazard in 
open cut mines. 
 Falls of ground (also known as rock falls), 
including rocks spat out horizontally 
from the face by intense pressure 
underground and falls of material from 
the high walls in open cut mines. 
 Outburst of poisonous gas (or 
dangerous accumulations of gas) in 
underground mines, although exposure 
to toxic fumes can also be an issue in 
confined spaces in open cut mines. 
                                                        
8
 See for example, Biswas and Zipf, 2000; Brune and 
Goertz 2013; Burgess-Limerick, 2011; Donoghue, 2004; 
Groves et al, 2004; Hopkins, 1999; Karra, 2005; Nugent 
et al, 2010; Saleh and Cummings, 2011; Swedziicki, 
2001; Towsey, 2003.  
 Machinery incidents in both 
underground and open cut mines 
(including contact with moving 
machinery, catastrophic machinery 
failure, and traffic incidents such as 
collisions between vehicles or vehicles 
hitting pedestrians). 
 Electrocution through contact with live 
cables, water or machinery in both open 
cut and underground mines. 
 Falls from height including failure of 
winding gear in underground mines, falls 
from platforms or machinery or falls 
associated with trucks etc. tipping over 
inclines, especially in open cut mines. 
 Entrapment in confined spaces in both 
underground workings or confined 
spaces in open cut workings. This hazard 
can become fatal when associated with 
fire, toxic gases, lack of oxygen or rising 
water levels. 
 
The first four of these hazards have been 
associated with significant multiple fatalities 
(especially fire and explosions), although falls and 
entrapment can also result in multiple fatalities. 
Machinery and electrocution have led to multiple 
fatalities, though this is fairly rare.  
 
In checking for these hazards inspections may 
examine several simultaneously. For example, 
checking the electrics of machinery and 
infrastructure will simultaneously address the 
potential for electrocution as well as potential 
ignition points for a fire/explosion. Similarly, 
examining road conditions and berms in mines 
entails considering the risk of collisions as well as 
vehicles tipping over the steep inclines and height 
found in open cut mines. Equally, assessing 
ventilation regimes and testing for gas levels in 
mines (including methane [CO4], carbon 
monoxide [CO]
9
 and carbon dioxide [CO2]) not 
only addresses the risk of fire/explosion but also 
the build-up of toxic fumes. In the same way 
examination of secondary egress and the 
availability/condition of self-rescuers addresses 
both the hazards of fire/explosion and 
                                                        
9
 Which can be important evidence of a fire including 
that resulting from spontaneous combustion often 
referred to as a heating. 
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entrapment. In recording what was being 
examined during inspections we were conscious 
of, and duly recorded, where an activity 
addressed several different fatality mechanisms 
among this broad categorisation of eight kinds of 
fatal risks. 
 
The analysis of the records supplied by CFMEU 
involved the research team in reading each 
document and ‘coding’ its content in relation to 
the four areas outlined above. The aim was 
describe the activities of union health and safety 
representatives (that is, the activities of SSHRs 
and ISHRs) by creating a typology of those 
activities (summarised in Table 4.3) and using that 
typology to consider both the relative frequencies 
of a range of types of activity and also any 
changes in these frequencies over time. The 
intention was to be able to describe what union 
health and safety representatives do, with a view 
not only to considering how they meet what is 
required of them in the Act, but also to building 
up as detailed a picture as possible of their role in 
the prevention of ill-health, injury, disability and 
death. It is, of course, essential to bear in mind 
that what representatives record in their reports is 
not an exhaustive description of an inspection, so 
this analysis can only consider what is actually 
recorded in those reports. Further details of their 
activities were obtained from the detailed 
interviews with representatives listed in (Table 
4.1).  
 
4.2.3 Non-participant observation  
One of the research team was able to attend and 
observe sessions of the annual training course 
provided by the CFMEU for the SSHRs. There 
were two training courses, one for underground 
SSHRs and one for open-cut SSHRs, with each 
training course being of four and a half days 
duration. The researcher attended two days of 
each course. The aim of this was to explore the 
nature of the support that they received, what the 
SSHRs were trained in, the nature of the 
pedagogic methods involved, to make a 
subjective judgement concerning the quality of 
the training delivered and to observe the nature 
of the interaction between SSHRs; between them 
and the ISHRs; between SSHRs and trainers; and 
between the SSHRs and the trade union more 
generally.  
Table 4.3: Typology coding for union health 
and safety representative and inspectorate 
activity records 
1. Inspections 
Reason for inspection 
Physical inspection 
(e.g. inspection of 
work areas, work in 
progress, machinery 
etc.) 
Documentary 
inspection (e.g. 
inspection of 
documents, including 
the SHMS). 
Outcomes of 
inspection (e.g. formal 
notification) 
2. Legislative 
functions*  
Inspect and assess 
whether the level of 
risk at a coal mine is at 
an acceptable level 
Review procedures 
that control the level of 
risk 
Detect unsafe 
practices and 
conditions and to take 
remedial action to 
lower the level of risk 
Assist investigations 
into serious accidents 
and high potential 
incidents and other 
matters 
Investigate complaints 
from coal workers 
Assist with initiatives to 
improve safety and 
health 
3. Other 
information 
Data (e.g. mine OHS 
performance) 
Contracting out (e.g. 
differences in work 
environments for 
directly and indirectly 
employed workers) 
4. Fatal risks 
Inrush / inundation 
Outburst 
Entrapment 
Machinery 
Fire / explosion 
Rock fall 
Electrocution 
Falls 
*ISHR functions shown 
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4.2.4 Interviews with key informants 
Interviews were undertaken with 24 people 
including: SSHRs, most of whom worked in the 
mines listed in Table 4.1; current and former 
ISHRs; and a very senior mines inspector (Table 
4.4).  
 
Table 4.4: Project interviewees 
Interviewee Number 
SSHR at mine included in the 
documentary analysis 
14 
SSHR at other mine 4 
Current ISHR 3 
Former ISHR and current 
CFMEU District President 
1 
Former ISHR and current 
CFMEU District Secretary 
1 
Senior mines inspector 1 
Total 24 
 
Interviews were conducted either in between 
training sessions while the representatives were 
attending training organised by the CFMEU in 
June 2013, or at the district offices of the CFMEU 
in two separate districts during August 2013. Each 
interview lasted for approximately one to one 
and a half hours and they were all recorded and 
subsequently transcribed. All the interviews were 
undertaken following procedures approved by 
the Research Ethics Committee of the School of 
Social Science at Cardiff University. The content 
of the interviews has been anonymised as far is 
possible in this report in accordance with the 
University’s ethics procedures.  
 
The interviews sought to elicit further information 
concerning the activities of the representatives 
such as those outlined in Table 4.3. That is, for 
both the ISHRs and the SSHRs, they aimed to 
achieve a sense of: 
1. the different ways in which the SSHRs 
conducted their OHS activities;  
2. what they spent most of their time doing 
(and how much of their time they spent 
doing it);  
3. the extent to which they were doing 
what the legislation prescribed they 
should do (and the extent to which they 
do something else), and how they 
situated their activities in relation to the 
legislation, what they perceived to 
represent ‘best practice’ and how they 
went about meeting this standard; 
4. whether representatives brought a 
particular skill set to their role on health 
and safety in mines;  
5. how they perceived themselves to be 
supported by the inspectorate, the 
union, and their relationship with 
management (levels of co-operation 
they experienced, what they regarded as 
barriers to their activities etc.);  
6. the constraints and obstacles they faced 
in carrying out their roles; and 
7. what they thought would improve their 
effectiveness and the support for it in the 
mines. 
 
We were also interested in exploring how the two 
types of representatives saw the nature of the 
relationship between each other — how SSHRs 
perceived the role of the ISHR in relation to 
themselves, the kinds of support they received, 
how they valued and used this support, and how 
important they believed it to be in achieving the 
effective delivery of their own roles. In turn, in the 
interviews with the ISHRs, as well as inquiring 
about the ways in which they undertook the 
activities identified in Table 4.3 and their 
responses to the questions in 1 to 7 above, we 
were also interested in how they prioritised and 
undertook supporting the work of the SSHRs, 
how they deployed their rights and functions 
under the regulatory provisions in their own 
inspection and investigative work in relation to 
the mines they covered and the extent to which 
they engaged with wider consultative activities in 
OHS regulation in coal mining in Queensland. In 
both cases we were further interested in how the 
representatives defined what constituted health 
and safety issues on which they could legitimately 
represent miners’ interests, how they perceived 
the boundaries of such issues in relation to more 
general labour relations matters and what, if any, 
were the strategies they adopted for resolving 
any conflicts that might arise in these matters. 
 
Transcripts of the interviews allowed identification 
and exploration of themes reflecting the above. 
Themes for both ISHRs and SSHRs included: their 
perceptions of their role in injury and ill-health 
prevention; activities, perceived outcomes, 
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balance of activities (i.e. relations with workers 
and managers, support for SSHRs, relations with 
sub-contractors, work with the industry more 
generally, input to government policy and liaison 
with inspectorate); the role of the regulatory 
provisions in determining activities — using 
statutory powers as the basis for representation; 
safety versus industrial issues; supports and 
constraints; challenges, perceived needs (what 
would make things better); how SSHRs valued 
support from ISHRs (and other sources of 
support – from the union, inspectorate, employer 
and elsewhere) and vice versa; time off for SSHRs 
to undertake functions, receive training etc., the 
role of training; facilities for representatives that 
were available at mines; and relations with the 
inspectorate. Copies of the interview schedules, 
participant information sheets, consent forms etc. 
can be found in the Annexe. 
 
The interview with the senior mines inspector 
essentially followed the same structure and was 
based on a dialogue on the same issues as those 
with the representatives – with the difference that 
it was the perspectives of this individual 
concerning the activities of representatives, their 
rights and functions and the contexts in which 
they operated that were its main focus.  
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5 The practice of worker representation on health and 
safety in Queensland coal mines: OHS management 
systems, communications and supports  
 
In this and the following chapter we consider the 
main activities of ISHRs and SSHRs based on 
analysis of both documentary evidence from 
nearly half of the coal mines in Queensland and 
interviews with a sample of the representatives 
themselves. We explore what they do, their 
perceptions of their effectiveness and the 
supports and barriers to its achievement. We also 
examine the relationship between the two types 
of representatives, between them and the 
workers they represent and with the managers, 
mines’ inspectors and others with whom they 
interact in undertaking their representative roles. 
As well as the positive aspects of their role and 
the supports for it, we discuss some problematic 
issues in the current construction of the activities 
and relations of worker representation on health 
and safety in the context of Queensland coal 
mines and the wider environment in which they 
are set. We look at the role, activities and 
relations of the ISHRs by considering their own 
testimony alongside that of the SSHRs for whom 
they provide support. In this chapter we begin 
with a brief profile of the representatives 
themselves, both SSHRs and ISHRs, which 
conveys a sense of who they are and what are 
their motivations for undertaking the role. In the 
light of the statutory provisions, we then turn to 
the involvement of the representatives in the 
overall system for safety and health management 
in coal mines. We then examine communications 
between the representatives and workers, 
managers and inspectors during inspections. 
Finally, we examine the support the 
representatives feel they receive from each other, 
from workers, the trade union, management and 
the Inspectorate.  
 
5.1 Who are the worker 
representatives?  
The 18 SSHRs interviewed in the present study 
were all men, the majority were between the 
ages of 35 and 45, and all were experienced 
miners. A number of the representatives currently 
working in open cut mines had also gained 
previous experience in underground mines, as 
had all of the ISHRs. Most of the SSHRs 
interviewed were well-established in this position 
and had been in the post for several years 
already. A few had been SSHRs for considerably 
longer, five having been in the position for more 
than ten years. Five were relatively new to the 
role, having been elected within the previous two 
years. By far the majority had not held other 
trade union representative positions prior to 
becoming SSHRs. Of the few who had, only one 
seemed to have continued with any of these 
previous roles. Some had held other positions in 
the mines relevant to health and safety, mostly 
having been involved with mines’ rescue teams. 
They were drawn from a mixture of trades and a 
minority of them were qualified as deputies. 
Some of them had volunteered themselves for 
the election to become SSHR, often because they 
wanted to contribute to the prevention of the 
accidents and incidents of which they had 
become aware as a result of their role in mines 
rescue.  
 
Interviewer: So what prompted you to 
take on the role [of SSHR]? 
Respondent: I basically thought we can 
improve things … ’cos we’re reactive as 
rescue. We turn up and fix the situation 
somebody had a broken leg, a heart 
attack or an injury of some sort. And I 
thought maybe we can look at … well 
look at doing something better and 
helping people out before they get hurt. 
(7120040 - SSHR) 
 
I’ve taken on the role because safety is 
pretty important in our industry and 
yeah I just enjoy doing it.  
(7120017 - SSHR) 
 
The majority, however, had been nominated for 
their election to the position. They offered various 
reasons why they had been the subject of such 
nomination, generally a combination of being 
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already known to be interested in health and 
safety issues and being seen to be able to speak 
up and willing to engage with supervisors and 
managers concerning such matters.  
 
… with being a Deputy and helping out 
the blokes, like blokes come said to me, 
you’re a good candidate to do this job. 
So sat back and had a think about it 
and said, yeah, I’ll do it. 
(7120041 - SSHR)  
 
… well the man who was doing the role 
for a number of years he resigned … 
and I actually hadn’t really paid much 
thought to it but then a couple of guys 
… approached me about maybe they 
thought I’d be good for the role … in 
the position then I went out and 
thought about it for a while and had a 
yarn to couple of friends about it and … 
I thought I’d be able to.  
(7120016 - SSHR) 
 
The general impression was that representatives 
believed that the position as a SSHR was likely to 
be a fairly long-term one and indeed this was 
confirmed by the considerable length of time for 
which many of those we interviewed had already 
held it. They also believed it took them some time 
to become well acquainted with the legal 
provisions and procedures applying to health and 
safety in the mines, but the majority, having by 
now acquired such knowledge, felt they were 
trusted by their colleagues to represent their 
health and safety interests.  
 
Interviewer 2: Do you feel that you 
have the support of your members? 
Respondent: Oh yeah, yeah. Well 
probably too much at times. They think 
I can wave the wand and make things 
appear and vanish and sort out and I’ll 
have a real good go but I’m battling.  
(7120040 - SSHR) 
 
Training experience prior to becoming SSHRs 
varied according to the extent to which the 
representatives had been previously involved with 
safety-related responsibilities such as mines 
rescue. Subsequent to their election all the SSHRs 
had attended the one-week long training 
conferences organised annually by the trade 
union and continued to attend them each year 
while in the post. As we will discuss in more detail 
later, they all placed considerable value on this 
experience of training, which they regarded as by 
far the main form of training they received. A few 
individuals had sought further technical training 
in their own time – exploring issues in which they 
were particularly interested. Most said they had 
received little if any training support from their 
employers beyond the statutory minimum.  
 
Only training provided by the union, 
which is these week-long safety 
conferences. That’s the only training. … 
They’re good, they’re valuable … some 
of the information that comes out of it 
is really helpful.  
(7120017 - SSHR) 
 
The representatives not only took their role at the 
workplace very seriously, but they also invested a 
substantial amount of their free time in 
developing and carrying it out. Such off-site 
activity concerned not only making themselves 
better acquainted with regulatory and technical 
issues, but also communicating with fellow 
workers about health and safety issues on which 
their input was sought. Often such off-site 
communication occurred because either the 
workers concerned felt unable to raise such 
issues at the workplace, or because the SSHR 
believed it necessary to treat their concerns 
confidentially. On other occasions off-site 
communications related to being informed about 
incidents occurring at the mine during the SSHR’s 
free time, often resulting in their returning to the 
mine to investigate or assist. When the travelling 
time involved in such responses is taken into 
account the extent of the SSHRs’ commitment to 
their role is further apparent. Indeed overall, the 
sense of commitment to their role evident among 
all of the SSHRs was one of the more striking 
aspects of the interviews. 
 
Because I’m on shift and there’s four 
shifts, I’ve also got to do my job as a 
diesel fitter. … And then this role. So 
this role to me is a fulltime gig. Like I 
got operated on yesterday and as soon 
as I got out of thing I got about 20 
calls. So you just don’t get any time to 
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yourself. It’s very hard for the family at 
present … Like if there’s an incident, 
they can ring me up one o’clock in the 
morning and I’m on dayshift, and 
notify me. 
(7120040 - SSHR) 
 
Interviewer: And then you’re dealing 
with issues that people are raising … 
Respondent: They take up, they take 
up a lot of time, lot of time of my time 
off, which I don’t mind doing. … But 
yeah, like I, you know, I’ve got to go 
through and chase them up, chase 
procedures up and all that sort of stuff 
so.  
(7120017 - SSHR) 
 
All three current ISHRs were experienced miners, 
had all been deputies and met the necessary 
criteria formally qualifying them for their position 
as an ISHR. They had held their positions for 
varying lengths of time. One was considerably 
experienced, while two were relatively new to the 
role. The two former ISHRs we interviewed both 
currently held senior positions in the trade union. 
Both had been SSHRs before becoming ISHRs. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the nature of their 
role, all the ISHRs, present and past, conveyed a 
very strong sense of commitment to the position 
 
To try and find someone in this role 
here. … it’s a huge drop in wages. And 
you’ve just doubled your hours of work 
to do the role! So it’s not something 
you do for … you do it for the love and 
passion. … And then you might get 
weekends off every sixth weekend, ‘cos 
you’re on call …  
(7120033 – Former ISHR) 
 
They were especially clear concerning their 
contribution to supporting the activities of the 
SSHRs: 
 
The good part of the job is probably 
going and talking to the local checkies 
and the local checkies training we run 
…  
(7120037 - ISHR) 
 
At the same time there was awareness that there 
was a broader remit and the activities in which 
they engaged in support of the SSHRs also had a 
wider effect:  
 
Well there’s a few answers to it … One 
would be that you are continually 
educating those in the SSHR roles, 
those that’s been elected in. So 
assisting them in their role. The other 
side of it is that you are assisting 
management at the same time … three 
legs of the same stool ─ I’m helping 
and assisting our people, doing the 
same with management and working 
in conjunction with the Mines 
Inspectorate.  
(7120033 – Former ISHR) 
 
The three ISHRs shared the burden of their 
responsibilities for representing mine workers and 
supporting the SSHRs between them. They were 
well acquainted with each other’s work through 
personal meetings and telephone exchanges. 
They all undertook both reactive and proactive 
work, responding to requests and notifications 
from both SSHRs and individual workers as well 
as to information concerning incidents in the 
mines. A substantial amount of time was spent 
engaged in mine inspections, both proactive and 
reactive according to need. They kept track of 
their activities and made a collective effort to 
ensure that the SSHRs and mine workers in all the 
mines in their jurisdiction received their support, 
while at the same time recognising that some 
mines and SSHRs required greater attention than 
others. We look in detail at how they conducted 
these activities in the following sections.  
 
In short, the SSHRs were a group of experienced 
miners, with considerable knowledge of 
regulatory, technical and managerial issues 
relevant to health and safety in mines. They all 
shared a strong commitment to their 
representative role in health and safety on behalf 
of their fellow workers and trade union. They 
believed it to be important to act within what 
they perceived to be the regulatory framework 
governing their role. They did this as much for 
their own protection against the possibility that 
their employer would try to discipline or dismiss 
them for their actions as for clarity in the pursuit 
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of their health and safety objectives. The same 
was true for the ISHRs — arguably more so — 
for these representatives were already qualified 
deputies, had all previously held representative 
roles in health and safety as SSHRs, as well as 
sometimes in other trade union lay positions and 
had thereby gained considerable knowledge and 
experience as a result. They put this experience to 
use across the full spectrum coal mines in 
Queensland, interfacing not only with the SSHRs 
they supported but also with senior mines 
managers and inspectors as well as with other 
actors and institutions involved in health and 
safety issues in coal mines such as company 
lawyers, and mining and health and safety 
specialists, as well as with the courts and specialist 
mining and health and safety institutions. Such a 
high profile and variety of engagement with the 
industry, its regulators, advisors and institutions at 
numerous levels served to further ensure they 
took pains to act within the limits of what they 
understood to be their statutory remit.  
 
This leads us to consider some of the activities of 
both kinds of representatives in a little more 
detail. We begin with their role in relation to risk 
management and the systems in place for 
managing health and safety risks in coal mines.  
 
5.2 Worker representation and the 
system for managing OHS in 
Queensland coal mines 
The introduction of the Coal Mining Safety and 
Health Act 1999 (Qld) (CMSH Act) emphasised 
the adoption of a risk management approach to 
regulating OHS in Queensland coal mines and, as 
we described in Chapter 2, mining companies 
operating mines in Queensland have in place 
both architecture and procedures to meet these 
requirements. Recent research into the operation 
of these systems, however, has argued that in 
terms of effective operation they have a number 
of limitations (see, for example, Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 2012).  
 
Amongst the powers of both SSHRs and ISHRs 
are included processes to enforce safety and 
health management systems established under 
the Act. Subsections 99(5) and (6) require SSHRs 
to inform the site senior executive if they believe 
the safety and health management system at the 
mine to be ineffective. SSHRs are further required 
to advise an inspector if they feel the action taken 
by the SSE to remedy this is not satisfactory. 
Similar requirements are placed on ISHRs under 
section 121. It is therefore instructive to consider 
the extent to which both types of representative 
address themselves to the risk management 
systems in place in the mines, the extent to which 
they find them wanting and the kinds of actions 
they have undertaken to contribute to their 
improvement.  
 
The SSHRs made frequent references to their 
contribution to various elements of the safety and 
health management system, such as risk 
assessments and hazard management plans. 
They played a role in both the synthesis of these 
risk management instruments and in keeping 
them under review:  
 
… a lot of our time has been on risk 
assessments, reviewing principal 
hazard management plans, basically 
updating everything …  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
I do all — inspect, detect, investigate, 
review. I get the whole lot. Mostly its 
review at the moment.  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
The mine safety and health management system 
itself was also frequently mentioned as a focus for 
activity: 
 
Also involved with reviewing the safety 
management system and reviewing or 
auditing the emergency response 
exercises they have.  
(7120023 - SSHR) 
 
SSHRs spoke of spending time reviewing 
documentation, by which they usually meant 
procedures and other written outputs such as 
principal hazard management plans associated 
with the safety and health management system in 
the mine. Many felt the facilities they were given 
to undertake such tasks were limited. There was a 
clear preference among the SSHRs for dealing 
with health and safety issues on site rather than in 
the form of paperwork ─ talking with fellow 
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workers, with supervisors and managers and 
‘hands on’ engagement with the physical 
operation of the mine and mining were seen as 
the ‘real’ business of representation on health 
and safety.  
 
Well basically if I go out and do the 
inspection of the mine site physically. If 
you see something there, then you 
check to see if, it’s wrong so you check 
to see if the paperwork’s right, and if it’s 
not right, you know the reason why it’s 
wrong. So in other words, you see the 
physical side before you do the 
paperwork. A lot of people like to do 
the paperwork, I’m sort of an on hands 
sort of person and I always have been, 
so yes.  
(7120020 - SSHR) 
 
Interviewer: … do you spend more time 
on the management system or do you 
spend more time looking at the 
physical hazards? 
Respondent: I probably spend more 
time with the physical hazards because 
we are part of the crew we’re not based 
in an office upstairs, but that would be 
at work. Spend more time looking at 
the principle hazard management 
system back at your camp or at home.  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
The ISHRs also spoke of reviewing the safety and 
health management systems in the mines they 
visited and the analysis of documented 
inspections shows that such review featured 
prominently amongst their recorded activities 
during site visits with a little over half of the 
inspections recorded (54%) referring to the 
inspection of documentary material (risk 
assessments, records etc.). As Figure 5.1 shows, 
reference only to documentary inspection was 
rare (2% of ISHR records of site visits). It also 
shows that the ISHRs and the Mines Inspectorate 
(MI) focus more on the documentation of the 
safety and health management system than the 
SSHRs do (as might be anticipated from the 
interviews). Patterns of documentary inspection 
between ISHRs and MI inspectors were similar. As 
can be seen from the detail in Table 5.1, the main 
differences between the approaches of ISHRs and 
MI inspectors were that more ISHR reports 
referred to the inspection of documents relating 
to emergency response, training, representatives, 
records/monitoring, the match between 
documentation and practice, and the 
effectiveness of the safety and health 
management system. 
 
Figure 5.1: Relative levels of physical and documentary inspection for ISHRs, SSHRs and MI 
inspectors 
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Table 5.1: Documentary inspection during site visits 
 
TOTAL ISHR MI SSHR 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Safety and health management system (i.e. 
inspection of part of the documented SHMS) 
157 16 59 15 94 17 4 8 
Principal hazard management plan 123 12 53 13 69 12 1 2 
Risk assessment 108 11 51 13 55 10 2 4 
Standard operating procedure 160 16 60 15 95 17 5 10 
Policy  
Fitness for work 37 4 19 5 18 3 0 0 
Working hours 14 1 8 2 6 1 0 0 
Fatigue 21 2 10 3 10 2 1 2 
Stress 5 1 2 1 2 <1 1 2 
Bullying 2 <1 1 <1 1 <1 0 0 
Contractors 
Owner’s policies on 
contractors 
41 4 12 3 29 5 0 0 
Contractors’ documentation 21 2 13 3 8 1 0 0 
Emergency response 37 4 23 6 14 3 0 0 
Training 75 7 43 11 31 6 1 2 
Incidents 74 7 27 7 47 9 0 0 
Representation 
Communication 8 1 5 1 3 1 0 0 
Consultation 8 1 4 1 4 1 0 0 
Representatives 6 1 6 2 0 0 0 0 
Records 156 16 82 20 72 13 2 4 
Match (between documentation and practice) 71 7 50 12 20 4 1 2 
Effectiveness (how well SHMS deals with 
problems) 
36 4 21 5 15 3 0 0 
Other (e.g. statutory reports, presentations by 
managers, safety meeting minutes) 
163 16 76 19 82 15 5 10 
 
Almost all of the mines inspection reports of site 
visits in our sample (96%) referred to the 
inspection of something physical (work areas, 
equipment etc.), but reference only to physical 
inspection was made in half (51%) of them. This 
was most common amongst the SSHR reports, 
reflecting the preference, clearly demonstrated in 
the interviews with them, that these 
representatives have for a ‘hands on’ health and 
safety role within coal mines.  
 
Interviewer: And what sort of routine 
would you have in inspecting?  
Respondent: Well normally you do an 
inspection and you take notes and then 
if you find that something has caught 
your eye or ear, that looks out of place 
or not quite right, well you go back 
after your inspection and you do a 
revision of what procedures are in place 
for that area, whether it’s to do with 
traffic control or what jobs guys are 
doing or conditions, lighting, all that 
sort of thing.  
(7120035 - SSHR) 
 
Focusing only on physical inspection was least 
common amongst ISHR reports. This is perhaps 
best explained by the wider role played by ISHRs 
in relation to reviewing OHS management in the 
coal mines within their jurisdiction, and their 
position external to the mines they visit. As the 
interviews with both them and the SSHRs make 
clear, ISHRs often visited mines either in response 
to requests for support from the mine SSHR or as 
part of proactive mines inspection visits. As one 
SSHR said in answer to a question on his 
impressions of how the ISHRs operate when they 
visit a mine:  
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Respondent: They bounce off us a lot 
for the best places to go and look at, 
the high-risk areas. So they will come 
up to us and say, where is your 
problems? And I will say, well the long 
wall at the moment is shitty and the 
standards… 
Interviewer: So they would start by 
looking at the physical issues? 
Respondent: They will come and talk to 
us first and they will ask us what has 
been happening? Where is your 
problem? And we will say oh well we 
have been having a bit of an issue 
down at development. Well we will go 
and have a look  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
In both cases it might be anticipated that to carry 
out these tasks adequately, the ISHR would need 
to undertake some documentary inspections 
alongside the physical inspections made and that 
the two would be related to one another. Again 
this is borne out by the interview data. 
 
Respondent (ISHR): Okay, what I do, if 
I’m going to a mine, I’ll bring up their 
last six months, or since I’ve last been 
there, of high potential incidents. 
Interviewer: And you’ll do that from 
your desk before you go? 
Respondent: Yes, I plan obviously, I 
ring up and I send a notification that 
I’m coming on this day at this time, 
and I’ll be there for whatever period. 
Then I print out HPIs, I’ll print out 
inspectors’ reports, and I’ll print out 
MREs that I’ve sent to the mine or that 
the SSHRs have sent to the mine. Okay, 
then I’ll simply take a few notes, of 
what I’ve got, you know what I mean? 
Okay, has this been done? You know 
what I mean? If I haven’t been in touch 
and there’s nothing to say, if SSHR 
raises an issue about, let’s say, this 
procedure not meeting standard 
requirements, I’ll go and ask about this 
procedure, and that’ll be done in the 
first instance when I have a meeting 
with the company, I’ll go, I’ll arrive on 
site, on arrival I’ll go to meet with the 
SSE normally or if he’s unavailable, he’ll 
normally send someone to get me, or 
to be with me, we go and, we 
undertake a meeting, and they’ll ask 
what I’m there for, I’ll explain the issues 
or what I’ve got and what I want to 
look at, and then generally we’ll do a, 
we’ll have a meeting about that and 
they’ll provide some documents or 
answers … 
Interviewer: So while you’re in the 
office, you’re trying to find out what 
their process is to address these issues?  
Respondent: Yes, and what they’ve 
done about it … And then I’ll come, 
after that we’ll do a general drive round 
inspection, where I get to see the 
physical workings of the mine they’ll 
take me and give me an overview and 
in the first twelve months, this is our 
first visit to all these mines, generally 
we went and sat up at the thing, this is 
what we do here, this is the type of 
mining we do, they’re the machines we 
have this is what we have here, this is 
our drug and alcohol, this is, so we’ve 
got a general overview of the mine, you 
know what I mean? And some of the 
mines that we went five times, so I’ve 
got more of a general overview, and 
then, so then I’ll do a drive round, we’ll 
go to the wash plant, we’ll do certain 
parts of the mine, and in particular if 
there’s any areas that the SSHR, I’ll 
meet with the SSHRs ...  
(7120027 - ISHR) 
 
Further support for this is found in Figure 5.2, 
which shows that the balance of the inspections 
referring to physical features, documents or both 
has changed significantly over time. In both ISHR 
and MI inspectors’ reports, reference to both 
physical and documentary inspection increased 
from 1999 to 2008. We think it is reasonable to 
conclude that this reflects the effects on practice 
of the introduction of statutory requirements for 
safety and health management systems in 1999. 
Again this is to some extent supported by the 
responses of the interviewees:  
 
I think things have changed… you 
know, our Check Inspectors to me 
appear to be tied up a lot now with the 
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legislation and procedures and that 
type of stuff. … When I first come into 
the role, I used to inspect every 
underground mine twice a year and 
every open cut once a year. … I… 
personally I like the hands-on 
approach. I loved inspecting coal 
mines. I loved going… I’d go out and do 
a midnight inspection. These guys 
[current ISHRs] are probably snowed 
under. A lot of it now is about risk 
assessments and reviewing risk 
assessments and doing that.  
(7120038/9 – Former ISHR) 
 
Interviewer: Has your role changed 
over time, you’ve been doing for 13, 14 
years so. 
Respondent: Yes, it’s, legislation just 
changed a bit … legislation before it 
was very prescriptive, and I tend to find 
that probably a lot easier in my job 
when it was prescriptive, because when 
you had quite a few contractors coming 
through at least it was the same at 
every mine and now they’ve gone to 
this risk, risk management where, 
mines have got all different policies and 
procedures here … 
(7120023 - SSHR) 
 
More difficult to explain, however, is that Figure 
5.2 also demonstrates that reference to both 
types of indicators of OHS management 
performance during their visits to coal mines has 
fallen back in the last five years (Figure 5.2). As 
we will see several times again in the findings 
presented in this chapter, this slowing down or 
reversed trend was also observed in relation to 
several other aspects of the operation of 
arrangements for health and safety management 
in recent years.  
 
Figure 5.2: Comparing relative levels of physical and documentary inspection among ISHRs, 
SSHRs and MI inspectors over time: before the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, 
between 1999 and 2008, and in the last five years 
 
 
Considering relative levels of physical and 
documentary inspection by mine type suggested 
more of the reports on open cut mines referred 
only to physical inspections, while more of those 
on underground mines referred to both physical 
and documentary inspections, in particular 
among ISHR reports of site visits (Figure 5.3). This 
may be a reflection of the general feeling among 
the representatives interviewed that more 
elaborate and complicated arrangements for 
health and safety management occurred in 
underground mines because of the greater and 
more complex risks there and there were more 
documented procedures to manage them as a 
result. Consequently an inspection visit by an 
ISHR, whether prospective or to support the 
SSHR, would be likely to involve more scrutiny of 
documented procedures in underground mines 
simply because there were more there to 
scrutinise.  
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Figure 5.3: Comparing relative levels of physical and documentary inspection among ISHRs, 
SSHRs and MI inspectors by mine type: open cut and underground  
 
 
Overall, it is abundantly clear from documentary 
analysis that the ISHRs and SSHRs have engaged 
appropriately with the safety and health 
management systems adopted by mining 
companies in the mines studied. This finding is 
further corroborated by the interviews with the 
worker representatives themselves, which show 
how the hands-on experiences of safety and 
health issues are used by the representatives to 
help identify, understand and remedy weaknesses 
in the safety management systems and 
procedures in place.  
 
Sometimes problems are identified which require 
attention to be drawn to the safety and health 
management system and under the 1999 Act the 
representatives have a role in reviewing such 
situations and bringing them to the attention of 
the SSE in a formal procedure. Cases in which the 
safety and health management system was found 
be inadequate and which had led to the ISHR 
serving a formal notice to this effect featured in 
5% of the ISHR inspection documents reviewed, 
applying at various times to around half of the 
mines covered. These findings are discussed in 
Section 6.5, in which we examine the use of the 
representatives’ statutory powers to serve notices 
requiring mining company management to take 
action on different aspects of OHS.  
5.3 Communications between 
representatives, workers, 
managers and inspectors 
during inspections  
It is interesting to compare with whom the 
representatives and inspectors held discussions 
during their inspections. As can be seen in Figure 
5.4, our analysis of the documentary material 
shows that the most frequent exchanges took 
place with a mine manager, which might be 
anticipated given that managers were responsible 
for health and safety matters at the inspected 
mines. More than 90 per cent of the inspections 
undertaken by the mines inspectors involved 
discussions with management and 80 per cent of 
those undertaken by ISHRs did too, while the 
SSHRs’ documented engagement with managers 
was some way less, featuring in only 30 per cent 
of their inspections. This is understandable, 
because SSHRs were working within the mine that 
they were inspecting, and could undertake 
routine inspections of the mine, or parts of the 
mine, without needing to contact management. 
ISHRs and SSHRs spoke to workers more 
frequently than did the mines inspectors, as 
might also be anticipated given that they are 
tasked with representing their interests. ISHRs 
engaged with other representatives (almost 
always SSHRs) considerably more frequently than 
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the mines inspectors. Again this might be 
anticipated given that the ISHRs were generally 
visiting the mines in support of the activities of 
the SSHRs who were working there, but 
communication with worker representatives is 
supposed to be an important element of the 
mines inspectors’ visit, so the seemingly very low 
proportion of their inspections in which this 
occurred needs further comment. We return to 
this issue when we consider the support available 
to representatives in Section 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4: Differences in discussion during site visits among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI 
inspectors 
 
 
References to discussion with workers, managers 
and reps also show changes over time (Figures 
5.5 to 5.7). In terms of discussion with workers, 
more ISHR reports refer to such discussion in the 
period following the introduction of the 
legislation (1999 onwards), but over the last five 
years these have fallen back again (Figure 5.5). 
However, ISHR discussion with both SSHRs and 
managers has increased over time (Figures 5.6 
and 5.7). Among MI inspector reports, however, 
references to discussion with workers fell and 
then levelled out (Figure 5.5) while those to 
discussion with SSHRs and managers rose 
(Figures 5.6 and 5.7).  
 
Figure 5.5: Differences in discussion with workers among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI inspectors 
over time 
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Figure 5.6: Differences in discussion with managers among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI inspectors 
over time 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Differences in discussion with representatives among ISHRs, SSHRs and MI 
inspectors over time 
 
 
It seems most likely that differences in the extent 
of the engagement between those inspecting the 
mines and mine workers, their representatives 
and managers over time may to some extent 
reflect regulatory changes. Thus, with one or two 
exceptions (MI inspectors and workers, and 
SSHRs and managers), the ‘risk-based’ provisions 
of the 1999 Act seem to have stimulated greater 
engagement between inspectors, representatives, 
management and workers. It may be that 
subsequent instruction to inspectors to be more 
active in seeking out representatives may have 
aided sustaining the communications between 
these two groups. However, the explanation for 
the observed reduction in engagement between 
both ISHRs and SSHRs and workers and between 
SSHRs and managers since 2009 cannot be 
explained by legislative changes.  
 
As well as being to some extent driven by 
legislative requirements, the nature of relations 
between the mines inspectorate and both types 
of worker representative are important in 
determining the form and extent of support the 
representatives’ experience in relation to their 
activities. We will explore these relations in 
greater detail in the following section (5.4).  
 
5.4 Support for worker 
representation in health and 
safety arrangements on site 
Many of the studies of health and safety 
representatives reviewed in Chapter 3 identify 
provision of support for their role as a strong 
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research). In particular, research in other sectors 
identifies trades unions, employers and the 
regulatory inspectorate as the key institutional 
players in the provision of support. Additionally, 
virtually all studies agree that there is a strong link 
between training and the effectiveness of health 
and safety representatives, with better trained 
representatives being found to be considerably 
more effective than poorly trained 
representatives in almost all aspects of their 
activity. Moreover, studies of worker 
representation in health and safety also identify 
support for representatives from the workers in 
their constituencies as important factors 
influencing both their confidence and behaviour. 
Although very little of this research has 
concerned the mining industry, there is no reason 
to suppose the situation would be any different 
here. We have, therefore, examined the 
experience of the provision of support for the 
SSHRs and ISHRs from these sources as well as 
considered their experience of training. We begin 
with the role of the trade union and in particular 
the ISHRs in providing support for the SSHRs.  
 
5.4.1 Support from trades unions and 
the ISHRs  
The legislative framework for worker 
representation in Queensland coal mines is 
unusual in that it provides for a two tier system, 
consisting of work health and safety 
representatives (SSHRs) elected from among the 
mine workers of specific mines, that are 
supported in their role by full-time trade union 
health and safety officers (ISHRs) appointed and 
paid by the main miners’ trade union. This 
approach is not unique in mining. As we have 
discussed earlier in this report, it has developed 
from long-standing regulatory provisions 
originally introduced in the UK towards the end 
of the 19
th
 century — but it is different from 
legislative arrangements applying more generally 
in other sectors. It is, therefore, important to ask 
what value the difference adds to the operation 
of the system. While policy advisers and 
regulators have generally found the Queensland 
framework a useful approach, and have on 
occasion suggested it should serve as a model 
for mining elsewhere (for example the recent 
Royal Commission inquiry into the Pike River 
tragedy recommended such a course), mining 
companies have been more critical and have 
suggested that at best its requirements are over-
elaborate, and at worst they may serve to hinder 
productivity without adding anything to improve 
OHS outcomes. The main focus of disagreement 
about the system is concerned with the role of 
the ISHRs. However, neither the positive nor the 
negative views of the system have been 
supported with robust research evidence for their 
assertions. Therefore, the present inquiry 
considers the evidence of what the position of 
ISHR adds to more conventional approaches to 
worker representation on health and safety. As 
we have recounted already, there is compelling 
evidence to suggest that through exercising their 
regulatory functions, powers of review and direct 
intervention, ISHRs play a positive role in 
improving the operation of arrangements for 
managing OHS. Equally important is the extent of 
the additional, albeit indirect, role they play in 
achieving improvement through providing 
counsel, advice, information, and training support 
for the activities of the SSHRs. It is with these 
activities that we are concerned in this section. 
 
A strong theme running through all of the 
interviews we conducted with the SSHRs was the 
extent to which they valued the support they 
received from the ISHRs: 
 
Like always … no matter what time of 
day or night we ring up, leave a 
message or something, they’ll always 
get back to us and always good for 
advice. People have some issues — 
might’ve been to do with an injury they 
got from work or something like that. 
We can point them in that direction. 
They’ve never ever let us down. And 
they’re always there and I guess it’s just 
like a family, once every twelve months 
you all get together and everyone 
telling everyone what goes on in their 
mine and they’re trying to tell us, — 
hey, we need to get better at this, or 
this view and that, sort of thing. They’re 
… look, without them we can’t survive. 
(7120036 - SSHR) 
 
There are several elements of this support 
captured in the above quote, which was typical of 
many such responses from the SSHRs. First, there 
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was the sense of the availability of the ISHRs. 
Again this availability and willingness to respond 
was often repeated in the interviews:  
 
Any time I have had any concerns … I’d 
just ring them and if I couldn’t get a 
hold of them, they’d all ring back.  
(7120042 - SSHR)  
 
… like when you first take on this role, 
it’s a bit daunting, but as you find your 
feet, become more confident with what 
you’re doing, you probably have less 
coaching and more guidance. That’s 
probably the best way to describe it. 
You only probably ring them once a 
week at the start, because you don’t 
know whether you’re really going about 
it the right way or whatever, yeah, after 
a while, with the coaching they give 
you, then it’s just down to guidance.  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
Second, there is their reliability. For example, they 
could be relied upon to provide information and 
advice: 
 
If you couldn’t find out information 
yourself, they’d be the first point of call. 
And if you weren’t sure about which 
way to go on a decision, ring them.  
(7120035 - SSHR) 
 
But they provided more than advice and 
information. Third, there was a strong feeling 
among the SSHRs that the ISHRs understood the 
difficult situations in which the SSHRs found 
themselves – perhaps not least because they 
knew that the ISHRs had themselves been SSHRs 
in the past. They could be relied upon to give 
counsel and help to maintain the morale of the 
SSHRs, both when they were new and feeling 
overwhelmed by their tasks, as well as when they 
were dealing with difficult issues.  
 
… no I have never had any issues with 
any of the industry safety and health 
reps, they have always been more than 
helpful and, you know, steer you on the 
right path, yeah. And like I said, when I 
was new on the role, in [mine name], I 
was always ringing them up and, you 
know, they never said, not this prick 
again… 
(7120013 - SSHR) 
 
I just run by him what we're doing ... 
what action we need to take and they 
might give us another avenue that we 
can follow or whatever, but they'll 
normally back us up and say, you're 
doing it right, you're doing it right … or 
you're doing it wrong — this is what 
you should be doing. But most times 
they'll be backing us up and that's 
what we're looking for, that's where the 
situation is now.  
(0650032 - SSHR) 
 
There was also a sense of the way in which the 
expertise of the ISHRs was valued, but also of the 
continuity of the support that the trade union had 
established through the ISHRs and of the 
expertise they brought to their role:  
 
Interviewer: So, how would, overall, 
how would you describe the support 
that you get from the ISHRs? 
Respondent: You couldn’t describe it. 
It’s a wealth of knowledge that you 
couldn’t put in a book. A database 
couldn’t do it, it’s just, the experience 
that they’ve got. … and that knowledge 
seems to get passed on to the next 
people that get elected in that position, 
these three boys aren’t the first three 
industry reps I’ve worked with. It does 
seem to get passed on, I don’t know 
what you’d do without them.  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
There was a further strong sense of the authority 
carried by the ISHRs. If necessary, they could be 
called upon to intervene and their intervention 
would carry weight beyond that which the SSHRs 
were able to command. This was seen as 
indispensable in enabling the SSHRs to be 
effective: 
  
Interviewer: … if they got rid of the 
industry reps, how would that affect 
your work?  
Respondent: No well it would just 
make it bloody twice as hard trying to 
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get anything done because it does help 
to have those blokes to come out and 
give you some back up and they can 
bloody put some weight in it too, you 
know … they can steer you in the right 
direction if you are not sure of 
anything. Like I said, most of the time 
we can fix things on our own but if you 
need those guys well they will come in 
and bloody help you out you know … 
Yeah, because they are a critical role to 
me. We can’t do without them.  
(7120013 - SSHR) 
 
These sentiments were corroborated by the 
ISHRs’ own descriptions of what they did and 
how they saw their role, in which both their 
support for the SSHRs and their role as external 
back-up were prominent themes:  
 
Like they’ll ring up for — I got this 
issue, I need some advice — and that’s 
more what our role should be for them, 
to help advise them, not saying we 
know everything either but if they ring 
up and they got an issue, say, well, 
have you thought about attacking it 
this way? Or going that way? Or, have 
a look at … or I’m not sure about this, 
I’ll have to do some homework and I’ll 
get back to you. We should be helping 
them to run the ball up at first and if 
they hit trouble or something we can 
come in and take the ball off them and 
run it up for them.  
(7120034 - ISHR) 
 
Although a major element of the work of the 
ISHRs involved planned inspections of coal mines, 
which were prioritised according to conditions of 
work in the mines across the Queensland 
coalfield, they also regarded themselves as part 
of a system in which mine workers’ health and 
safety were protected through the 
implementation of statutory requirements for on-
site safety and health management systems and 
procedures. They were aware that mine workers’ 
participation in these procedures was provided 
for both directly through statutory requirements 
for their direct engagement in the development 
of the procedures, and indirectly, through the 
activities of the on-site SSHRs. As the above 
quote makes clear, the ISHRs saw themselves as 
supporting the role of the latter by giving advice, 
information and building confidence to enable 
the SSHRs to act on their own in relation to mine 
management, as well as being there at the mines 
when needed. In addition, in their mine visits they 
sought time with ordinary mine workers to seek 
their views on OHS issues and to gauge the 
extent to which they participated directly in the 
risk management procedures as required under 
the law.  
 
There was also a strong sense in the responses 
from the ISHRs that not only were they trying to 
encourage the SSHRs to act more independently 
in relation to the management of the mines, but 
also to be more strategic in building consultative 
relations with managers in order to obtain better 
outcomes. They were aware that this required 
skills that would take time and support for the 
SSHRs to perfect. As one ISHR said of his 
interaction with a SSHR:  
 
I told him, I said, don’t ring me … Go 
through the process and try to get the 
company to come round so they can 
show that you’re trying to be 
consultative. “Cos, you know, you’re 
going to have to hopefully work there 
for another five years as a checkie. 
Don’t go and belt them first off and 
then keep getting a flogging every 
time.”  
(7120037 - ISHR) 
 
In addition they used their position to encourage 
mine managers to take consultation with the 
SSHRs more seriously, so when in conversation 
with mine managers they would often stress the 
idea that listening to the SSHRs could help the 
mine managers in ensuring that the mine was 
kept safe and within the requirements of the law: 
 
So we all go and talk, yes, yes, here 
look, this bloke’s actually here to keep 
you out of jail. That’s how I sell them. 
He’s your eyes and ears. He’s the voice 
of your workforce that either don’t 
want to or are afraid to put their hands 
up.  
(7120033 – Former ISHR)  
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As well as their every-day support for the SSHRs 
in their activities and relations with management, 
the other major form of trade union mediated 
support in which the ISHRs were centrally 
involved was the annual training conference for 
the SSHRs, which they played a major part in 
organising and which they also used as an 
informal way of better getting to know the SSHRs 
and their issues. There were two training 
conferences each year, run separately for 
underground and open-cast mines and each 
held over the course of a week. All the SSHRs 
interviewed regarded these training conferences 
positively. They spoke warmly about how 
attending the conference as newly elected SSHRs 
had helped them: 
 
It was very helpful for me when I 
started, as the site safety health rep, 
‘cos I knew jack about legislation, I 
knew jack you know ... you know you 
could stand up for yourself and that's 
the stuff but it come to the legislation 
and I had no clue and that's what the 
conference does ... then enlightens you 
as the role of the site safety and health 
representative and the whole, this is 
what you do, this is how it's done and 
this is through the legislation, … , they 
used to give you a little book ... and 
these are where your involvement is in 
the legislation and what you may have 
to use. That's what you learn. And also 
it's not just that, it's that you have, we 
get a lot of inspectors come there and 
so you get access to them and you get 
a lot of conversations with explosives 
about fumes and stuff but they're there 
you know ... the different inspectors 
that come there you got access to 
those people.  
(0650032 - SSHR) 
 
They said the conferences provided a continuing 
source of help, even for the more experienced 
representatives. As well as training them to better 
understand and use the legislation and 
regulations, and hearing from inspectors and 
other experts on technical and other matters, 
they also valued the conferences for the 
opportunity they offered to learn from each other 
and about the experiences of SSHRs in other 
mines: 
 
Yeah, just hearing how the other pits 
are going as well. What struggles some 
of the other checkies have from other 
pits with companies and stuff.  
(7120035 - SSHR)  
 
There were several examples given of practical 
innovations on safety in other mines that SSHRs 
had learned about from their colleagues while 
attending the conference which they felt could 
usefully applied to their own situations: 
 
Like, you know, there’s probably mines 
out there that are using… like (names a 
mine) for instance, with the shuttle 
cars, they had a thing on the back 
when they pick up the cables and stuff 
like that, which I thought was a great 
idea ‘cos we’re introducing these shuttle 
cars …  
… Gives you email address, gives you 
all these photos and stuff like that you 
know … somewhere along the line 
somebody out there’s got something 
somebody else is going to need to use 
one day. So if you can get all the 
information off all them people it’s 
great. 
(7120041 - SSHR) 
  
I had an issue with the bathhouse, 
another bloke down south had an issue 
and we were flicking emails backwards 
and forwards and one had machinery 
fires, we just had … so, and they’d flick 
it out to everyone, hey, this is what’s 
happened. So, yeah, no, it’s good, good 
like that.  
(7120042 - SSHR) 
 
Indeed the experience of the training conference 
was so positive the SSHRs were frequently vocal 
in expressing a wish for more of the same kind of 
training to be provided: 
 
Oh I reckon it was great. I reckon there 
should be more of them personally, like 
one a year for me is not enough. I 
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reckon there should be two, at least 
two, because things change.  
 (7120041 - SSHR) 
 
And:  
 
Training wise, I’m pretty sure we could 
do some more training.  
(7120017 - SSHR) 
 
Further endorsement of the value of the ISHR 
role in supporting the SSHRs was provided by the 
senior representative of the Mines Inspectorate 
interviewed who said: 
 
…look, the relationship of the Industry 
Safety and Health Representatives with 
the workforce is excellent. I believe the 
workforce views them as a party that 
they can take their concerns to if they 
hit a brick wall trying to deal with 
management.  
(7120032 – Senior Mines Inspector) 
 
On their achievement in this capacity he went on 
to say: 
 
Oh look they’ve achieved a great deal. 
There’s absolutely no doubt about it. So 
if there’s any question mark about is it 
a role that shouldn’t exist. Bullshit. It’s a 
role that needs to exist. 
 (7120032 – Senior Mines Inspector) 
  
In summary then, the SSHRs were unanimous in 
their view of the added value provided by the 
ISHRs in enabling them to undertake their 
functions effectively and use their powers 
appropriately. There was no dissent concerning 
the crucial nature of the support they provided in 
this respect, through training, mentoring, advising 
and informing the representatives, as well as 
none concerning the various aspects of their role 
outlined previously in which they engaged more 
directly with management or with coal workers. 
This was a view that was given some substance 
by the accounts of their activities provided by the 
ISHRs themselves, and it was further 
corroborated from the perspective of the Mines 
Inspectorate.  
 
5.4.2 Support from workers 
The SSHRs were also positive about support they 
felt they received from their fellow workers. Most 
were unequivocal concerning this: 
 
Oh yeah, yeah. No they’re really 
good….yeah I think we have got full 
support from them. 
(0650032 - SSHR) 
 
And: 
 
Oh yeah, yeah. Well probably too 
much at times. They think I can wave 
the wand and make things appear and 
vanish!  
(7120040 - SSHR) 
 
Occasionally some SSHRs were somewhat more 
reflective, especially concerning their feelings of 
isolation and responsibility:  
 
Interviewer: And do you feel you have 
the support of your fellow workers? 
Respondent: Sometimes yeah. It’s a 
pretty lonely job at times … People are 
funny, they will soon bag us, but like I 
said at the start, occasionally some 
bugger will walk past us and say you 
guys are doing a good job … So yeah 
they are pretty supportive.  
(7120014 - SSHR)  
 
Indeed, in a few cases this support extended to 
situations in which SSHRs had been involved in 
difficult confrontations with management and 
had drawn some confidence from the knowledge 
that their actions had the confidence of their 
fellow workers: 
 
… they were told to go back to work 
and they refused to go back until I gave 
them direction. That sits very highly in 
my book — that they had 
management telling them to do 
something and they wouldn’t do it. 
They were waiting for my instruction. 
That tells me that they believe in what I 
am doing.  
(7120021 - SSHR)  
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However, interviewees were somewhat less 
unequivocal about the support for representation 
on health and safety that was provided from 
other sources — as we discuss in the following 
sub-sections.  
 
5.4.3 Support for representation 
provided by mining company 
management 
Studies of the operation of regulatory 
arrangements on worker representation make it 
clear that the positive support for such 
arrangements from the leadership and 
management of the organisations to which they 
apply is a major factor influencing their 
effectiveness (Walters and Nichols, 2007; Walters 
et al, 2012). There are many ways in which such 
positive support can be provided. They include: 
sufficient time to undertake functions provided 
for under the legislation; facilities to enable these 
functions to be undertaken efficiently, such as 
telephone, report writing, information retrieval 
and storage support; as well as the provision of 
training on health and safety matters and release 
from work without loss of pay to attend this 
training or that provided by others; and also 
more generally in terms of the responsiveness of 
managers to the concerns of the representatives. 
Experience of the extent of the formal provision 
of support in terms to time and facilities varied 
considerably among the SSHRs. When asked 
about the time they were allowed to undertake 
their functions, some were clearly happy with the 
arrangements: 
 
No, that’s where [name of fellow SSHR] 
are lucky I suppose ‘cos we’re not in 
panels all the time, like we are stuck 
outbye for that reason. So if something 
happens they can just call us up or 
whatever and get us to fix that sort of 
stuff.  
(7120041 - SSHR) 
 
… if I need, or something was to come 
up, I just tell the manager I’m going for 
inspection and I just do it.  
(7120042 - SSHR) 
 
In other situations, however, there were 
restrictions on the time allowed and a strong 
feeling among the SSHRs that it was not sufficient 
to enable them to perform their tasks:  
 
Interviewer: Is there anything that can 
be done to improve your role? 
Respondent: Yes, give us more time to 
fulfil our obligations under the 
legislation, one day a month, as far as 
I’m concerned, is nowhere near 
enough. 
Interviewer: Is that effectively how 
much time you’re given? 
Respondent: It’s not under legislation. 
It’s all the mine will give me. … we don’t 
get time, we don’t get time.  
(7120021 - SSHR) 
 
The same representative echoed the sentiments 
of several others when he explained that they 
were obliged to undertake many tasks in their 
own time:  
 
Respondent: … I’ll be honest I put on 
average five to ten hours a week of my 
own time into this now, you’ve got to 
have a personal life. I do it when my 
wife is at work, so my wife doesn’t 
know what I’m doing. 
Interviewer: I see. 
Respondent: It’s like having the 
mistress, you know, my wife doesn’t 
need to know ‘cos it eats into your 
private life. And I’ll be honest, it affects 
your private life. It’s affected mine.  
(7120021 - SSHR) 
 
While some of the SSHRs complained of the 
formal restrictions placed on the time available to 
undertake their safety tasks, a more subtle 
constraint commonly experienced was that of 
feeling unable to attend to many immediate 
health and safety issues because the crews in 
which the SSHRs worked would have to cover 
their work for them or may even be unable to 
complete their allocated tasks without them:  
 
Interviewer: Are there any particular 
obstacles … to you performing your 
role? 
Respondent: Time … since August last 
year, we’re no longer extra to the crew, 
we are part of the crew, so if I don’t go 
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down and drive the miner, my crew is 
short, if they’re short, they can’t cut … 
So we’re not extra like we used to be, … 
an extra person would fit in where we 
could, but if we had a role to do, which 
we’re supposed to be able to do, it’s go 
and do that role. But now we’ve got to 
balance. Is that important enough to 
warrant us not doing our job? Whereas 
before we could go upstairs and sort it 
out. 
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
And: 
 
Interviewer: That’s a big thing. I mean 
you can point to the legal powers as 
much as you like, but if you’re working 
with a group 
Respondent: it lets them down. And 
the boys want you there, but the thing 
is it puts more pressure on them. 
(7120020 - SSHR) 
 
As these quotes show, the extent to which the 
SSHRs were able to find time to undertake their 
functions was dependent on a combination of 
factors. They included: the kind of tasks their 
mining job entailed and how much they were 
involved in working in teams or with machinery 
for which their continued presence was necessary 
to maintain production; the ease or 
appropriateness of their replacement to enable 
them to undertake their functions; and the 
attitudes of supervisors, middle and senior 
managers towards prioritising the health and 
safety activities of the SSHRs in relation to the 
routines of their normal job. The result of this 
combination was that it was relatively rare for the 
SSHRs we interviewed to suggest that they were 
able to get on with their health and safety related 
activities unfettered by concerns about their work 
tasks. Most sought to find an acceptable balance 
between the two and this was facilitated or 
frustrated by the attitude of managers and 
supervisors. All had at times had been frustrated 
by constraints on their health and safety activities 
as a result. Most of them also said that a further 
consequence of the need to achieve this balance 
was that they undertook a variety of health and 
safety related tasks in their own time.  
 
When asked what could be done to improve the 
situation many of the SSHRs talked about being 
provided with designated time away from their 
normal job to carry out their health and safety 
tasks. Some had achieved this already, but all 
agreed that designated time would not address 
the all problems they faced — such as needing to 
react to incidents or concerns at short notice. 
Some SSHRs had found the intervention of the 
ISHRs useful in supporting their need for such 
time and the ISHRs also commented that they 
not infrequently were required to intercede with 
managers concerning the importance of allowing 
the SSHRs time and facilities to undertake their 
tasks. Moreover, as one SSHR previously quoted 
typically indicated, some SSHRs had noticed the 
provision of time to undertake their health and 
safety activities had lessened as the result of 
relatively recent managerial decisions — ‘…since 
August last year we are no longer extra to the 
crew…’. Changes in management personnel and 
different management attitudes and approaches 
that resulted from them were seen as partially 
responsible for this situation:  
 
It depends who the management is at 
the time. Previous management knew 
that if we stopped something it was to 
help them out because we knew if they 
kept going they would get someone 
hurt and they would be in the shit … 
and the SSE we have got now, well he 
has got a different opinion.  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
Another aspect of the mixed experiences 
reported concerning support that was provided 
by employers was found in the extent of the 
dedicated facilities that were available to SSHRs:  
 
At the mine yeah. So we have got our 
own room. We have got our own office 
where we have got a computer; we 
have got access to a safety health 
management system and all that sort 
of stuff … So anybody knows where we 
are if they want to come and see us 
and the management is the same 
because they use us as well to help 
them.  
(7120014 - SSHR)  
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I think … if you’re going to do the job 
properly we should have all the same 
computers, somewhere to put 
everything, phones. Mate, we struggle, 
we do, we struggle. So I used to do it, I 
used to pay my own phone, and 
everything like that sort of thing, then 
the union paid it, that’s it. Now the 
company … they want to control it. 
Take it off us … it’s not good.’  
(712020 - SSHR) 
 
Interviewer: Do you have a room that 
you can use …? 
Respondent: Oh we got one little 
computer room that all the Deputies 
share. So there’s just … it’s like going to 
Woollies, take a number until you get 
in there and start and use it. Yeah, it’s 
not too bad. 
Interviewer: But there’s no dedicated 
space? 
Respondent: No, [name of fellow 
SSHR] and I are trying to sort that out 
at the moment, sort of get our own 
little office so we can stick stuff in there. 
Interviewer 2: Is that essential do you 
think for the role? 
Respondent: I think it is. Because, you 
know, if you want something… 
especially if you’ve got filing cabinets, 
you already got stuff in there and stuff 
like that, you can just walk in there and 
grab whatever you need and say, okay, 
here it is. But you’ve got to try and find 
a computer that no-one’s using and sit 
down and, you know … take longer.  
Interviewer: And how supportive do 
you think the SSE is in terms of giving 
you that kind of space?  
Respondent: I think it’s going to be 
hard.  
(7120041 - SSHR) 
 
These issues of SSHRs not having enough time, 
or sufficient facilities, to carry out their SSHR role 
point to gaps in the Coal Mine Safety and Health 
Act 1999, which does not specifically require mine 
operators or SSEs to ensure that SSHs have the 
time and facilities necessary for them to perform 
their SSHR role. By way of contrast, the 
harmonised Work Health and Acts place 
obligations on all persons conducting a business 
or undertaking to provide any resources, facilities 
and assistance to a HSR that are reasonably 
necessary to enable the representative to exercise 
her or his powers or perform her functions 
(section 70(1)(f)), and must allow a HSR to spend 
such time (with the pay that the HSR would be 
entitled to if performing his or her normal duties) 
as is reasonably necessary to exercise his or her 
powers and perform his or her functions under 
the Act (sub-sections 70(2) and (3)). 
 
On the provision by employers of training on 
health and safety, the majority of SSHRs 
acknowledged that their employers allowed them 
to attend the annual training conference run by 
the trade union, but added their employers 
provided little or nothing at all themselves in the 
way of dedicated training for SSHRs: 
 
Well what I’m saying is, at the moment, 
the only ones that train us is the union. 
The company should be training us, at 
least something you know.  
(7120020 - SSHR) 
 
Several pointed out that training from the 
company would be extremely useful, especially 
that covering the risks associated with new 
machinery or processes, as well as technical 
training on known risks such as those arising from 
the use of hazardous chemicals, explosives or 
dangerous machinery and company procedures 
for their assessment and management:  
 
… yeah, training on the company side 
thing, there’s no training from the 
company. Yeah, we probably go to the 
conference. See you later. That’s about 
it. They don’t … you got to always ask 
and follow up, you know, can I get 
involved in ICAM? Can I get ICAM 
training? Can I get this? Can I get that? 
You’re never approached to say, hey, 
you’re an SSHR, we have a 
responsibility to assist and help you 
conduct your role as best as possible. 
How about you come do some ICAM 
training? No, I’ve got to go and ask for 
that. Whether they feel I require it or 
not, you know, just … so I understand 
their process. So I think on the 
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company’s behalf, I’d get the training 
but I’ve got to keep asking, I’ve got to 
follow it up and all that. And it just 
seems to take forever.  
(7120042 - SSHR) 
 
Experience of support more generally for their 
role from the management of the companies for 
which they worked was also mixed. Some SSHRs 
spoke of having good relations with the company 
management and especially with the SSE, which 
meant they felt they were listened to and were 
able to get things done. Others spoke of SSEs 
who were dismissive of their concerns, who were 
not willing to meet with them and who 
themselves were often recent appointments and 
whose knowledge of the legislative requirements 
applying at the mine was limited. They spoke of 
bureaucratic systems and procedures in place 
which sometimes made it difficult for them to 
respond swiftly to issues raised by fellow workers 
or to incidents when they were located at places 
in the mine at some distance from where the 
SSHR was working. They also suggested that the 
safety managers employed by the company were 
mostly concerned with following paper trails in 
the safety management system: 
 
Respondent: The safety department I 
should say, they don’t do safety, all 
they control is the safety management 
scheme, the paperwork, they look after 
it, make sure it’s right, and they don’t 
even go out and wander round the 
mine site, the only safety officer you’ve 
got out there is the open cut 
examiners, I suppose they class their 
foremans as safety officers, but they’re 
not, they’re production, and the 
checkies, the site safety health reps. 
Interviewer: Are you saying that the 
consequence of that is that the safety 
department is really just caught up with 
that paperwork? 
Respondent: Yes, that’s all they do. 
Interviewer: So it’s the paper system 
that they spend all their time with?  
Respondent: That’s right, that’s exactly 
right. Well see, they don’t even go out 
and ask the workers are they alright, 
you know, can we help you, can we do 
it, they don’t even talk to them. And 
they’ve moved them, (names company) 
they’ve moved most of them to 
Brisbane. 
(7120020 - SSHR) 
 
Where limitations in the support offered to the 
activities of the SSHRs by the mine management 
were perceived, they were usually understood 
and characterised by the representatives as 
resulting from three main trends in the way in 
which work in the mines was currently managed. 
First, as the above quote illustrates, an over-
reliance on the existence of documented safety 
and health management systems and procedures 
was felt to obscure or reduce the responsiveness 
to the more hands-on safety concerns held by 
the workers’ representatives. Linked to this was a 
second concern about the rapid turnover among 
senior mine management, which was regarded as 
having increased considerably in recent years, 
leading to dependence on these management 
systems replacing intimate first-hand knowledge 
of safety in the mines for which they were 
responsible being held by senior managers. 
Representatives often felt strongly that managers 
were not in post long enough to gain really 
useful experience of the way these issues could 
be most usefully addressed or of the role of the 
SSHR as their ‘eyes and ears’ in this respect. The 
short-term duration of their stay was also 
frustrating for some of the more experienced 
representatives who felt they had invested 
considerable time and effort in building good 
relations with particular senior managers only to 
find them replaced just when this time and effort 
were beginning to pay off. Furthermore, the 
effects of such turnover were seen to extend to 
middle and supervisory management, causing 
them to become more dependent on the 
documented safety and health management 
system and ‘perform’ according to its 
bureaucratic requirements, rather than to be 
more responsive to the practical health and 
safety observations of the workers’ 
representatives. This created a feeling among the 
representatives that if issues of concern to them 
were not ‘in the system’ then it could be difficult 
to get them addressed. 
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5.4.4 Support from the inspectorate 
The Mines Inspectorate is committed to 
sustaining dialogue with health and safety 
representatives both during the visits of 
inspectors to the mines and through engagement 
with both the ISHRs and SSHRs off-site. The 
senior mines inspector we interviewed made this 
commitment clear during his interview: 
 
… whenever we go to the site we want 
to be able to meet with these guys. We 
want to have open communication 
channels with them. … They are seen 
as a key part of managing safety.  
(7120032 – Senior Mines Inspector) 
 
However, as section 5.3 makes clear, although 
the proportion of mines inspectorate visits in 
which SSHRs were present has increased in 
recent years, it remains the case that by no 
means all the records of such inspections include 
mention of the presence of the SSHR. Indeed, 
even among the more recent records in which 
such a presence is mentioned more than twice as 
frequently than previously, it still occurred in only 
one third of the total number of inspection 
reports analysed. Of the 605 reports from Mines 
Inspectors that we included in our analysis of 
documentation, 555 (92%) referred to an 
inspectorate visit to the mine (the remainder 
referred to, postal entries and meetings at 
inspectorate headquarters). Figure 5.8 
summarises these data, which were also 
elaborated in section 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.8: Reference to SSHR presence during inspectorate mine visits over time 
 
 
The interpretation of these data is perhaps best 
aided by the remarks of the senior inspector we 
interviewed. When asked how inspectors actually 
go about interacting with SSHRs when they are at 
the coal mine, he explained: 
 
… they advise the mine they’re coming. 
The SSE is obligated to tell the Site 
Safety and Health rep that an Inspector 
is going to be on site … in advance of 
the inspection. That advice might 
actually say to the SSE as a reminder, 
make sure you let the SSHRs know we 
coming. Now having said that, the 
absence of that advice doesn’t give the 
SSE the option not to tell the SSHR. So 
I’m a little bit wary about that advice 
because I don’t want it to come back as 
if it’s the Inspector’s obligation. It’s 
actually the SSE’s obligation. So when 
the Inspector actually arrives on the 
site, he will ask is the SSHR available? 
Then, given him being available or not 
available, he will, when he fills out his 
mine record entry he will actually make 
a note of whether the SSHR was made 
available. So they’re the three checks. 
What should happen is that the SSHR 
should be able to accompany the 
Inspector on his inspection. That’s what 
should happen. 
(7120032 – Senior Mines Inspector) 
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But this is clearly not what happened in just over 
half of the records that we analysed of such 
inspections undertaken between 2009 and 2013. 
They made no mention of whether or not a SSHR 
had been present during the inspection. 
Therefore, despite the senior inspector’s remarks, 
in the largest proportion of the most recent 
records we analysed there was no note of 
whether or not the SSHR had been made 
available. It would seem that the most likely 
inference from this is that the SSHRs remain 
excluded from a substantial proportion of visits 
by mines inspectors. The representatives 
themselves reported a mixed experience 
concerning notification of the visits of inspectors. 
Some told us they believed they were always 
informed of these visits in advance, and they 
generally accompanied the inspector during the 
inspection, while others were more unsure of 
how systematically they were informed of 
inspectors’ visits and some felt that their 
management were less than helpful with such 
information ─ if they informed them at all, it was 
frequently telling them that the inspector was 
there at times when they were unavailable:  
 
Interviewer: So are you’re saying … 
they don’t visit the mine very much or 
when they do visit the mine, you’re 
either not there or don’t…? 
Respondent: Yeah, I’m not there or … 
but it’s strange because they’re 
supposed to notify me. They always 
notify me when I’m on days off, they’ll 
say, oh we’ve got the Inspector here, 
they have the obligation, they notify 
me. …. So I don’t know. I’ve never had 
a conversation with a Mines Inspector 
on site in twelve months. 
(7120040 - SSHR) 
 
This was confirmed by the documentary 
evidence, as the following extracts from an MI 
mine record entry and an ISHR report, both 
written relatively recently (2007 and 2012 
respectively), illustrate: 
 
Unfortunately the Site Safety Health 
Representative had not been informed 
of the visit and therefore not available 
to accompany the Inspectorate. 
(MI mine record entry) 
 I was met by [name of Pre-Strip 
Manager] at the security gate. As we 
proceeded through the security gate 
and to [name of Pre-Strip Manager] 
office I asked where the SSHR [name of 
SSHR] was. [Name of Pre-Strip 
Manager] informed me that he wasn’t 
on site. I advised [name of Pre-Strip 
Manager] that I had been in contact 
with [name of SSHR] and knew he was 
on site. [Name of Pre-Strip Manager] 
advised me that he would contact his 
supervisor and to see if he can be 
released. Must I remind the Site Senior 
Executive (SSE) of section 118 (2) (b) of 
the Coal Mining Safety and health Act 
1999 (CMSHA) 
(ISHR report) 
 
One ISHR pointed out that the legislation did not 
require the Inspector to make contact with the 
Site Safety and Health Representatives: 
 
But it’s not actually in the legislation, 
it’s not up the inspectors to notify the 
local checkies, the SSEs supposed to do 
that.  
(7120034 - ISHR) 
 
Despite this, in his view whether the SSHRs were 
likely to meet inspectors during their inspection 
could still be strongly influenced by the attitude 
of the inspectors themselves:  
 
Depends on the Inspector. Some 
inspectors are pretty proactive about 
that and some aren’t.  
(7120034 - ISHR) 
  
On the whole, the representatives had also had a 
rather mixed experience of interactions with 
inspectors, some finding them helpful, especially 
in relation to technical or legal issues:  
 
I’ll even go to say that some of the 
Mine Inspectors at times are very 
helpful. …. Yeah, yeah. You use them 
for what they’re there for, you know.  
(7120036 - SSHR) 
 
This seemed to be especially the case among the 
more experienced representatives, perhaps 
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because they had had greater opportunity to get 
to know the inspectors:  
 
Respondent: I know a few of them as 
well, back in the 90s, they were 
probably working next to me, not 
where they are now, when you see 
them, they’re friendly, which is all right. 
A few of them are probably better than 
others, some of them are very good at 
their job you’re just not sure what job 
they’re doing. Normally I’ll get an email 
telling me they’re coming. I’ve been 
fortunate the last couple of years with 
the amount of trouble we’ve had at 
work with the oxidation and everything 
else, they’re up there nearly every 
month, it wasn’t hard to build a 
relationship with them, and now you’ve 
got all their numbers and you can ring 
them if you need them. 
Interviewer: And do you do that now? 
Respondent: Occasionally I’ve had to, 
that’s something that they’ve 
suggested … 
Interviewer: So would you say they’re a 
useful resource and a useful form of 
support to you? 
Respondent: They are to me, I know 
they’re not to everybody, they are to 
me.  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
Mines inspectors are very often mining 
professionals who have previously worked in the 
mines as engineers and managers themselves. 
Indeed, it was frequently pointed out by workers’ 
representatives and the senior mine inspector 
that this employment history, as well as the 
practice in some cases of continuing to move 
back and forth between management positions in 
the industry and employment as inspectors, led 
workers’ representatives to question their 
impartiality.  
 
Among the ISHRs – who probably had even 
greater opportunities to get to know inspectors 
—engagement with inspectors took place in 
relation to the formal use of their powers as well 
as through their presence at Technical Advisory 
Committees. One long-standing ISHR who was 
active in this committee had also been active in 
various other policy forums and was regarded by 
the other ISHRs and the senior representative of 
the Inspectorate interviewed as having a key role 
in this respect. Other relations with between the 
two groups took place informally but there were 
regular exchanges. Talking about these types of 
relations, the senior Inspector interviewed said: 
 
A real life example would be that 
[name of ISHR] might leave a message 
for me. It might take me a couple of 
days to get back to him, but I’ll get 
back to him. But it’s not the sort of 
dialogue that happens every day. It 
might be a couple of weeks, once every 
couple of weeks I have a chat with him. 
And he’ll come and see me and we’ll 
have just a general shoot the breeze … 
(7120032 – Senior Mines Inspector)  
 
The ISHRs had also sought support from the 
Inspectorate for the Training Conference they 
organised each year, frequently asking inspectors 
to speak at these events. The SSHRs generally 
commented favourably about this practice, as did 
the senior representative of the Mines 
Inspectorate, with all regarding it as a useful way 
of gaining a better understanding of each other.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
SSHRs were appointed from among experienced 
mine workers. Most were persuaded to stand for 
election by fellow workers. ISHRs, who had served 
as SSHRs, had even greater experience.  
 
Both SSHRs and ISHRS engaged with safety and 
health management systems as a core part of 
their activity, using both the informal and formal 
procedures available to them in the legislation. 
SSHRs never lost their focus on physical hazards, 
but both they and the ISHRs were able to use the 
identification of such issues to help remedy 
defects in the safety and health management 
systems. 
 
The most important form of support for the 
SSHRs was provided by the ISHRs, who made 
themselves available at all times to provide 
mentoring, advice and moral support. The 
principal form of training for SSHRs was the 
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annual week long training organised and 
delivered by the ISHRs. This was greatly valued by 
the SSHRs. There was little, if any, training by 
mine management.  
 
SSHRs reported strong support from fellow mine 
workers, and a relatively positive relationship with 
the mines inspectorate, although there were 
some concerns about the frequency of contact. 
SSHRs experience with mine management was 
mixed, with many expressing concern at the level 
of support. 
 
The next chapter examines the activities of the 
representatives in relation to serious risks, and the 
use of their powers. 
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6 The practice of worker representation on health and 
safety in Queensland coal mines: serious risks, 
incidents and the use of statutory powers  
 
In this chapter, we consider the ways in which 
representatives carry out their detailed statutory 
functions of inspecting and investigating 
incidents, following up complaints and making 
representations of members’ interests on health 
and safety. Given current policy interest in the 
statutory powers of these representatives, we pay 
particular attention to evidence of the ways in 
which they use such powers. 
 
We also pay attention to the labour relations 
contexts in which they operate in Queensland 
coal mines and discuss what elements of these 
wider contexts they see as supporting or posing 
limitations on their effectiveness. 
 
6.1 Serious risks and the role of 
the worker representatives in 
prevention  
An issue that is often of some concern in 
participative approaches to health and safety 
management in which workers’ representatives 
have statutory powers and functions is whether 
they use their powers and functions responsibly 
and in ways that are proportional to the risks 
involved. To obtain some sense of this in relation 
to coal mining, as explained in detail in Chapter 
4, we identified the most frequent fatal risks in 
coal mining as evidenced by the international 
literature and then analysed the documented 
records of the activities of the representatives in 
relation to these risks. As a further comparative 
measure we also analysed the reports of the 
Mines Inspectorate in the same way.  
 
Most reports of site visits, regardless of whether 
they were those of the ISHRs, SSHRs or the Mines 
Inspectors referred to the inspection of at least 
one fatal risk (94%). Machinery, fire or explosion 
and rock fall were the fatal risks that were most 
commonly reported (Figure 6.1). There was some 
variation between ISHR and MI reports: more 
ISHR reports referred to the inspection of 
inrush/inundation, fire/explosion and rock fall, 
and more MI reports referred to outburst and 
electrocution. Binary logistic regression showed 
that most of these differences were significant 
independent of mine type, with ISHR reports 
more likely to refer to inrush/inundation, 
fire/explosion, rock fall and entrapment, SSHR 
reports more likely to refer to inrush/inundation 
and entrapment, and MI reports more likely to 
refer to electrocution. In addition, mine type was 
independently associated with reference to all of 
the fatal risks except electrocution, with 
underground mines more likely to have reports 
referring to inrush/inundation, fire/explosion, 
outburst, rock fall and entrapment, and open cut 
mines more likely to have reports referring to 
machinery and falls.  
 
Figure 6.1: Inspection of fatal risks 
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The representatives themselves were aware of 
the potentially serious nature of the outcomes 
they saw themselves as being there to prevent:  
 
Oh there was one time I had to stop 
work because I found something 
unsafe. So there was … we weren’t 
doing production at the time but it was 
leading up to production, install the 
long wall, passing underneath an 
overcast that wasn’t properly secured. 
So it was left like that, in that condition, 
so that’s when I had to stop, pull up 
proceedings, we don’t go through until 
all that’s fixed and made safe.  
(7120035 - SSHR) 
 
… the mines inspector just talked about, 
radar systems … He just brought up an 
issue back on * day this year, at a, I 
think he said it was, I’m not too sure 
what pit he said it was now, * it was I 
think. They actually removed a radar, a 
radar system was there, only 
protection, an early warning system for 
* failure, right? Now they removed that 
for maintenance, over a three, two or 
three day period I think. So on the 
second the third day after they moved 
it, the high wall collapsed. Now that 
could have caused, extremely, and it’s 
an extremely hazardous area and that 
could have caused deaths or 
permanent injuries or, it’s 
unimaginable what it could have done, 
but I had a similar thing, number of 
years ago, where I refused to allow 
people to go into that pit because the 
centrepiece of our risk assessment and 
this was the same with this one, was 
the radar early warning system. So it’ll 
give you, as soon as that wall moves a 
couple of millimetres, it’ll start to alarm, 
and those alarms will go from green, 
through the ambers up to red. Even 
when they hit red you’ve still got time 
to get out, without it, you don’t really 
have much indication you know and it 
can start to trickle a little, but unless 
you’re right on it and you’re actually 
watching all the time, so it’s ironic that, 
and to me it justifies my thoughts as if 
we take a centrepiece of a risk 
assessment away, that risk assessment 
is null and void, and if it’s null and void, 
the risk is unacceptable, we just don’t 
go there.  
(7120025 - SSHR) 
 
And: 
 
Because it frightens you at 2 o’clock in 
the morning when you get a call, you 
think what’s going on, this is bad. And 
to wake up out of a sleep, you know, 
my worst fear is a fatality, you know, 
and that’s, I’m very very, I don’t want 
that to occur, you know what I mean? 
And that to me is a failure, you know 
what I mean? Where I’ve failed, in the 
role, because I haven’t been able to 
stop it. So, and that’s, no one wants to 
see that happen, and that’s where we 
want to be is a fatality free and 
hopefully injury free industry but it is 
inherently dangerous and we 
understand that when everyone goes 
out there, we all understand that, and 
the hope that we’ve got is that we can 
make a difference and that’s all we 
hope.’  
(7120027 - ISHR)  
 
6.2 Investigating accidents 
The functions of the ISHRs under the Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Act 1999 enable them ‘to 
participate in investigations into serious accidents 
and high potential incidents’ (section 118(d)). The 
same Act also gives them powers ‘to examine any 
documents relevant to safety and health …’ 
(section 119(c)). SSHRs do not have a specific 
function under the Act to participate in accident 
investigations although they have the same 
powers to examine relevant documents as the 
ISHRs. Under section 106(1)(a), the SSE must tell a 
SSHR at the mine about ‘an injury or illness to a 
person from coal mining operations that causes 
an absence from work of the person’. In addition, 
the same section requires that they do so ‘as 
soon as is practicable after the thing comes to 
the SSE’s knowledge’. In practice, usually both 
types of representatives are informed of the 
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occurrence of serious accidents and they review 
the reports of the investigations of such 
occurrences that have been undertaken by the 
company. In total 85 (16%) of the ISHR and SSHR 
reports we analysed in the present study referred 
to representatives assisting with investigations 
into serious accidents, High Potential Incidents 
and other matters (78 (16%) of ISHR and seven 
(14%) of SSHR reports). Many of these reports 
referred to more than one incident, in some 
instances there was more than one report 
relating to a single incident, and in some cases 
the details of the incident were not clear. 
However, 12 (14%) of the reports referred 
explicitly to injuries to workers, and all of them 
referred to at least one of the more serious risks 
included in our category of ‘fatal risks’. Incidents 
involving vehicles were most common among 
them (27, 32%), followed by fire/explosion (22, 
26%) and rock fall (18, 21%). 
 
While the ISHRs were sometimes involved in the 
investigation of an accident, they were mainly 
informed of their occurrence and the reports of 
investigations undertaken on behalf of the 
company: 
 
So they ring up … this is what’s 
occurred, okay, you may ask a few 
questions, what have you done to stop 
it from reoccurring, how bad is the 
injury, where has he gone to hospital, 
that sort of stuff, then at some stage 
they have to send a form 1A it’s called, 
they send it to the inspectors and to us. 
(7120027 - ISHR) 
 
In the interviews, SSHRs indicated that they were 
sometimes involved in accident investigation, but 
more commonly they were kept informed of 
investigations undertaken by the company into 
accidents: 
 
Yeah so and if there is an accident or 
incident they do an investigation and 
they send the investigation report to us 
and we have a look at it and see if we 
are happy with what has happened 
and the outcomes and stuff like that.  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
 
For the SSHRs, involvement in the investigation of 
accidents was uncertain, and often depended on 
mine management: 
 
Interviewer: And of course there would 
be incidents where you would have to 
get involved. Does that happen a lot? 
Respondent: Well, like I said, depends 
who the management are. If there is a 
… like a major incident, then sometimes 
we go and investigate it as well but it 
depends who it is. Sometimes we don’t 
get invited and sometimes we don’t get 
told about it.  
(7120013 - SSHR)  
 
Representation of the interests of the victims of 
accidents was not something that fell within the 
remit of the SSHRs. The ‘industrial’ side of 
representation in the coal mines addressed this, 
while both types of safety and health 
representatives were concerned only with 
prevention. Generally the SSHRs and ISHRs were 
quite clear about the separate nature of these 
roles and were at pains not to confuse them.  
 
Well there is the industrial side there to 
help as well. But you have got to 
understand our job is safety. So we 
can’t cross the line into industrial 
because it just gets messy. So safety is 
safety. 
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
They frequently spoke about their priorities being 
concerned with the prevention of harm. When 
they became involved in investigating serious 
accidents, their primary motivation was to 
prevent a reoccurrence. However, investigating 
incidents in which injuries or fatalities have 
occurred, for which legal responsibilities may 
apply for the company concerned, also 
sometimes led to perceptions of conflicts of 
interest and representatives commented on the 
difficulties of performing their preventive roles in 
such situations: 
 
… but the thing is, SSE’s have got their 
own different ways. Some are good, 
because I’ve been involved in, what 
four deaths, on a mine site. And out of 
three, out of three of them it was good, 
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the fourth one was sort of, you’re not 
allowed there, don’t do this, don’t do 
that … I’ve done what, three 
investigations courses with the police. 
So in other words I know what I’m 
doing when I go on to a scene. But they 
don’t want that. They just do their own 
thing because they think we’re going to 
blame them. 
(7120020 - SSHR) 
 
Many of the incidents that were reported to the 
representatives as well as the subsequent 
investigations they reviewed and sometimes 
assisted with were classified as High Potential 
Incidents, not all of which resulted in serious 
injury (but which had the potential to do so). 
Distinction between these and other accidents 
that resulted in investigations was often blurred, 
both in the formal reports and in the interviews 
with representatives. We turn to these incidents 
next.  
 
6.3 Investigating high potential 
incidents 
High Potential Incidents (HPIs) represent a 
category of OHS outcomes that has taken on 
increasing importance in health and safety 
practice in recent years — especially in high-risk 
industries. They include the kinds of incidents that 
are judged to have a high potential to lead to 
serious harm, regardless of whether such harm 
has actually occurred. The risk-based regulation 
implemented in Queensland by the Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Act 1999 and subsequently, 
reflects this increased significance given to the 
reporting and investigation of HPIs within the 
arrangements and procedures for managing 
OHS in high risk work such as coal mining. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, HPIs were a recurring 
theme among ISHR reports, particularly those 
from later years. Under the legislation, which 
defines a HPI as ‘an event, or a series of events, 
that causes or has the potential to cause a 
significant adverse effect on the safety or health 
of a person’, mines are required to report HPIs to 
SSHRs, ISHRs and to the Inspectorate. As would 
be expected, therefore, many of the ISHR reports 
referring to HPIs were written following such 
notification by the mine and show ISHRs’ 
involvement in and support for the investigation 
and subsequent learning processes.
10
 This extract 
from an underground mine is typical: 
 
Prior to going underground discussions 
were had [with managers and the 
SSHR] … in relation to what has been 
occurring at the mine with the recent 
HPI’s [SIC] and the proposed process 
the mine is considering with review of 
HPI’s and SHMS. There has been a 
number of HPI’s [SIC] on site in recent 
times and some of these have caused 
concerns to the coal mine workers at 
the mine and management. With the 
employment of [a Safety 
Superintendent] one of his main 
focuses at this time is working thru 
[SIC] a process in relation to the HPI’s. 
There has been a flow chart developed 
to assist with this process and it is 
hoped that by applying a process like 
this is it will look at the main 
contributing factors involved. The 
following are the main factors to 
consider in this review: look at the 
control measures both what are 
currently in place and also long term 
controls and strategy for these with the 
aim being effectiveness of them; the 
current SSHR will be taken off the 
current shift roster to be involved in the 
process with [the Safety 
Superintendent]; the review is to break 
the areas down looking at operational, 
technical and maintenance related 
issues. Included in this would also be 
the equipment, training, processes and 
people factors; remind all coal mine 
workers of their obligations under the 
Coal Mining Safety & Health Act 1999 
and in particular S39 requirements; 
remind all coal mine workers of their 
roles & responsibilities under the 
CMSHA 1999 and in particular 
Explosion Risk Zone Controllers (ERZC) 
who needs to understand that their first 
responsibility is the health & safety 
matters prescribed under the Coal 
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 These reports are not always the result of a site visit. 
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Mining Legislation; going to reinforce 
the importance of the CMSH legislation 
and the mines Safety & Health 
Management System to all workers; 
carry out weekly reviews of the HPI’s 
that may occur at the mine; a meeting 
has been held with senior management 
& workers representatives on a way 
forward to correct the problems at the 
mine. These discussions looked at the 
critical issues and a strategy to move 
forward with all involved; I look forward 
to the outcomes of this process and the 
implementation of the action plan to 
move forward to assist in controlling 
the issues on site. The importance of 
this process is the involvement of the 
work force and all CMW understanding 
their roles & responsibilities in this. In 
my view it applies to all people at the 
mine from the SSE down to worker at 
the coal face. 
(ISHR report) 
 
Several ISHR reports also indicated that they were 
passing on details of HPIs elsewhere to mines 
they were inspecting – the following extract is 
from an open cut mine: 
 
Informed those present of the HPI 
incident which had occurred at 
[another] open cut coal mine involving 
a sling breaking while being used to 
tow another dozer out which become 
stuck which resulted in a flying metal 
object going through the back window 
of a D11Dozer just missing the 
operator. 
(ISHR report) 
 
However, a number of the ISHR reports refer to 
disagreement between a mine manager and the 
representative about whether or not an incident 
should be classified as an HPI. As this extract 
from an ISHR report on an open cut mine shows, 
this was also an area of concern among the 
mines inspectorate and the views of the ISHR and 
MI inspector were usually in agreement: 
 
Discussions were held over a HPI 
incident that occurred at the mine on 
the 8th of June which involved a light 
vehicle rolling over on the back access 
road. I was informed by those present 
that the SSE at the time did not believe 
that this light vehicle roll over was 
reportable HPI. The SSE at the mine 
had put out a document titled “[Mine] 
HPI Guideline” the purpose of this 
document was to provide a consistent 
interpretation of what is a HPI. I was 
provided with a copy of this document 
and after viewing it find that it actually 
is a cut and paste of the legislation 
requirements but has not included the 
full abstract of S 17 of Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Act 1999 which 
defines what HPI is as defined below. 
After some discussion between those 
present on this particular incident, we 
could not agree and in the absence of 
the SSE it would be easier to discuss the 
issue with the SSE.  
(ISHR report) 
 
HPIs were also often ongoing issues at particular 
mines which had very frequently also been 
flagged up by SSHRs, as is clear from this ISHR 
report extract from an underground mine: 
 
The reason for the inspection was 
twofold, firstly to inspect the site of the 
latest HPI at the mine and secondly to 
raise question with the mine’s Site 
Senior Executive (SSE) as to the mine’s 
Safety and Health Management 
System being adequate and effective. 
On traveling to the mine, I received a 
phone call from the mine’s SSHR to 
inform me that there had been yet 
another incident at the mine. This latest 
incident … [resulted] in the injured coal 
mine worker being sent to hospital to 
receive stitches to his head. Once 
again, the mine failed to inform the Site 
Safety and Health Representatives, 
Industry Safety and Health 
Representative (ISHR) and the DNRM 
Inspectorate as per Queensland Coal 
Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 – 
Sections 106 & 198. This issue of not 
informing the relevant people was 
raised on my last visit to the mine and 
assurances were then given by the 
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mine to ensure that compliance to the 
mines procedure and legislation was 
adhered to. A mine record entry was 
also made by the mine’s SSHR’s 
regarding same, prior to my last visit. 
Discussion was held regarding the 
unremitting failure to adequately 
inform the mines SSHR’s and Inspectors 
of High Potential Incidents. The Health 
and Safety Manager assented that 
once again there had been a failure in 
the mine’s Safety and Health 
Management System. I enquired as to 
the information of the latest incident 
and was informed that there had been 
two incidents on the same shift. With 
this information presented to me, the 
extremely high frequency of HPI’s and 
Serious Incidents, and the mines 
inability to curb the rising amount of 
incidents, the non-compliance with 
legislation regarding notification and 
also the UMM statement that the 
majority of incidents occurring where 
related to contractors it is my belief 
that the Safety Health Management 
System … is inadequate and ineffective. 
(ISHR report) 
 
The focus of ISHR references to HPIs in their 
reports was predominantly on fatal risks. For 
example, after visiting an underground mine 
following an HPI in which a continuous miner 
unexpectedly intersected a methane drainage 
bore hole, the ISHR includes mention in his report 
of a similar event in his report which was not 
classified as a HPI and so had not previously 
been reported: 
 
It was also raised that a similar issue 
had previously occurred in this panel 
with the ERZ Controller and the shift 
supervisor not classing the incident as a 
HPI … above 5% CH4 was released in 
an uncontrolled and unexpected 
manner definitely classes as a HPI. If 
this had been then an investigation 
would have been investigated and 
implemented controls that may have 
prevented this reoccurrence ...  
(ISHR report) 
 
Similar accounts of involvement in the 
investigation of HPIs were given in interviews with 
both the SSHRs and ISHRs. 
 
Yes and also you take the HPI 
notifications at 2 o’clock in the morning 
at 3 o’clock in the morning, coming 
from a mine that, you’ll be woken up 
out of sleep and you’ll have to take that 
call, you know what I mean, it’s just 
part of the role, we understand that, we 
understand that before we took the role 
up. 
(7120027 - ISHR) 
 
… when they have a HPI they do an 
investigation, it’s to prevent it from 
happening again, that’s the idea of the 
investigation process to prevent 
reoccurrence okay, so I’ll ask them what 
they’ve done and if there’s anything in 
particular like four electric shocks in a 
period then obviously there’s a 
problem, you know what I mean? And 
we need to work together to have a 
look at what we’re doing to stop them 
from occurring, do you understand 
what I mean? And that’s the process 
that I take.  
(7120027 - ISHR) 
 
… if an incident happens, we’re the first 
ones they call, and that’s management 
calling us. Not because they want to 
tell us, but because they want us to go 
and investigate it and fix it for them.  
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
It is also worth noting that the failure to report 
HPIs was a serious issue for the Mines 
Inspectorate. For example, the inspection records 
examined included a number of instances where 
the management of a particular mine was called 
to attend a compulsory conference with the Chief 
Inspector of Mines, amongst others, in response 
to failure to report HPIs. At these meetings the 
seriousness of failure to report was emphasised 
as was the potential for further action. 
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6.4 Dealing with complaints 
Both the ISHRs and SSHRs undertook further 
reactive work by investigating complaints they 
received from mine workers. In the documentary 
analysis 17% (88) of the ISHR and SSHR reports 
analysed made reference to representatives 
investigating complaints from workers (79 (17%) 
ISHR and 9 (18%) SSHR reports). They often 
referred to more than one complaint, while in 
some cases a single complaint was referred to in 
more than one report, and in some the details of 
complaints were not given in full. Allowing for 
these limitations, the reports suggest that 
complaints most often centred around: failure to 
follow a policy or SOP (19, 22%), problems with 
equipment (15, 17%) and intimidation, 
harassment, bullying or assault in relation to 
reporting a safety concern (13, 15%, and many of 
the latter complaints came from workers at a 
single mine). Other complaints concerned 
dangerous working conditions (10, 11%), work 
rosters and/or fitness for work arrangements, 
emergency procedures and welfare facilities (9, 
10% each). 
 
It seems likely that, in the case of the SSHRs, 
simply counting the complaints that were 
formally documented seriously underestimates 
the proportion of their activities that result from 
being made aware of health and safety issues as 
a result of such ‘complaints’ being raised by 
fellow mine workers. In the interviews with the 
representatives, they frequently cited examples of 
such notifications and how they responded to 
them. While it is difficult to be precise concerning 
the exact balance of their work that is in this 
sense reactive, and a response to complaints 
concerning health and safety matters (as 
opposed to being proactive inspection 
undertaken on the initiative of the SSHR and not 
a response to concerns expressed by fellow mine 
workers), the impression gained from the 
interviews is that the proportion time spent on 
such reactive matters is greater than that 
indicated by the documentary analysis. For 
example, during interviews once it was clear what 
we meant when we asked how frequently they 
responded to ‘complaints’ it was evident that 
such responses took up a significant proportion 
of the time of the SSHRs:  
 
Interviewer: How many complaints 
would you receive? And I probably 
shouldn’t say complaints. Other 
workers raising issues with you about 
health and safety 
Respondent: Every day, every day. 
They have a doubt every day. And if we 
don’t know the answer then we will find 
the answer out. We will go and talk to 
people or look it up on the system. 
They might come up and say look, has 
there been a risk assessment done on 
this? And I will say look I wasn’t 
involved in it but I will find out and get 
back to you. …or they might come up 
and say what was the investigation 
outcome of such and such hurting his 
finger and I will say yeah I have got 
that through, will give you a copy of 
that, or that was in a toolbox talk 
or…Yeah every day, without a doubt.  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
It was also clear that the boundaries between 
reactive work involved in responding to 
complaints and that of more proactive work were 
themselves often blurred and one would often 
lead to the other: 
 
Interviewer: So routine inspections and 
complaints are the main part of your 
role?  
Yes… A lot of those complaints can 
involve the review process so going 
back and reviewing procedure and then 
coming with some information and 
saying to them well look this is how I 
interpret this or whatever you know 
Interviewer: So we are really talking 
about what triggers things you do ..., so 
you would have a routine inspection 
and then you would have complaints. 
Or issues raised, I mean probably 
complaints is too grand a term isn’t it?  
Respondent: … Yes well as I say, a lot 
of the time we review procedures and 
things like that and also give advice on 
what to do. If something is really 
sticking in their neck like a panel or 
something, then I will say well I will 
come down and have a look. And that 
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will be another inspection or 
investigation on my part.  
(7120013 - SSHR) 
 
There was also evidence that bringing issues to 
the attention of the SSHRs did not only occur at 
work, but also encroached into their time outside 
of the workplace:  
 
Oh look, I don’t finish work when 
everyone else finishes work, I go home, 
I have a meal at night, you go and sit 
down for dinner, I get three, four 
people sometimes, I’ve had them stand 
in line, to talk to me. They all come to 
me with an issue, this happened today, 
this. I say well, what you really need to 
do is rather than wait until now to tell 
me about it, talk to your supervisor, yes 
I did, but that supervisor doesn’t want 
to know about it, alright, well leave it to 
me, I’ll go and speak to your supervisor, 
and I do, and the next morning, first 
up, I’ll be over, they have their pre-
starts, I’ll go and have a talk to the 
supervisor, get him away, say listen, 
yesterday this happened, how did, why, 
and why did that happen, did anybody 
mention anything to you, oh yes, but 
you know, so I can have a talk to them, 
I can sort it out that way. 
(7120025 - SSHR) 
 
Sometimes this was a reflection of the number of 
issues that the representatives needed to deal 
with or, as in the quote above, it was a result of 
the affected worker feeling that the supervisor or 
manager at work had not properly addressed a 
matter that the affected worker had brought to 
their attention. On other occasions, however, 
complaints came to the SSHRs outside of work 
time and off-site because the workers concerned 
were afraid of the repercussions that might arise 
if they were observed by their supervisors or 
managers to be raising these matters (as is 
reflected in some of the documentary data 
referred to above):  
 
… you’ve got this massive culture of 
people that are scared or intimidated to 
raise concerns … Contractors and 
permanents as well. There’s the culture 
if you speak up you’ll be, you’ll be given 
crap jobs or you know, you’ll be put in 
the corner.… Yeah so it’s only those 
that are willing to speak up sort of, and 
the others that don’t speak up, some of 
them come up and see you, you know, 
or I’ll hear it second or third hand and 
you’ve got to get back to the source 
and investigate it, so. But yeah, it’s just, 
you know, a lot of people are 
intimidated to speak up, and that’s the 
culture that (names a mining 
company) has created.  
(7120022 - SSHR) 
 
Although, as the above quote makes clear, in 
some coal mines these fears were shared by 
permanent and contract workers alike, in most 
cases, for contract workers, the insecurity of their 
work arrangements made it less likely that they 
would raise complaints about health and safety 
issues. However, if they did, there was a greater 
likelihood that the complainant would wish to 
remain anonymous. Experiences of such 
complaints were recounted by the ISHRs, 
especially in relation to their dealings with 
contract workers. Safeguarding the anonymity of 
the complainants could present problems when it 
came to effectively addressing the matters that 
were causing the concern: 
 
Respondent: He’s made a call to you, 
and he’s saying, our mate he’s working 
80 hours a week, he’s on the road, 7 
days a week, he’s been instructed to do 
this by his company. Okay, what’s the 
company? Oh no, I can’t … So you’re a 
bit tied, and you might put an hour’s 
worth of work into this bloke and he’s 
not going to give you the information 
you need to act, and if he got killed the 
next night, I’d be devastated because I 
couldn’t help him, do you understand 
what I mean? 
Interviewer: You can’t help him if you 
don’t know where to look? 
Respondent: That’s right, … and I’ve 
had one by email, a ‘concerned coal 
mine worker’ and he’ll go into explain 
that he doesn’t believe that the 
electrical issues are being looked at 
certain underground mines and people 
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are meeting compliance on these 
strange standards, and so you’ll look at 
this strange thing and you’ll do some 
work on it, and then you’ll put an email 
back to, reply, to concerned coal mine 
worker, and say mate, please give me a 
call, because I can’t help you, I haven’t 
got the evidence, about which mine 
you’re talking, because there will be no 
mine, it’ll be at general underground 
coal mines, and like I said there’s ten, 
there’s twelve of them, they could be 
anywhere.  
(7120027 - ISHR) 
 
6.5 Using statutory powers 
As well as the rights to undertake the various 
functions discussed in the previous sections, both 
SSHRs and ISHRs have statutory powers to order 
work to be suspended if they believe there to be 
serious risks of injury or ill-health involved. The 
legislative provisions that apply were outlined in 
Chapter 3. In brief, the Coal Mine Safety and 
Health Act 1999 gives SSHRs authority to order 
the suspension of all mining operations or to stop 
specific operations or require supervisors to stop 
them if they reasonably believe there is an 
immediate danger. Similar powers are given to 
ISHRs in the form of a directive under section 167. 
In addition, representatives have statutory powers 
to order mine management to undertake certain 
actions, for example, in relation to the review of 
the safety and health management system in 
place in the mine, they must advise the SSE if 
they believe the system to be inadequate and 
inform a mines inspector if they are not satisfied 
that appropriate action is taken as the result of 
such advice. The mines inspector is obliged to 
investigate and report this in the mines record. 
Not surprisingly, these powers and the way they 
are used are the subject of long-standing debate 
between the industry and the miners’ trade 
union. For this reason we have looked at the 
documentary evidence of their use as well as 
questioning all of our interviewees concerning 
their experiences in relation to using these 
powers. We report our findings in this section. 
The documentary analysis
11
 showed that ISHRs 
rarely stop work at mines: only 24 (5%) of reports 
referred to the suspension of operations. These 
related to eleven mines, with numbers of 
suspensions varying from one to five per mine. 
On four occasions operation of particular plant in 
specified areas was suspended as a result of 
faulty equipment causing an incident at another 
mine – which, of course, also led to similar 
restrictions at the mine where the original 
incident occurred; in another mine two reports, 
made on consecutive days, refer to the same 
incident (in this case risk of in-rush); and for two 
mines identical suspension notices, issued within 
days of each other, referred to a fume incident 
but it was not clear which of the mines that 
incident took place at.  
 
Suspension of all operations at a mine, as 
opposed to operations in particular areas and/or 
using specific equipment, was even rarer: there 
were six such suspensions (26% of the 24 reports 
referring to the suspension of operations, and 1% 
of all ISHR reports). In suspending operations 
either completely or partially, all but one of the 
reports referred to at least one of the fatal risks 
identified as being most commonly linked to 
mining as the reason for stopping work. The one 
that does not referred to the mine’s Fitness for 
Work policy, which should cover fatigue, drug 
and alcohol and other physical or psychological 
impairment. This is an area that is increasingly 
recognised as critical for workers’ safety, health 
and well-being both within mining and more 
widely in other high-risk sectors. It is also 
noteworthy that two of the reports referred 
explicitly to the ISHR supporting an earlier 
decision by the SSHR to suspend operations. Of 
course, this should not be taken to mean that this 
was not the case for any of the other reports, 
rather that this was not mentioned in those 
reports.  
 
The CFMEU’s own analysis of all suspension 
notices for all Queensland coal mines identifies 
80 such notices being served since the 1999Act 
was introduced (CFMEU, 2013). Our data is far 
less complete, since it is drawn from mines 
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 Including reports following a site visit and other 
reports. 
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records in a sample of less than half of the coal 
mines and in some cases for a period that is 
shorter than the approximately twelve years 
covered by the CFMEU compilation. Taking this 
into account, the number of suspension notices 
we have identified is broadly the proportion of 
the total that would be anticipated in our sample 
of mines records. The reasons for and extent of 
suspensions of operations are summarised in Text 
box 6.1. 
 
Text box 6.1: Reasons for and extent of suspensions of operations by ISHRs 
 REASON EXTENT REASON EXTENT 
O
P
E
N
 C
U
T
 M
IN
E
S
 
Suspension of all blasting 
activities following a review of 
all information relating to a 
recent fume event. 
Suspension of 
all blasting 
activities** 
Preparation plant is not to 
restart until issues are dealt 
with (trip and fall hazards).  
Suspension 
of work in 
particular 
area 
Suspension as emergency 
response requirements of the 
mine’s SHMS are not being met 
(not enough ERT [Emergency 
Rescue Team] members trained 
in breathing apparatus and 
conduct fire operations. 
All work 
suspended 
Suspension of a particular 
operation until risk 
assessment is complete and 
identified controls are 
implemented following an 
inspection (prompted by 
incidents at 2 other mines) to 
establish the risk of interaction 
between the dragline bucket 
and jewellery and the dozer at 
boom point. 
Suspension 
of dragline / 
dozer assist 
mining 
U
N
D
E
R
G
R
O
U
N
D
 M
IN
E
S
 
ISHR supports SSHR’s ‘no 
roading’ of an area because of 
poor ventilation and consequent 
problems with diesel vehicles. 
Use of 
vehicles in a 
particular 
section 
Suspension of coal mining 
with any continuous miner 
with a failed methane sensor 
following reported concerns.  
Suspension 
of work with 
particular 
equipment 
ISHR supports SSHR’s 
suspension of operations in a 
section of the mine stating “the 
conditions and standards in this 
section were very poor and 
some of the worse that I have 
encountered while in this 
position of Industry Safety and 
Health Representative”. Safety 
issues included lack of stone 
dusting, inadequate ventilation, 
poor roadways and lack of 
portable methane detectors on 
diesel ram cars.  
All operations 
in a particular 
section 
Suspension because, when 
the active longwall panel 
TARPs [Trigger Action 
Response Plans] were 
exceeded, the workforce was 
taken through a new TARP 
developed that morning that 
altered the evacuation 
triggers, but the ISHR 
reviewed documentations and 
felt that there was an 
unacceptable level of risk 
(because the original TARP 
levels (CO and H2 levels) 
were being exceeded).  
All people 
withdrawn 
from the mine 
Suspension of operations as 
goaf management systems are 
ineffective ( gas monitoring 
system does not automatically 
shut down equipment, no 
provision for withdrawal of 
miners prior to the explosive 
range being reached, no boiler 
maintenance regime etc.).  
All operations 
CV005 submerged in water 
from 10 to 14 c/t is not to be 
restarted until it can be 
inspected (i.e. the belt must 
be clear from hazards and the 
belt and return rollers must be 
visible - this includes at least 
not being submerged in 
water). 
Operation of 
particular 
equipment 
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 REASON EXTENT REASON EXTENT 
U
N
D
E
R
G
R
O
U
N
D
 M
IN
E
S
 
Suspension until the advanced 
heating or fire and the 
possibility of explosive 
atmosphere with Number 3 
Longwall goaf are made safe. 
No people 
permitted 
underground 
Suspension until the boiler 
exhausting which is ineffective 
in its current location is 
rectified. 
All people 
withdrawn 
from the mine 
Suspensions as a result of an 
inspection following a complaint 
water accumulation in the 
Longwall 9 goaf.  
Suspension of 
work in 
particular 
areas 
Further inspection (see above) 
and continued work 
suspension as a result of 
excess water behind goaf 
seals in LW 9 block.  
Suspension 
of work in 
particular 
area 
Suspension of operations 
because the two entrances from 
the surface of the mine are not 
escapeways within the meaning 
of and for the purposes of s 
296(1) of the Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Regulation 
2001, because they are not 
separated in a way that 
prevents a reasonably 
foreseeable event happening in 
one of the entrances affecting 
the ability of persons to escape 
through the other entrance.  
All 
underground 
operations 
Suspension of operations 
inbye of the main intake shaft 
collar because of the potential 
for a fire in the intake shaft 
causing smoke or other 
contaminants to affect escape 
through the other escapeway.  
All 
underground 
operations in 
a particular 
section 
Suspension of all operations 
affected by the Fitness for 
Work Procedure following the 
inspection of its 
implementation and review.  
Suspension 
of particular 
operations 
*Issued to 5 underground mines following an incident at a mine not included in the study 
**Issued to 2 open cut mines – not clear if the event was at either of these mines or elsewhere 
 
Similarly, only three (6%) and 10 (2%) of the SSHR 
and MI reports respectively referred to 
suspending operations (Text box 6.2). All three 
SSHR reports were from the same mine, while the 
MI reports related to four mines. All the SSHR 
and MI reports suspending operations referred to 
at least one of the fatal risks. 
 
Text box 6.2: Reasons for and extent of suspensions of operations by SSHRs and MI 
inspectors 
 REASON EXTENT REASON EXTENT 
SSHR REPORTS 
O
P
E
N
 C
U
T
 M
IN
E
S
 Following a complaint by 
workers about mines rescue 
members being brought to the 
mine from other mines when the 
required numbers aren’t 
available and not being 
inducted and site familiarised. 
Practice of 
bringing in 
rescue 
personnel 
from other 
mines 
Lack of identification of 
vehicles permitted to tow 
plant; lack of operational 
brakes on trailers and towing 
equipment and six-monthly 
servicing / maintenance of 
brakes; lack of twin safety 
chains on towing equipment. 
All towing 
operations 
Non-compliance with seat belt 
regulations 
All mobile 
equipment 
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 REASON EXTENT REASON EXTENT 
MI REPORTS 
U
N
D
E
R
G
R
O
U
N
D
 M
IN
E
S
 
Elevated methane in general 
body caused by ingress from 
SIS borehole. 
Cutting activity 
The implementation of 
controls regarding explosions 
zones had not commenced. 
All operations 
The absence of a documented 
procedure or process for 
conducting brake testing of a 
shuttle car, the absence of a 
documented procedure or 
process for conducting 
maintenance and fault finding 
on mobile plant and equipment 
under power, the issue of 
maintenance personal working 
on equipment in no go zones. 
Operations at 
parts of the 
mine 
Detection of serious regulatory 
breaches in relation to 
management/measurement of 
methane and methane 
layering at the workface. 
All operations 
O
P
E
N
 C
U
T
 M
IN
E
S
 
Notified that an explosive fume 
cloud travelled outside the fume 
management zone and that this 
was not reported by the mine to 
either the explosives or mines 
inspectors. As a result 8 coal 
mine workers at an adjacent 
mine were taken to hospital. 
All activities 
involving 
explosives 
Working below tipping trucks 
- SSHR was concerned about 
any vehicle working at the 
base of a live tip and was not 
satisfied with the manager’s 
explanation that he was 50 
metres away from where the 
loads were being tipped. 
Operations on 
the shovel 
circuit 
Trip hazards on walkways and 
inadequate access on scaffold. 
Also inadequate recognition of 
hazards in JSA’s [Job Safety 
Analysis] involved in the 
erection of dragline. 
Operations in 
some areas 
Following notification of a 
collision between a service 
truck and a light vehicle, and 
given the seriousness and 
similarity to a previous 
incident, SSHR feels the 
SHMS [Safety and Health 
Management System] is 
ineffective. 
Light / heavy 
vehicle 
interaction 
Following notification from drill 
and blast superintendent that a 
shot had damaged a dozer and 
rocks had piled up around a 
digger when both machines 
were in the exclusion zone, 
SSHR was concerned about the 
controls for a PHMP [Principal 
Hazard Management Plan] not 
being effective. 
Blasting 
operations 
The mine reported an incident 
involving explosives which 
resulted in fly-rock causing 
significant damage to a 
dragline that was parked 396 
metres away from the shot 
face, outside the 300 metre 
exclusion zone for machinery. 
This was the second 
significant event resulting in 
damage to equipment at the 
mine in six months. 
All drill and 
blast activities 
 
There were too few directives to suspend 
operations issued under section 167 in our data 
for us to be able to draw reliable inferences 
concerning patterns in what they addressed or 
trends in these matters over time. However the 
CFMEU submissions based on their records of all 
such Directives issued since the 1999 Act came 
into force indicate that these directives have been 
increasingly used by ISHRs at the management 
systems level (CFMEU, 2013). The submission also 
notes that only one of the major coal operators 
significantly questions their content and that until 
relatively recently such objections were relatively 
rare. Mostly the actions of the ISHRs have been 
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upheld following these appeals, or the Mines 
Inspectorate has issued a Directive under section 
166 in their place which requires remedial action 
but allows the process in question to continue 
while such action is taken. As the CFMEU has 
pointed out, in most cases the Inspectorate and 
the ISHR have been in agreement over this 
action, pointing out that had the ISHRs had the 
power to issue a section 166 Directive, they would 
have done so themselves.  
 
In addition to suspensions and stoppage of work, 
other formal notifications by ISHRs were also rare 
(37, 8%). However, most of the mines had been 
issued with such a notification (15, 79%), with the 
numbers issued to each mine varying from one 
to nine. In two cases the notifications were 
related to, and issued at the same time as, a 
suspension of operations. Again, four (11%) of the 
reports make explicit reference to and are 
supportive of the SSHR. Many of these formal 
notifications identified weaknesses and required 
corrections to the health and safety management 
systems in place in the mines. A further 11 (2%) of 
the ISHR reports make some other kind of 
‘formal’ requirement. These included: 
requirements to supply the ISHR with 
documentation; requirements for corrective 
action plans; requirements to apply interim 
procedures; and referrals to the inspectorate. It 
was also rare to find these types of formal 
notifications in the reports of the SSHRs (3, 6%). 
They were, however, more frequent among the 
reports of the MI inspectors (145, 24%). A further 
five (10%) of the SSHR reports and 28 (5%) of the 
MI reports make some other kind of ‘formal’ 
requirement. Text box 6.3 presents a summary of 
the reasons for each of these notices in which 
weaknesses in the safety management systems 
are identified. 
 
Text box 6.3: Reasons for formal notifications by ISHRs in which inadequate SHMS or related 
matters are mentioned 
 REASON REASON 
U
N
D
E
R
G
R
O
U
N
D
 M
IN
E
S
 
Following an incident in which a miner was 
serious injured the mine is found to have an 
ineffective and inadequate SHMS in relation to: 
defining management roles and responsibilities 
and training workers in the management structure 
of those responsibilities; and managing 
emergencies. 
Mine could not supply relevant documents from 
a risk assessment or a timeline for events 
leading up to the return to work following an 
evacuation for TARPS being exceeded. ISHRs 
believe the standard elements of the mine’s gas 
monitoring system is not reliable or 
comprehensive enough to make quality 
decisions. They give notice that the mine’s 
SHMS relating to document control and 
availability are inadequate or ineffective make 
certain requirements and require certain 
documents to be forward to them before 
proposed actions can proceed. Related to a 
simultaneously served suspension of work 
order. 
Inadequate or ineffective SHMS with regard to 
training of rescue team members, housekeeping, 
ventilation standard for standing places in the 
change panel, unbolted roadways, strata support, 
block side ribs, ventilation of stubs, hygiene at 
underground crib camps and no road barricading 
standards. 
Inadequate or ineffective SHMS identified as 
ISHR has examined the recent non-compliance 
with regards to senior management reviewing and 
changing a procedure at the mine with no 
consultation with affected coal mine workers. 
ISHR refers to and supports the SSHR’s view that 
the SHMS has an ineffective and inadequate 
system with regards to fitness for work section. 
ISHR refers to SSE’s last ‘derisory 
correspondence’ to indicate that he does not 
believe that the SSE is taking the necessary 
action to make the SHMS adequate and effective 
and so sends the mine record entry to the 
regional senior mines inspector for his attention. 
Under section 121: due to the importance and 
number of Principal Hazard Management Plans 
(PHMPs) that require a review and since 
numerous workers say this has been raised 
before to no avail, ISHR believes that there is an 
inadequate and ineffective SHMS with respect 
to the listed PHMPs (i.e. strata management, 
spontaneous combustion management, mine 
evacuation, emergency procedure, fire 
management and water management) - 
response requested detailing the corrective 
action to be taken with 2 weeks of action will be 
taken 
SHMS is inadequate or ineffective regarding the 
tag board and fire equipment checks. 
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 REASON REASON 
U
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Following concerns raised by miners on the use of 
foam resin, polyurethane and seal component, 
ISHR issues a directive that miners are not to be 
or work within the 300 meter exclusion zone on 
the return side of where these substances are 
being pumped or injected. 
Following a review of emergency response 
procedures, the ISHR is of the belief that the 
mine’s emergency response procedures and 
failure to validate the procedures using good 
risk management has resulted in the mine 
having an ineffective and inadequate SHMS in 
relation to emergency response. 
Ineffective and inadequate contractor 
management, supervision and inspections, 
notification and communication and strata control. 
ISHR also requests the DNRM Mines Inspector 
investigates. ISHR believes that the SSE has 
failed to ensure an adequate and effective SHMS. 
This follows 2 incidents in which miners were 
injured and, to validate his reasoning, the ISHR 
quotes extensively from the SSHR’s most recent 
mine record entry. 
Mines incident reporting and notification system 
is ineffective and inadequate; systems for ERZ 
Controllers to fulfil their obligations is 
inadequate and ineffective; ISHR requires SSE 
to respond with 2 weeks stating the actions 
taken to rectify the lack of segregation devices 
in parts of the mine where the conveyor 
intersects the primary escapeway and the other 
issues highlighted in the report - failure will lead 
to ISHR forwarding request to mines inspector 
to investigate. 
SHMS is inadequate or ineffective regarding 
mucking operations in the shaft due to the 
potential for interaction of workers and machinery. 
Inadequate or ineffective SHMS relating to the 
control of diesel emissions and the Mine 
Training Scheme regarding documenting the 
progress of trainees. 
SHMS is inadequate or ineffective regarding the 
monitoring of CO and diesel engine pollutants 
exposure, the application of stone dust and in 
controlling workers’ exposure to respirable dust 
(due to the 80% failure rate that the non-use of an 
equivalent dosage level of dust exposure for shifts 
greater than 8 hours in length) 
Ineffective and inadequate SHMS in relation to 
monitoring and recording diesel emissions and 
ventilation quality. 
Inadequate or ineffective SHMS relating to the 
Frictional Ignition Risk Management – Single 
pass Development Mining Standard Operating 
Procedure dated 30th of September 2004. 
Notice under section 121: OSHMS is inadequate 
or ineffective as evidenced by the deficiencies 
regarding compliance with the regulation on 
action to be taken if methane detector activates or 
is non-operational - require written notification on 
actions planned to take in response; This was 
related to and at the same time as a suspension 
of operations 
Notification 121 inadequate or ineffective 
SHMS: that the management structure 
documents and the roles and responsibilities 
documents in the SHMS are inadequate (i.e. 
generic statement about compliance with SHMS 
rather than listing relevant documents the 
individual has roles and responsibilities for 
under the SHMS – ISHR comments that this is 
‘like most of similar documents in the industry’). 
Following a review of SHMS documents (RA of 
maingate and tailgate development), the SHMS 
both ineffective and inadequate. 
O
P
E
N
 C
U
T
 M
IN
E
S
 Following a review of the documents the mine is 
found to have an ineffective and inadequate 
SHMS in relation to emergency response, with 
ineffective and inadequate risk management 
processes used in its development. 
Following a review of the emergency / crisis 
management procedure, the emergency 
response procedure and the ineffective and 
inadequate risk assessment has resulted in the 
mine having an ineffective and inadequate 
SHMS in relation to emergency response 
Ineffective and inadequate SHMS concerning the 
training of (contractor’s) workers for confined 
space rescue in the dragline erection site. 
SHMS is inadequate and ineffective with regard 
to issue over PPE SOPs for contractor and mine 
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SHMS is inadequate and ineffective due to the 
allowance of separate SHMS procedures at the 
mine and the differentiation between permanent 
and contract workers by contract workers 
operating under contractor's procedures - SSE 
has 1 month to take action to address this; road 
widths, grades, cross-grades and dust were less 
than good mining practice on the ramp – ISHR 
requests that all operations cease so that these 
issues can be discussed and grades surveyed - 
otherwise the ISHR will issue a directive 
suspending operations - manager opts for former; 
the SHMS is inadequate and ineffective due to 
non-compliances with adequate supervision, 
adherence to mine standards surrounding haul 
roads, ramps and grades and dust suppression - 
SSE has 1 month to respond 
Following an incident management manual 
review, the mine’s emergency response 
procedures and failure to validate procedures 
using risk management has resulted in the mine 
having an ineffective and inadequate SHMS in 
relation to emergency response 
Requirements (7 days) that documentation is 
sent to inspection: fatigue policy (RA and SOPs 
for regulation 41 and 42); and documentation in 
place for regulation 15 and 16 (accidents and 
incidents) 
Requirements (5 days): Contractor to draw up a 
corrective action plan for its currently 
inadequate braking systems part of its SHMS; 
Contractor to provide ISHR with documentation 
on their systems for Regulation 98 (reporting 
and rectifying defects); and also Requirement: 
contractor to supply ISHR with SOP on checking 
mobile plant (Regulation 73) 
  
There are several points that emerge from these 
data. Firstly, as is the case with the suspension 
notices previously, it is apparent that the orders 
made by the ISHRs in relation to inadequate 
safety and health management systems account 
for a very small proportion of the outcomes from 
their inspection activities overall. Secondly, and 
for the most part, they have been used to 
address what appear to be significant health or 
safety risks, including inadequacies in emergency 
response procedures and equipment, ventilation, 
gas monitoring, machinery hazards and so on. 
Further, they are generally used to identify the 
link between the risks posed by these failings and 
the safety and health management system 
required to be in place to reduce this risk to 
acceptable levels. That is, they use identification 
of specific risks as symptomatic evidence of 
inadequacies in the management systems that 
should be in place to ameliorate and control 
them. This kind of feedback constitutes a 
procedure that is widely accepted as good 
practice in OHS management and risk 
prevention. It seems, therefore, that the 
documentary evidence supports the conclusion 
that ISHRs are using their powers to order the 
suspension of work responsibly and in relation to 
identifying serious failings of the safety and 
health management systems they are also acting 
entirely appropriately. Moreover, there is no 
evidence in the documentation that referral of 
any of these matters to Mines Department 
Inspectors has resulted in them being deemed to 
have been issued inappropriately or irresponsibly. 
Rather, as the following lengthy MI mine record 
entry made by a very senior inspector indicates, 
inspectors often went to considerable lengths to 
make their support of ISHRs known: 
 
On Wednesday, 9 February 2011 ISHR 
[name of ISHR] issued a s167 directive 
stating: 
 
"CV 005 is not to be restarted until 
such time as it can be inspected in 
accordance with the SHMS. For this 
inspection to be undertaken to achieve 
an acceptable risk the belt must be 
clear from hazards and able to be 
visually inspect the belt and return 
rollers. This would include at least not 
being submerged in water."  
 
The issuance of the directive is one with 
which I agree. I am also informed that 
Inspector [name of inspector] held 
similar concerns on his inspection of 
the operation on Tuesday 8 February 
and indeed placed specific 
requirements on the mine regarding 
the operation of this conveyor. His 
reluctant agreement to permit 
continued operation of the conveyor 
was based on concerns that a higher 
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level of risk would present due to the 
longwall being in a "weighting" period.  
 
During ISHR [name of ISHR] inspection 
the longwall was stood, undergoing 
maintenance and no issue of weighting 
was evident. Since ISHR [name of ISHR] 
issuance of the directive it has been 
reported that the longwall has been 
weighting up and that areas of the face 
are nearing full yield, because of that 
weight concerns are held for the 
integrity of the face strata conditions.  
 
SSE [name of SSE] contacted me [name 
and title of inspector] to request that I 
lift ISHR [name of ISHR] directive. SSE 
[name of SSE] was informed that he 
was required as per the Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Act 1999 to make 
application as required under s175 and 
to ensure the requirements under 
s176(1) were met before I could review. 
It should be noted by the SSE that the 
directive issued was under s 167 and 
not as indicated in his application letter 
s 168 of the Coal Mining Safety and 
Health Act 1999. 
 
At this time I wish to make it clear that 
the variance or setting aside of a 
directive is not something that is lightly 
undertaken by this office and indeed it 
is the reason the applicable sections of 
the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 
1999 are so detailed, to ensure a 
thorough review. The application of 
effective mine planning and operation 
would have prevented the issue from 
occurring in the first instance and had 
those elementary standards been met 
then the issuance of the s 167 would 
not have been necessary or an 
application to review required. 
  
I have reservations in dealing with a 
directive unless I have sufficient time to 
thoroughly review and consider all 
aspects of the issuance and specifically 
the safety and health implications. That 
said, in this instance I have reluctantly 
made a decision based on the evidence 
to hand.  
 
Under s176(5) of the Coal Mining Safety 
and Health Act 1999 I am confirming 
that I have just sufficient information 
required under s176(1)(b) of that Act to 
make a determination.  
 
Under s177 of the Coal Mining Safety 
and Health Act 1999 I inform the SSE 
that I have made a decision in this 
matter and that decision is I vary the 
ISHR's directive to permit CV005 to 
operate until such time as the longwall 
mines in to a stable geological area. 
When that stable ground is reached 
and weight lifts from the shields 
conveyor CV005 must be stopped and 
isolated until such time as the ISHR's 
directive is complied with.  
 
My decision, as required under s177(4) 
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 
1999 was based on the fact that I 
consider that the risk posed to 
mineworkers by preventing operation 
of Longwall 805 is greater than that 
posed by allowing operation of CV005 
under increased controls.  
 
As stated above, the variation to the 
directive is only applicable whilst 
Longwall 805 is subject to 'weighting' 
problems which may create 'iron-
bound' conditions described in the 
application to review.  
 
The conditions on the operation of 
CV005 are as required by Inspector 
[name of inspector]; in that whilst in 
operation there must be in attendance 
one person on the immediate outbye 
side of the water and one person on 
the immediate inbye side of the water 
to monitor the conveyor and having 
access to stop the belt should a 
hazardous condition arise. Further, all 
of the conditions contained in the email 
forwarded by the UMM, [name of 
underground mine manager (UMM)] to 
[title of inspector] of this date, detailing 
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the risk management to be adopted 
during the operation of the conveyor is 
to be fully complied with.  
 
Once the weighting eases on the face 
and it is considered safe to "park up", 
CV005 must immediately be stopped 
and isolated until such time as the 
requirements of IHSR [name of ISHR] 
directive is complied with.  
(MI mine record entry) 
 
It is clear from the interview data that both the 
ISHRs and the SSHRs were aware of the 
significance of these powers to stop work and 
they used them sparingly as a result.  
 
I know I very, very rarely have to wave 
a big stick just shutting the pit down, 
having said that I have at times had to 
say I'm sorry but until you do this 
correctly your pit's closed and let me 
tell you every time it's been fixed within 
the hour.  
(0650033 - SSHR) 
 
… we’re pretty careful how we issue a 
167. So it’s like … it’s your final power.  
(7120037 - ISHR) 
 
Generally, they used them when they felt there 
was no other recourse — often in situations in 
which they had previously engaged with the mine 
management concerning risks associated with 
particular operations but found the action taken 
as a result to have failed to reduce the 
seriousness of the risk concerned.  
 
Well look in the whole 8 years I am 
happy to say I have only had to do it 
about 4 times. But a lot of times, if 
something is not an immediate danger 
then I will try and give people the 
opportunity to fix it. I try to be a bit 
diplomatic … But most times people 
have taken on board what I have said 
and said well ok we will do this to fix 
the problem, you know.  
(7120013 - SSHR)  
 
Look, as our powers and functions to 
stop stuff, we will give the mine the 
option to first. So we will go up and say 
we believe this is unacceptable, you 
need to do this, this and that and then 
we will go and see them or document 
it, send them an e-mail and then they 
usually, 99.9% of the time, say yeah we 
will fix this or give me an action plan of 
what you gonna do, we will be happy 
with that and we will check up on them 
and see that they are doing it or if they 
don’t then we will just stop it.  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
On other occasions they were used when they 
felt there was an immediate risk of serious harm 
occurring if the process or operation continued.  
 
… you issue that obviously if there’s 
what I say is a dangerous situation or 
unacceptable level of risk is a problem 
… let’s say, like the explosive range. I 
issued a 167, get everyone out of the 
mine. And that was warranted … on 
that occasion, because I wanted 
everyone out the mine, out of the 
explosive range then we’ll have the 
discussion.  
(7120038/9 – Former ISHR)  
 
Yes, we don’t take it lightly … It has got 
to be a high-risk area and a high-risk 
task, like if it is strata. If you are 
working a high risk area, if you are 
going backwards and forwards, if you 
are going past something like a rib that 
is not bolted well, you get clobbered 
with it and that is the end of you, you 
know, so that is high risk.  
(7120014 - SSHR) 
 
It was further clear from the interviews that both 
the SSHRs and the ISHRs were very aware of the 
strictures placed on their freedom to serve such 
notices to suspend work or stop particular 
operations by the regulatory requirements on 
them not to ‘perform a function or exercise a 
power … for a purpose other than a safety or 
health purpose’ or ‘unnecessarily impede 
production at a coal mine’. 
 
I’m not out there just to try and stop 
people from working or disrupt 
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anything that’s going on, that’s not the 
name of the game.  
(7120025 - SSHR) 
 
In short, there was no evidence to suggest that 
either the SSHRs or the ISHRs were using their 
powers to suspend operations irresponsibly or 
that they were using them inappropriately or 
immoderately. Indeed the gist of our findings is 
that both the SSHRs and the ISHRs are well aware 
of the regulatory strictures on their actions, both 
in terms of them being restricted to health and 
safety purposes and in not unnecessarily 
impeding production and that they go to some 
lengths to ensure they act within these limits. At 
the same time the fact that they possessed such 
powers considerably strengthened their own 
perception of their legitimacy, a perception that 
was reinforced in part by the positive feedback 
they received from work colleagues.  
 
I see the work force gains a fair bit of 
confidence from what we do, if we’re 
happy or if we consider it safe, they 
accept, that yeah, we’ve got the risk as 
low as is reasonably achievable, if we’re 
not, confident or happy with, what’s 
been decided or the controls, they know 
we’ve got the power to go further, so if 
we stop fighting, it means, that we 
think, that with what we’ve got, the 
resources, the people and the job, 
we’ve got risk as low as is reasonably 
achievable, and that’s, if the workforce 
is confident, the workforce performs, 
and that’s what everyone wants to do. 
So, I just, it’s a confidence thing, from 
the workforce, we get used as much as 
we work, I wish I had a dollar for every 
time I overheard a manager say, your 
SSHR said, or he was involved, or he 
did that, and that’s a way for them to 
tell the workforce it’s above board, 
we’ve done this, we’ve done that. 
(7120015 - SSHR) 
 
It also went some way to encourage their 
confidence that they would be taken seriously by 
senior managers in their pursuit of actions that 
are in the main consultative and co-operative, 
involving the improvement of arrangements for 
prevention of work injuries and ill-health among 
the workers in these mines, but where they are 
treated with respect precisely because they have 
the potential to use powers that would be, at the 
very least, of serious inconvenience to the senior 
management of the mine. There are strong 
parallels between these findings and those in 
studies in which the powers of health and safety 
representatives to stop dangerous work have 
been examined in other industries and countries. 
For example, in Sweden where both workplace 
and regional
12
 health and safety representatives 
have a similar power, researchers have found that 
it is used very sparingly indeed, but that it is 
greatly valued by representatives, both for the 
legitimacy and for the respect for their role that it 
confers (Frick and Walters, 1998; Walters and 
Frick, 2000; Frick, 2009). Similarly, in Australia an 
ACTU (2005) survey of health and safety 
representatives (HSRs) reported that 11 per cent 
of HSRs had said that they had issued a 
provisional improvement notice (PIN) or default 
notice, and that 91 per cent of these said it was 
effective in resolving the OHS issue. Given that 
HSRs in New South Wales and Queensland, 
would not have the power to issue a PIN, one 
would expect the usage of PINs to be more 
extensive than the ACTU survey suggested. 
Consistent with this, Victorian Trades Hall survey 
(VTHC, 2004 and 2006) survey found that 25 per 
cent of respondent HSRs in Victoria had issued 
PINs, and the 2003 survey found that of the 25 
per cent of HSRs issuing PINs, 45 per cent had 
only issued one PIN. There is also little Australian 
evidence that HSRs’ powers to direct that 
dangerous work cease have been overused (but 
see Maxwell, 2004:192-3). The ACTU (2005) 
survey reported that 21 per cent of HRSs said 
they had directed that unsafe work cease or 
stopped work for OHS, and 88 per cent said that 
the direction had been effective in resolving 
issue. 
 
                                                        
12
 Statutory provisions in Sweden allow for the 
appointment of peripatetic ‘regional health and safety 
representatives’ to represent workers in small firms in a 
particular region and sector. They are in some ways 
analogous to the ISHRs, but are present in most 
sectors of employment in Sweden (see Frick and 
Walters, 1998; and Frick, 2009). 
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6.6 Conclusions 
In short, both the documentary evidence 
resulting from the formal actions of workers’ 
representatives during the previous fifteen years 
or more in Queensland coal mines, along with 
the testimony of a sample of these 
representatives, demonstrate that they make a 
substantial contribution to the operation of 
arrangements for OHS management in the 
mines.  
 
The evidence indicates that the representatives 
are a group of committed, highly motivated and 
active change agents in OHS who deliver the 
functions required of them and use the powers 
available to them both diligently and responsibly. 
They operate within a framework well-established 
by successive rounds of regulation, but which 
under the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 
1999 provides for a modern, risk-based, 
systematic approach to regulating health and 
safety management in which arrangements for 
the representative participation of workers are 
both well-adapted and closely integrated. Within 
this system, the two tiered approach in which 
three Industry Safety and Health Representatives 
have a state wide remit and support the activities 
of locally operating Site Safety and Health 
Representatives in each coal mine is both well 
organised and well-adapted to enable 
representative worker participation in systematic 
approaches to the management of health and 
safety risks. It provides a structured approach to 
the support of the SSHRs in representing workers’ 
interests in health and safety in coal mines and in 
co-operating with managers to ensure the latter 
deliver their responsibilities for managing OHS 
effectively. At the same time the system provides 
considerable added value in the shape of three 
knowledgeable, experienced and active 
representatives who are able to operate not only 
in support of the SSHRs but also at the industry 
level themselves and in direct interactions with 
managers and regulatory inspectors alike. They 
are highly regarded by the SSHRs and generally 
appear to also enjoy the respect of workers, 
inspectors and most mine managers. Indeed, if 
the system has a weakness at all, it would seem 
to lie in the fact that there are only three such 
representatives for the whole of the Queensland 
coal mining industry. They are considerably 
overworked as a result, despite their best efforts 
to organise and manage their workload and 
there would seem to be a strong case for the 
appointment of a further ISHR to support them.  
 
The ISHRs also play a very important role in 
training the SSHRs; indeed this is by far the main 
form of training received by the SSHRs. They also 
have supportive dealings with individual mine 
workers on a regular basis and provide a means 
to bring issues to the attention of mines 
managers or regulatory inspectors that for 
whatever reason mine workers feel unable to 
raise directly themselves. In terms of the use of 
their powers, we have found no evidence to 
suggest that either the SSHRs or the ISHRs are in 
any way abusing the powers they have to 
suspend operations or that they are using them 
inappropriately or immoderately. Indeed the gist 
of our findings is that the ISHRs are well aware of 
the regulatory strictures on their actions, both in 
terms of them being restricted to health and 
safety purposes and in not unnecessarily 
impeding production. They go to some lengths 
to ensure they act within these limits. Moreover 
they convey this ethos to the SSHRs through 
training and personal interactions with them. At 
the same time, the fact that they possess such 
powers considerably strengthens the perception 
of their legitimacy, both amongst themselves and 
among their work colleagues (including the 
SSHRs). It also goes some way to encourage 
confidence that they will be taken seriously by the 
senior managers in the mines they visit, where 
they pursue of actions that are in the main 
consultative and co-operative, involving the 
improvement of arrangements for prevention of 
work injuries and ill-health among the workers in 
these mines. In short, we have not found any 
evidence to support diminishing or removing the 
existing powers of ISHRs or of the SSHRs they 
support.  
 
This said, there are several areas where there are 
some causes for concern and where the 
operation of the system for worker representation 
in health and safety arrangements in coal mines 
might be further improved. We discuss these in 
the final chapter of this report. 
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7 Conclusions  
 
The first and most obvious conclusion that 
emerges from the evidence collected in this 
preliminary study is that the regulatory system for 
representative participation in health and safety 
management in Queensland coal mines has been 
largely successful. Its elements combine to 
enhance approaches to managing health and 
safety in ways that are likely to lead to improved 
health and safety outcomes. The role, 
commitment and activities of both the ISHRs and 
the SSHRs are major elements in determining this 
success.  
 
Broadly speaking, our findings lend weight to the 
conclusion that measures providing for a dual 
level of worker representation, in the form of 
both SSHRs at the workplace level and ISHRs at 
the industry level, are beneficial. The latter work 
effectively in support of the former, and add 
considerable value to the system overall. They are 
aided in this support by the enhanced functions 
and powers given to them by regulation and, as 
we have pointed out in the previous chapter, we 
have found no significant evidence to indicate 
that they mis-use or abuse these powers or are 
over-zealous in their use. Indeed the strong 
evidence gathered from both documentary 
sources and the verbal testimony of workers’ 
representatives and regulators is that the ISHRs 
are well aware of the regulatory strictures on their 
actions, they go to some lengths to ensure they 
act within these limits and they influence less 
experienced SSHRs to do likewise. It was further 
apparent from the interviews with both types of 
representative that, far from finding such 
regulatory strictures confining, they perceive 
working within them as a means of aiding their 
legitimacy and that of their actions. Moreover 
there is strong evidence from the mines records 
we have analysed and the interviews we have 
conducted that worker representatives devote a 
substantial part of their OHS activity to 
addressing serious risks of mining such as those 
most associated with fatalities in the industry.  
 
This said, the system is not perfect and the 
second main conclusion to emerge from this 
preliminary study is that there are several areas in 
which it could be made to work more effectively. 
In these Conclusions, therefore, we first outline 
why we think the Queensland system for worker 
representation is broadly successful. We then 
consider some of its apparent limitations and the 
reasons for them. In our discussion of both its 
success and its limitations we try to understand 
what occurs in Queensland coal mines in the 
context of wider research findings on worker 
representation in health and safety in other 
industries and in other countries.  
 
7.1 Measures of success 
The present study did not attempt to undertake a 
detailed exploration of the link between 
representative participation in health and safety 
arrangements and coal mine health and safety 
outcomes as measured by work injuries or ill-
health because the available data did not allow 
robust exploration of that issue. However, as 
others have pointed out, the well-documented 
trends in these data over the past two decades 
can be broadly divided into three phases. Pre-
1999 there were relatively poor health and safety 
outcomes as measured by injuries and fatalities, 
post-1999 saw a marked improvement, which 
slowed and plateaued after several years to the 
present levels. Attributing causation to regulatory 
intervention is notoriously uncertain; nevertheless, 
the changes of approach in the 1999 Act were 
towards a more systematised form of health and 
safety management in which strong participative 
rights for workers and their representatives match 
those in other industries and in other countries 
over recent decades. Such regulatory changes 
are widely held to bear at least some 
responsibility for improved health and safety 
outcomes in many of the other situations in 
which they have occurred. Researchers who have 
examined OHS management in Queensland coal 
mines have argued that a similar link exists 
between the development of the process-based 
provisions to manage health and safety risks in 
the 1999 Act and improved outcomes in injuries 
and fatalities. They point to the significant 
improvement observed in the second, post-1999 
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phase of the trends in injury and fatality data as 
evidence of this (see, for example, Gunningham 
and Sinclair, 2012; Yang, 2012). 
 
In the absence of sufficiently detailed empirical 
data, it is difficult to establish what proportion of 
the responsibility for this improvement could be 
attributed to the role of representative 
participation within the more general measures 
on OHS management. Nevertheless, there is a 
wealth of evidence from other sources that 
suggests the likelihood of a connection and we 
can find strong indications of its effects by 
drawing on inferences from several related 
observations.  
 
First, as we have made clear in Chapter 3, there is 
a body of evidence that indicates that the 
presence of trade union organisation in coal 
mines is associated with better OHS outcomes. 
Second, research shows that the mechanisms 
with which such outcomes are achieved vary but 
worker representation is usually a key feature. As 
we also detail in Chapter 3, two quite substantial 
bodies of research evidence indicate this and 
show that joint arrangements for health and 
safety management in which trade union 
representatives participate lead to better health 
and safety outcomes than do arrangements in 
which there is no such representative 
participation. The first of these bodies of research 
has measured the relationship between 
arrangements for representation and outcomes 
in the form of trailing indicators such as injury 
and fatality rates. The second measures 
outcomes in relation to leading indicators such as 
the implementation and operation of good 
practice in OHS management arrangements. 
Both point to improved outcomes in the 
presence of trade union supported worker health 
and safety representatives than occurs in their 
absence. This evidence comes in the main from 
industries other than coal mining, but it concerns 
similar kinds of arrangements to those we have 
studied in mining in Queensland.  
 
Third, there is further support for supposing that 
the Queensland arrangements for worker 
representation on health and safety in coal mines 
have positive effects on outcomes that is to be 
found in what is known about the determinants 
of these effects. Again in Chapter 3, we 
presented an overview of research on such 
determinants. These studies have shown that for 
worker representation to have a significant 
impact on either trailing or leading indicators of 
health and safety outcomes, some combination 
of supportive preconditions need to be in place 
in the organisations concerned. These include 
many of the supports we have seen in operation 
in the coal mines in the present study. For 
example, research elsewhere identifies the 
presence of a strong legislative steer — such as is 
clearly provided by the provisions of the 1999 Act 
— to be an important precondition of 
effectiveness. Commitment to supporting a 
participative approach to OHS management on 
the part of the regulatory agency and active 
engagement with representative arrangements 
by regulatory inspectors is a second well-
established precondition for effectiveness. In the 
coal mines we studied we found representatives 
had a somewhat mixed experience of such 
commitment among Queensland mines 
inspectors. But, while there were indications that 
it could be improved in some cases, in the main it 
was nevertheless a positive experience and such 
a commitment was also strongly articulated in the 
policies espoused by senior inspectors.  
 
Well-trained workplace representatives and 
substantial trade union support for them is a 
further precondition for success that is well-
established in research findings. In Queensland 
this precondition is amply provided for by the 
ISHRs and the efforts they make to support the 
SSHRs, especially with training and advice. The 
existence of the ISHRs also provides an indication 
of the commitment of the trade union to 
resourcing and supporting workplace 
representation on health and safety since it 
devotes substantial resources to funding these 
positions and providing the necessary support 
infrastructure to enable them to operate. Also in 
terms of support, the ISHRs collectively constitute 
a substantial body of experience and expertise on 
OHS which is utilised not only as back-up for the 
front-line activities of the SSHRs, but also in direct 
engagement with inspectors, employers and 
senior managers. Thus, this level of trade union 
support represents an important resource for 
representative participation and our evidence 
suggests it is a strong determinant of the 
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effectiveness of the Queensland system in coal 
mining. 
 
A further important precondition for the success 
of participative approaches to OHS management 
demonstrated in other research concerns the 
commitment of the management to such 
approaches. The testimony of the representatives 
who participated in the present study, as well as 
the documentary evidence it examined, indicate 
that there was a mixed experience concerning 
the delivery of this precondition. For some 
representatives a positive experience of support 
from senior management in the coal mines in 
which they worked meant they felt managers 
regarded their role as legitimate and useful. They 
received time and facilities to undertake their 
functions on health and safety, there were 
appropriate channels through which they were 
able to raise issues and their concerns were both 
listened to and responded to by the managers 
involved. There were a number of cases where 
this relationship had taken time to build but the 
representatives were satisfied that with 
experience; SSEs and other senior mine 
managers had come to respond positively to 
them and clearly saw them as contributing to 
helping them to deliver their own responsibilities 
for mine safety. In all these cases the SSHRs 
interviewed gave a strong impression of feeling 
that supportive relations with senior management 
in the mines in which they worked, even though 
in some cases such relations were hard won and 
had taken time to develop, helped lead to 
positive outcomes for the actions of the SSHRs 
on health and safety matters. Similar sentiments 
were expressed by the ISHRs.  
 
For other site representatives the experience was 
a lot less positive. The ISHRs themselves also 
pointed out that there was considerable variation 
in the quality of support they felt was available 
from managers to the SSHRs across the range of 
the mines in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, in 
their own direct dealings with mine managers 
ISHRs made it clear that the attitudes towards the 
role of worker representation that they 
encountered varied considerably. We return to 
the possible reasons for such inconsistency of 
support from mine managers and its 
consequences in the following section.  
 
For present purposes, the conclusion that we 
draw from the our study is that the same 
preconditions noted in other studies as helping to 
determine the effectiveness of worker 
representation in improving health and safety 
outcomes elsewhere exist in at least some 
Queensland mines. Moreover, in relation to some 
of these determinants, such as statutory powers, 
well-trained, competent and experienced 
representatives and strong support from trades 
unions, particularly in the form of the ISHRs, 
workplace representation is well provided for in 
unionised mines in Queensland. In combination, 
therefore, these observations suggest it is more 
likely than not that worker representation on OHS 
will have played a significant role in achieving the 
improved OHS outcomes observed in the early 
years of the millennium.  
 
However, it is also possibly the case that the 
limited articulation of the thinking behind the 
current regulatory system for managing health 
and safety risks in mining in Queensland (of 
which the provisions for worker representation on 
health and safety are an integral part) with health 
and safety management strategies adopted by 
some of the mining companies in the state, may 
be a reason for the plateau observed in OHS 
outcomes in more recent years. There are several 
aspects of disconnect between these two 
approaches. They include the behaviour-based 
models of health and safety management 
adopted by these companies, the hostile labour 
relations climate in their mines and in the industry 
more generally in the state, along with the rapid 
turnover of senior positions in mine management 
and the widespread use of contractors. Both 
singly and in combination these may all have 
contributed to an organisational environment in 
which the presence of preconditions for the 
effectiveness of arrangements for representative 
participation in OHS might be lessened. We 
explore the evidence for this and its 
consequences in the following section. 
 
7.2 Some challenges and contexts 
for worker representation on 
health and safety  
While our overall findings suggest that the 
statutory system for worker representation on 
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health and safety in Queensland coal mines 
makes a positive contribution to improved 
outcomes, there are several contextual features 
that provide challenges to its effectiveness. We 
examine some of these challenges in the 
following sub-sections and discuss their 
implications.  
  
7.2.1 Representative participation and 
styles of OHS management  
The mixed experiences of the responsiveness of 
mine managers to their statutory obligations in 
relation to representative participation reported 
in our preliminary study suggests that, at least in 
some mines in Queensland, there is room for a 
closer alignment between approaches to 
managing safety adopted by the mining 
companies and those framed by regulation.  
 
In the case of the latter, the regulatory framework 
applying in the state is an attempt to integrate 
long-standing requirements on worker 
representation (provisions for check inspectors 
have featured in Queensland mining legislation 
since the early 20
th
 century) with those for risk-
based systemic approaches to managing health 
and safety in mines. They do so by giving 
representatives functions in relation to inspection 
and investigation of health and safety matters 
generally and also by making specific provision 
for them to review ‘procedures in place at the 
coal mine to control the risk to coal mine 
workers’ and to inform senior management if 
they believe the safety management system to be 
ineffective. As we made clear in Chapters 2 and 3, 
this integration of representational rights and 
requirements on systematic approaches to OHS 
management is not unique to mining, but is 
widely found in regulatory provisions on health 
and safety management generally across a range 
of countries and sectors. Such measures attempt 
to ensure that ‘regulated self-regulation’ of OHS 
management is truly self-regulation in as much as 
it includes the workers’ voice as well as that of 
management in the arrangements it requires. 
What is special about the Queensland provisions 
is their level of detail and the extent of the explicit 
functions and powers they grant to worker 
representatives to achieve such involvement.  
 
In the case of the former, other researchers have 
argued that the predominant style of OHS 
management adopted by the large mining 
companies in Queensland is a behaviour-based 
model (see, for example, Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 2012). As we noted in Chapter 2, such an 
approach can make representative participation 
more difficult.  
 
As we reported in Chapter 5, in some mines the 
senior management discharged their statutory 
responsibility under section 99 of the 1999 Act 
and gave ‘reasonable help to a site safety and 
health representative in carrying out the 
representative’s functions’, while in others it 
seems a similar degree of support was not 
forthcoming and representatives experienced 
conflict with managers and supervisors when 
pursuing their statutory functions. In particular, 
they reported limited facilities, problems with 
securing reasonable time to undertake 
investigations and inspections, poor 
responsiveness from managers to remedying 
issues they identified and hostility to their role 
generally. Similarly, in relation to the review of 
systems and procedures for the management of 
health and safety risks, while some 
representatives clearly had positive experiences, 
others reported a lack of consultation on these 
matters and even the existence of a parallel 
system in which managers chose the coal mine 
workers they wished to include in consultation on 
the development of procedures and excluded the 
representatives. 
 
But you sometimes find that the 
company will select people to do those 
risk analysis and they’re not always 
people on the job, fully relevant to 
what’s going on 
(7120035 – SSHR) 
 
The ISHRs also spoke about the range of 
managerial attitudes experienced by site 
representatives in different mines and how this 
affected their own roles in relation to the support 
they were able to offer. As some of quotes 
included in section 5.4.1 make clear, they 
frequently gauged their approach to helping the 
SSHRs in accordance with the responsiveness of 
managers in the mines concerned and they also 
went to some lengths to persuade senior site 
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management of the value that they could obtain 
from proper consultation and use of the SSHRs.  
 
Both the ethos and procedures of behaviour-
based approaches to managing health and safety 
are sometimes argued to be unsupportive of 
representative participation because they focus 
on practices and procedures in which the direct 
engagement of workers is sought in preference 
to their representation (Frick and Kempa, 2011). In 
such scenarios it is difficult for worker 
representatives to gain a purchase in participative 
approaches to health and safety management 
and the only alternative course of action for 
representation is primarily a reactive means of 
defending what the representatives regard as 
workers’ interests in the face of a perception of 
poor OHS management. That is, rather than 
operating proactively and initiating changes from 
within arrangements for OHS management, they 
are obliged to act outside of the management 
system from which managers have effectively 
excluded them. This seems to have been what 
took place in some of the mines in our study.  
 
This is not to suggest that the two approaches 
are necessarily always mutually exclusive. Rather, 
it is to argue that where they operate together 
some thought needs to be given to ways in which 
they can relate in order that the benefits of both 
can be maximised. Research in the UK has 
suggested some ways in which this might be 
achieved (Lunt et al 2008). There would seem to 
be a clear onus here on the management of 
mines that adopt such behaviour-based 
approaches to ensure that they are compatible 
with and make the most effective use of the 
arrangements for worker representation in the 
mine which are present by virtue of statutory 
obligation. However, fundamental to such 
approaches is the presence of a high degree of 
trust and co-operation between employers, their 
managers and the trades unions representing 
workers on site. From our interviews with the 
representatives it seems that such trust and co-
operation was not a feature of the mines in which 
difficulties were experienced in carrying out 
representative functions. This was also a finding 
that emerged in the study of health and safety 
management in coal mines undertaken by 
Gunningham and Sinclair (2012). Clearly, such 
trust and co-operation are more likely to be 
present where the climate of labour relations is 
supportive. Unfortunately this experience is not 
widespread in Queensland mines as we explore 
further in the following section.  
 
7.2.2 Labour relations climate 
Although it is often claimed that in order for 
them to work effectively arrangements for worker 
participation on health and safety should be quite 
separate from those for labour relations more 
generally within organisations, the reality is that 
health and safety issues are inseparable from 
those surrounding the relations of production 
more generally. Therefore, while it may be 
possible to create separate institutional 
arrangements to address health and safety within 
organisations, for them to remain unaffected by 
wider labour relations issues is in practice as 
unlikely as them remaining unaffected by work 
organisational issues or, indeed, the business 
practices of an organisation. The effects of these 
wider contexts are evident in the findings of the 
present study.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that, as elsewhere, 
traditionally strong trade union organisation in 
mines has been substantially weakened by a 
combination of changes in legislation and the 
labour relations strategies of the major mining 
companies in Australia in recent decades. These 
changes have occurred at the same time as the 
shift to risk-based regulation has taken place. 
They have involved moves away from collective 
agreements determining pay and conditions of 
work to more individualised agreements and 
have been peppered with many examples of job 
losses, work restructuring and reorganisation, 
mine closures and re-openings with (re-)hiring of 
non-union workers, use of contract labour and so 
on, as mining companies have sought ways to 
release themselves from what they regard as the 
constraints of unionised labour. These changes 
have not gone uncontested. As a result there 
have been many cases of industrial dispute and 
the labour relations climate in the industry 
generally has been, and continues to be, a hostile 
one.  
 
It would be surprising indeed if worker 
representation on health and safety — like that 
on representation on all other aspects of work 
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and working conditions — were not affected by 
the prevailing ethos of workplace labour 
relations. While previous research points towards 
better health and safety outcomes for 
representative participation in health and safety 
arrangements where workplace labour relations 
are co-operative, this does not necessarily mean 
that in situations where they are more hostile, 
worker representation has no useful role. Indeed, 
common sense would suggest the opposite to be 
more likely. That is, in situations where there are 
high risks and poor labour relations workers seek 
to represent their interests on matters such as 
health and safety by organising collectively in 
order to resist their exploitation by their 
employers. Arguably, this has frequently occurred 
during the history of labour relations in coal 
mining. What is significant for our purposes, 
however, is the way in which union 
representatives operate in such hostile scenarios. 
Other researchers have suggested that worker 
representation on health and safety is relatively 
ineffective in ‘cold industrial relations climates’ in 
Australian coal mines (Gunningham, 2008). They 
have argued that the lack of ‘trust’ in employers 
and managers held by workers’ representatives 
and their trade unions seriously undermines the 
likelihood of positive outcomes for health and 
safety management (Gunningham and Sinclair, 
2012). They further suggest that this continuing 
situation helps explain why the progress observed 
in improved health and safety outcomes around 
the time of the 1999 Act has not been sustained 
to the present time.  
 
However, while it may be true that progress on 
OHS outcomes has slowed and that there was 
indeed an absence of trust in the motives of 
management often evident in the testimony of 
our respondents, the same testimony shows how 
union health and safety representatives 
nevertheless do their best to represent workers’ 
interests in health and safety in such situations 
and, importantly, how they deploy strategies to 
achieve this through offsetting the effects of 
managerial hostility.  
 
For example, as in all modern workplaces, the 
structural and organisational changes that have 
taken place in work in coal mines sometimes blur 
the boundaries between traditional health and 
safety issues and those that involve conditions of 
work and labour standards. The health and safety 
representatives’ statutory mandate explicitly 
covered the first of these but arguably not the 
others. Rather than seek to achieve a wider 
understanding of the work environment as the 
basis for their role in the modern workplace, 
however, the ISHRs and the SSHRs with more 
experience sought to maintain this separation of 
‘health and safety’ issues from ‘industrial’ issues.
13
 
According to them, this was because they 
needed to carefully maintain such a separation in 
order retain the legitimacy of their positions in 
negotiating with managers. They were aware of 
their vulnerability to reprisals from the mining 
companies if they strayed across this boundary as 
health and safety representatives, so where issues 
came up that appeared to contain ‘health and 
safety’ and ‘industrial’ elements, they worked on 
them with the wider trade union organisation at 
the mines to ensure that there was a co-
ordinated approach with an appropriate division 
of tasks between the health and safety 
representatives and other union representatives. 
Regular featuring of health and safety issues and 
reports from SSHRs at union lodge meetings 
were further ways of ensuring such integration.  
 
Respondent: Our on-site lodge 
structure supports, supports me you 
know like, if they’ve got an issue, you 
know, I’ll find the information, they 
also, they’re willing to bat for me if I do, 
not something wrong, but get into that 
area where, I’m tiptoeing on the 
industrial relation side of it. Safety side, 
but if I think it’s grey, I sort of step back 
because I’m just a bit wary that I don’t 
want to get into that arena that’s going 
to get myself into trouble. Not that I’m 
scared. 
Interviewer: You’re just being careful. 
Respondent: Yes because all I need to 
give my management an excuse to get 
                                                        
13
 It is important to acknowledge that the approach is 
different in other sectors, where there has been a long-
standing trade union discourse concerning the 
broadening of the concept of work environment to 
include work organisation and production organisation 
issues, and hence to broaden the remit and role of 
health and safety representatives to cover these too.  
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rid of me from where I am, and they’ll 
jump on it.  
(7120026 – SSHR) 
 
Respondent: … there’s safety, there’s 
industrial. You get pulled into it, you 
end up getting shot in… you’re unlucky 
you’ll probably get bloody prosecuted. 
So it’s a matter of just reinforcing that. 
And the same … if you’re an industrial 
bloke at the pit, you can come into the 
safety arena, no worries at all. But if 
you’re the safety rep, you can’t…  
… There’s Health and Safety legislation 
and there’s Industrial legislation. So 
that’s why I said that it’s been said to 
me, I say it to the blokes, if it’s not in 
there, you don’t deal with it. 
Interviewer 1: But do you not find that 
that limits the sort of issues that can be 
dealt with? 
Respondent: No, I think it aids in 
clarity. Cos most of the mines will have 
a lodge or some form of executive 
that’s been elected up. So they’re there 
industrial representatives. The Site 
Safety and Health Reps are their Safety 
and Health representatives. … They’re 
elected by everyone in that room, 
they’re elected everyone in the mine. 
They need to be seeing you work in 
with them and vice versa. So if you are 
going to raise an issue over here, make 
sure you’re not going to step on their 
toes by doing it. … I’m sure if you went 
and stopped a mine for a couple of 
days and was come out as an 
industrial matter, well you’d be in a bit 
of strife then.  
(7120033 – Former ISHR) 
 
Similarly, they strove to ensure that their actions 
were not construed as impeding production, for 
this was another statutory stricture by which they 
were bound. Collective experience in a poor 
industrial relations climate had taught them that 
being accused of causing such impediment 
would lead to swift reprisal from their employers. 
Again, comments from the more experienced 
respondents showed that the strategies they 
adopted in these situations involved a division of 
task content between the health and safety 
representatives and other representatives in ways 
which ensured that the former were not accused 
of impeding production – but could nevertheless 
continue to act legitimately on health and safety 
issues, even to the extent of stopping operations 
if they believed the seriousness of the risks 
involved warranted such actions.  
 
And I’m conscious from the point of in 
my former role like I had the likes of 
[Company Name] and some of the 
largest multinationals challenge me in 
particular to that, when I’ve shut their 
mines down, they’re unsafe. And when 
they had me before the Department 
Inspectors would be … And each and 
every time there’s nothing to answer. 
Cos the thing I looked at at the time as 
an ISHR was I was mindful of the Check 
Inspector. There’s certain conditions 
and powers and function of the Act 
there about impeding production. So 
my focus was health and safety. If it 
was an industrial issue, they sort it out 
there.  
(7120038/9 – Former ISHR) 
 
Therefore, it was clear that in some mines (and in 
relation to some mining companies) the labour 
relations climate was no more conducive to 
participative approaches to health and safety 
management than it was to the effectiveness of 
the behaviour-based health and safety systems 
also used in these mines. In these situations 
representatives had developed strategies that 
were appropriate to operating as worker 
representatives in a relatively hostile climate. 
These strategies ensured they undertook actions 
that were within the statutory framework on 
worker representation and which thus were 
effective in allowing them to represent the 
interests of the coal mine workers on health and 
safety, despite the hostility of managers. In this 
way, as the mines records and interview 
transcripts attest, both ISHRs and SSHRs were 
able to identify and remedy a range of conditions 
which, if left unchecked, would have constituted 
fatal risks to mine workers; and they were able to 
do so even in mines where the climate of labour 
relations was hostile. There is little doubt that had 
the labour relations climates been friendlier in all 
the mines in Queensland, the representatives 
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would have achieved even greater successes in 
terms of positive health and safety outcomes. 
However, in scenarios in which they operated in a 
‘cold industrial relations climate,’ the absence of 
trust between representatives and managers, 
although a feature, did not serve to incapacitate 
the representatives. Instead it meant they used 
tactics of health and safety activism that were 
more appropriate to the climate.  
 
7.2.3 Organisational change 
As elsewhere, reassertion of the strength and 
dominance of capital in the Australian mining 
industry in recent decades has led to 
considerable restructuring of the organisation of 
work. In coal mining the use of contractor labour 
has increased considerably. It is well-established 
that the fractured work arrangements that result 
pose challenges for managing health and safety 
(Johnstone et al 2001; Quinlan and Bohle 2008). 
At the same time they pose significant challenges 
for trade union organisation too. Indeed, in 
certain cases moves towards the greater use of 
contractors were a deliberate strategy of mining 
companies to reduce the influence of trade 
unions. In combination, therefore, it might be 
anticipated that the increased use of contractors 
evident in Queensland coal mines would be 
particularly challenging for arrangements for 
worker representation in preventive health and 
safety arrangements. As the evidence presented 
in previous chapters makes clear, while there is 
little doubt concerning these additional 
challenges, it is equally clear that both the ISHRs 
and the SSHRs had found a variety of ways to 
address them. Again, this was also supported by 
the documentary analysis: 
 
Maintenance manning and supervision 
were discussed in light of the recent 
restructuring at the mine. Supervision 
in the maintenance area covers the 
twenty four hour operation of the mine 
and includes a number of planning 
personnel. Contractors are more widely 
used for the ‘out of the ordinary tasks’. 
Cranes are no longer owned by [name 
of mine] but are contracted to the 
mine, the positive aspect of this 
arrangement was observed at the 
Dragline 37 shutdown site, where a 
new crane was in use. Generally the 
cranes supplied to the mine have been 
of a better standard than previously 
used on this site. 
(MI mine record entry) 
 
The discussion regarding the 
retrenchment of ERZ controllers was 
conducted with the SSE [name of SSE] 
in his office. The SSE explained that the 
reduction of numbers of ERZ controllers 
was a business decision driven by 
production and economic 
circumstances at the mine. The SSE 
said that the development production 
at the mine had been reduced to a 5 
panel roster from a 6 panel roster. The 
corresponding numbers of coal mine 
workers and ERZ controllers had been 
retrenched. The SSE determined that 
the risk to the mine and people as a 
result was insignificant. I explained to 
the SSE that my position was 
concerning the safety and health of 
people at the mine and the business 
decisions are not my concern. The fact 
that the number of supervisors at a 
mine had been reduced represents a 
significant change to both the 
management structure and the SHMS. 
I would expect that the risks of such a 
change would have been considered 
through the mines change 
management process in the same 
manner as any other change such as a 
ventilation change for example. I also 
expressed my concern to the SSE that 
UMM was apparently off site when the 
retrenchments were enacted upon. As 
the UMM is responsible for the control 
and management of the mine I would 
have thought that the reduction of ERZ 
controllers would be of major interest 
to him. 
(ISHR report) 
 
The other aspect of organisational change which 
was repeatedly the subject of comment from 
representatives concerned their relationships with 
senior mine managers. Modern management 
techniques in coal mining have led to a rapid 
turnover among senior mine management. The 
Final Report 
86 
 
consequences of this were felt by many of the 
representatives who took part in the study, as 
their comments in previous chapters make clear. 
They recognised that to be effective they needed 
to develop good working relationships with 
senior mine managers and this required 
significant investment of time and effort. They 
were frustrated by the lack of experience 
displayed by some new SSEs, both in relation to 
health and safety issues at their mines and in 
terms of the regulatory requirements concerning 
them. In this respect, while time and effort spent 
working on improving the knowledge and 
understanding of the SSE paid off, the short time 
they remained in this position meant that such 
organisational knowledge was not necessarily 
retained following their departure.  
 
7.3 Ways forward 
As we made clear at the outset of this chapter, 
our main conclusions in the present study 
concern the effective role played by worker 
representatives in improving health and safety in 
Queensland coal mines. Having undertaken a 
wide-ranging review of the research literature in 
this field we think our findings represent a new 
contribution to the literature on worker 
representation on health and safety in that they 
provide a detailed analysis of both the role of 
worker representatives and the statutory 
framework governing their activities on health 
and safety in coal mining — which is an 
important sector that has been neglected in 
previous work. The study is also unique in that it 
has used a combination of documentary records 
of the activities of the representatives (as well as, 
for comparison, those of mines inspectors) with 
that of transcripts of interviews held with the 
representatives in order to obtain a detailed and 
corroborated indication of their activities and 
effects.  
 
This said, we are aware of several significant 
limitations which should be addressed in further 
work. In short, there is a need to expand the 
scope of study in several directions. Firstly in this 
respect it would be important to include both 
mine managers and coal mine workers as well as 
more mines inspectors as participants in future 
studies. We recognise that our work was 
commissioned by the CFMEU and has used data 
and accessed participants provided through the 
CFMEU. While we feel that such access was 
entirely appropriate for the purposes of the 
present study, and our findings are independent 
of any influence from such access, it is equally 
important that follow-up work is inclusive of a 
wider group of participants. Secondly, we have 
been unable to explore any possible correlation 
between OHS outcomes as measured by trailing 
indicators of outcomes such as injuries or HPIs 
and the role of arrangements for representation 
on health and safety. Nor have we been able to 
explore such matters in relation to the self-
reported health or injury experiences of coal 
mine workers. While it is not entirely clear 
whether such data exist in sufficient, and 
sufficiently robust, detail to sustain such analysis, 
these are important issues that should be fully 
explored in future work.  
 
We have found indications of several areas in 
which the involvement of both ISHRs and SSHRs 
could be better supported in order to make their 
contribution to preventing harm even more 
effective. Each of these areas requires further 
analysis. They include: the relationship between 
arrangements for representative participation and 
the nature of the approach to health and safety 
management adopted in different coal mines; the 
facilities available to deliver effective 
representative participation; the role of 
arrangements for the organisation of work and 
employment in the mines in determining the 
extent and effectiveness of those for representing 
workers’ interests in health and safety; the role of 
labour relations issues in determining health and 
safety outcomes and the extent to which worker 
representatives are able to participate in their 
achievement; and the implications of the models 
adopted by mining companies to conduct both 
their work and business for systems for 
preventing injuries and ill-health in coal mines.  
 
Finally, we have suggested that on the basis of 
our evidence the main elements of the statutory 
regime framing provisions for worker 
representation on health and safety in 
Queensland coal mines are adequate. However, 
there is room for further study concerning how 
these arrangements compare with experience of 
the operation of corresponding provisions in the 
A study of the role of workers’ representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland 
87 
 
harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts where, 
as we have noted, health and safety 
representatives (HSRs) have a broader array of 
rights and powers, including the right to 
assistance from experts, the right to be present at 
interviews between workers and the employer or 
inspector, the right to information about the 
health and safety of workers and hazards 
affecting workers and the power to issue 
provisional improvement notices. Notably, the 
Work Health and Safety Acts also impose key 
obligations on persons conducting a business or 
undertaking (PCBUs) in relation to HSRs, and 
some of these rights directly address issues raised 
by SSHRs in this study. For example, the Work 
Health and Safety Acts (in section 70(1)) oblige 
PCBUs to provide resources, facilities and 
assistance to a HSR that are reasonably necessary 
to enable the representative to exercise his or her 
powers or perform his or her functions. They also 
oblige (sections 70(2) and (3)) PCBUs to allow a 
HSR to spend such time, on normal pay, as is 
reasonably necessary to exercise his or her 
powers and perform his or her functions under 
the Act. 
 
It is arguably also the case that, under the same 
Acts, HSRs are better protected against 
victimisation and from disqualification. For 
example, under the Coal Mining Safety and 
Health Act 1999 the Minister may remove a SSHR 
from office by notice (which must contain the 
reasons) if the Minister considers the SSHR is not 
performing the SSHR's functions ‘satisfactorily’ – 
subject to an appeal to an Industrial Magistrate. 
The Minister has the same power to remove an 
ISHR (section 112(1)). The Work Health and Safety 
Act 2011 (Qld), by way of contrast, vests the 
disqualification power in the Industrial Relations 
Commission (rather than a member of the 
Executive) and specifies clearer grounds for 
disqualification: that the HSR has: (a) exercised a 
power or performed a function as a HSR for an 
improper purpose; or (b) used or disclosed any 
information he or she acquired as a HSR for a 
purpose other than in connection with the role of 
HSR (section 65(1)). 
  
We have pointed out that the arrangements that 
apply to workers’ representation in mining arose 
in response to the risks of a very differently 
organised and structured industry to the one that 
currently exists and it would seem sensible to 
undertake some further comparative inquiry to 
determine whether such measures could be 
made more fit for purpose in relation to the 
predominant features of the industry as it stands 
today. To reiterate, however, our main findings 
on the current system for worker representation 
demonstrate that both ISHRs and SSHRs make a 
significant contribution to the prevention of harm 
in Queensland mines. The point we are making 
here is that providing additional supports already 
found under other legislation could further 
enhance this contribution to the health and safety 
of coal miners.  
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ISHR Interview Schedule 
 
1. Information concerning their (i) background; age, mining experience, mining and OHS 
qualifications, previous experience as SSHR; (ii) when and why they became ISHRs; (iii) how long as 
a representative; (iv) their training and other union support? 
 
2. What are the health and safety issues ISHRs most typically deal with? 
 
3 How do ISHRs spend their time? What are their major activities? 
(i) How do ISHRs use their various consultation, inspection, review of procedures, 
enforcement etc. powers;  
(ii) To what extent do ISHRs focus on OHS management issues and processes and to what 
extent do ISHRs concern themselves with infrastructure issues (ie get at the balance 
between looking at how safety is managed (SMS, risk assessment, control procedures and 
processes etc.) and looking at the mine itself – the physical conditions - (1) methane and 
coal dust monitoring and levels; (2) spontaneous combustion/heatings; (3)bratticing/seals 
and ventilation systems; (4) ground conditions and ground support regimes; (4) water 
seepage and inundation; (5) stone dusting, fire suppression; (6) condition of roadways; 
and (7) mining equipment.) 
(iii) Has the ISHR role changed over time? 
(iv) Do ISHRs face obstacles of any kind when they exercise their powers?; and  
(v) What are these obstacles (and which are the most significant)? 
 
Checklist of functions/powers: 
o inspecting a coal operation to assess the level of risk to which workers are exposed (can be 
accompanied by SSE and SSHR (Do they have a system of inspections on a regular basis through 
negotiation?; how often do they inspect? Why?); 
o review procedures in place at the mine to control risks to workers; 
o detect unsafe practices and conditions and to take action;  
o participate in investigations into serious incidents and HPIs and other matters 
o investigate complaints by coal mine workers; 
o to help in initiatives to improve OHS at coal mines 
o make inquiries about operation of mines relevant to OHS 
o with reasonable notice to SSE, enter any part of coal mines to carry out functions 
o copy safety and health management system documents; 
o to require person in control of mine to give ISHR reasonable help (unless reasonable excuse) in 
exercise of powers 
o If believes SHMS is inadequate/ineffective, must advise SSE – if SSE action inadequate, advise 
inspector (who must report results of investigation on mine record) 
o Issue a directive under s 167 
(vi) How do ISHRs deal with serious safety issues? Have ISHRs issued s 167 Directives? 
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4    (i)    How do ISHR’s consult with their fellow workers and represent their interests?  
(ii) To what the extent do they feel supported by their colleagues?  
(iii) How does the ISHR ensure they are accountable to members? 
(iv) What would improve their consultation and representation role, and the support they 
receive from colleagues etc? 
5 What sort of working relationship does the ISHR have with SSHRs? 
(i) How does the ISHR see his role in relation to SSHRs? 
(ii) How much time do ISHRs spend answering questions and queries from SSHRs? 
(iii) Does the ISHR meet regularly with SSHR to ascertain whether there are OHS 
problems or issues on shifts? 
(iv) What sort of training do ISHRs organise and present for SSHRs 
 Aim of training 
 Topics covered 
 Presenters – how chosen, background etc 
 Materials 
 How successful is the training? 
 Do ISHRs monitor competence of SSHRs? 
(v) Does the ISHR provide general OHS information to SSHRs? 
(vi) How do ISHRs find out about OHS issues and incidents at mines? Do SSHRs report all 
incidents likely to endanger workers to the ISHR (whether or not matter rectified)?  
(vii) What do ISHRs do when they hear of a serious OHS issue at a mine? 
(viii) What kind of support does the ISHR receive from SSHRs? 
(ix) Has the relationship with SSHRs changed over time? 
 
6 What is the ISHR’s role in relation to the joint health and safety committees at each mine; and what 
is the ISHR’s perception of the relationship? 
 
7 ISHRs relationship with the union: 
(i) discuss the union’s role in training, resourcing and otherwise supporting ISHRs;  
(ii) the ISHR’s overall perception and judgment about the union’s supportive role? 
(iii) has the relationship with the union changed over time? 
 
8 Discuss the structural and organizational changes (outsourcing, contracting, labour hire etc), 
government policies (including deregulatory strategies) leading different organizational and 
political settings in which representation on OHS occurs – as compared to those when the 
provisions for this type of representation were originally conceived.  
 
(i) Have the ISHRs noticed any ways in which these changes affect (i) OHS in the mines, (ii) 
their roles and activities and (iii) their ability to undertake them?  
(ii) Does the use of contractors present any challenges for ISHRs; do they bring issues to 
ISHRs? 
 
9 What are the ISHR’s perceptions of the broader industrial relations context within which they 
operate?         
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(i)     How does it affect the way they carry out their roles? 
(ii) Ask ISHR to reflect on their relations with the mine management and its commitment to 
OHS. 
(iii) Seek ISHR’s reflections of the extent of workers’ participation in OHS in coal mines – 
(documentary evidence suggests that the ISHR feel it is rather low). 
 
10 What is the ISHR’s relationship with, and experience of working with, mines inspectors: (i) How 
often they see them, how is contact initiated? 
(ii) What happens when they do see them? 
      (iii) How supportive are inspectors? 
(v) How has the relationship changed over time? 
 
11 What have ISHRs achieved with their powers? 
o including good examples of the successful utilisation of their powers);  
o examples of most important interventions/successes;  
o how do their activities ‘add value’ (mentoring and supporting SSHRs, their role in 
reporting and disseminating information on serious incidents for example, eg high 
potential incidents (HPIs) etc). 
 
12 What do ISHRs consider to be necessary to improve their role in Queensland mines?; What would 
most improve health and safety in mines? 
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SSHR Interview Schedule 
 
1. Information concerning their (i) background; age, mining experience, mining and OHS 
qualifications; (ii) when and why they became reps; (iii) how long as a representative; (iv) their 
training and other union support? 
 
2. What are the health and safety issues SSHRs most typically deal with? 
 
3. (i)  How do SSHRs use their various consultation, inspection, enforcement etc. powers;  
(i) To what extent do SSHRs focus on OHS management issues and processes and to what 
extent do SSHRs concern themselves with infrastructure issues (ie get at the balance 
between looking at how safety is managed (SMS, risk assessment, control procedures and 
processes etc.) and looking at the mine itself – the physical conditions - (1) methane and 
coal dust monitoring and levels; (2) spontaneous combustion/heatings; (3)bratticing/seals 
and ventilation systems; (4) ground conditions and ground support regimes; (4) water 
seepage and inundation; (5) stone dusting, fire suppression; (6) condition of roadways; and 
(7) mining equipment.) 
(ii) Has the SSHR role changed over time? 
(iii) Do SSHRs face obstacles of any kind when they exercise their powers?; and  
(iv) What are these obstacles (and which are the most significant)? 
 
Checklist of powers/functions: 
o inspecting a coal operation to assess the level of risk to which workers are exposed (Do they have a 
system of inspections on a regular basis through negotiation?); 
o make a written report on the inspection (copy to SSE, notify SSE of possibility of danger/safety and 
health management system inadequate (inform inspector if SSE response inadequate); and copy to 
inspector); 
o review procedures in place at the mine to control risks to workers; 
o detect unsafe practices and conditions;  
o investigate complaints by fellow workers; 
o attempt to investigate and rectify problems encountered by fellow workers (and pass complex 
issues on to ISHR); 
o inspecting documents and plans relating to health, safety and welfare that are required to be kept 
at the coal operation;  
o observing any formal in-house investigation of an event or other occurrence that must be notified 
to the Chief Inspector; 
o A site check inspector or electrical inspector who inspects any part of a coal operation must also 
make a record on the day of the inspection if they find any noxious or flammable gas, self-heating 
coal or other material, or any other dangerous conditions; 
o Right to be informed by SSE of injury or illness to mine worker; high potential incident at the mine; 
any proposed change to coal mine, plant or substances that may affect OHS; presence of inspector 
and directive by inspector or ISHR; 
o Power to stop dangerous operations (s 101). 
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(v) How do SSHRs deal with serious safety issues? Have SSHRs had to stop a work process on safety 
grounds (using s 101)? 
4. What is the SSHR’s role in relation to the joint health and safety committee; and what is the SSHR’s 
perception of the relationship? 
 
5.    (i)    How do SSHR’s consult with their fellow workers and represent their interests?  
(vi) To what the extent do they feel supported by their colleagues?  
(vii) What would improve their consultation and representation role, and the support they 
receive from colleagues etc? 
6. What sort of working relationship does the SSHR have with Industry Health and Safety 
Representatives? 
(x) Does the SSHR meet regularly with ISHR to ascertain whether there are OHS 
problems or issues on shifts? 
(xi) Does the SSHR report all incidents likely to endanger workers to the ISHR (whether or 
not matter rectified)? 
(xii) Our impression from our research so far is that ISHRs focus mainly on the 
infrastructure of mines (eg physical hazards) rather than on safety management 
systems and procedures – what is the SSHRs impression of this balance; and what 
balance do SSHRs themselves make? (ie compare their impression of ISHRs balance 
and their balance as stated in 3(ii) above). 
(xiii) What kind of support does the SSHR receive from ISHRs? 
(xiv) Has the relationship with ISHRs changed over time? 
 
7. SSHRs relationship with the union: 
(i) discuss the union’s role in the provision of training and information – relative to 
other sources of these things;  
(ii) what are the SSHRs’ views and perceptions of training experience itself; what 
they value about it; and how much of it they have received? 
(iii) the SSHR’s overall perception and judgment about the union’s supportive role? 
(iv) has the relationship with the union changed over time? 
 
8. Discuss the structural and organizational changes (outsourcing, contracting, labour hire etc), 
government policies (including deregulatory strategies) leading different organizational and 
political settings in which representation on OHS occurs – as compared to those when the 
provisions for this type of representation were originally conceived.  
 
(iii) Have the SSHRs noticed any ways in which these changes affect (i) OHS in the mines, (ii) 
their roles and activities and (iii) their ability to undertake them?  
(iv) Does the use of contractors present any challenges for SSHRs; do they bring issues to 
SSHRs? 
 
9. What are the SSHR’s perceptions of the broader industrial relations context within which they 
operate?         
(i)     How does it affect the way they carry out their roles? 
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(iv) Ask SSHR to reflect on their relations with the mine management, its commitment to OHS 
and the support for SSHR/obstacles. 
(v) Seek SSHR’s reflections of the extent of fellow workers’ participation in OHS in coal mines – 
(documentary evidence suggests that the ISHR feel it is rather low). 
 
10. What is the SSHR’s relationship with, and experience of working with, mines inspectors: (i) How 
often they see them, how is contact initiated? 
(ii) What happens when they do see them? 
      (iii) How supportive are inspectors? 
(viii) How has the relationship changed over time? 
 
11. What have SSHRs achieved with their powers? 
o including good examples of the successful utilisation of their powers);  
o examples of most important interventions/successes;  
o how do their activities ‘add value’ (their role in reporting and disseminating information 
on serious incidents for example, eg high potential incidents (HPIs) etc). 
 
12. What do SSHRs consider to be necessary to improve their role in Queensland mines?; What would 
most improve health and safety in mines? 
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Participant information sheet 
 
 
The effectiveness of workers’ inspectors: A study of the role of site and industry health and safety 
representatives in coal mines in Queensland 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide if you wish to take part it is 
important for you to understand what the research will involve and why it is being done. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Unionised worker representation has been an established part of the statutory requirements covering health 
and safety in coal mining in a number of Australian states for many years. Evidence from other sectors of 
industry suggests that this kind of representation has a positive effect on occupational health and safety 
outcomes. At the moment, however, there is very little evidence on this issue relating directly to the coal 
mining industry. In order to begin to address this, we are now trying to find out more about the role and 
activities of Queensland mines’ site and industry health and safety representatives and their effectiveness in 
relation to workers’ health and safety by asking those involved about their experiences.  
 
Who are the researchers and who is funding the research? 
The researchers are based at the Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC) which is part of the 
Cardiff University School of Social Sciences in the UK. You can find out more about CWERC and our work on 
our website: 
www.cardiff.ac.uk/cwerc/index.html 
 
The study is being led by Professor David Walters and Dr Emma Wadsworth with the assistance of other 
members of CWERC staff. The research is funded by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(CFMEU) Mining and Energy Division and has been approved by the Cardiff University School of Social 
Sciences Ethics Committee. 
 
Who can take part? 
We are inviting those connected to coal mining in Queensland in a number of ways to take part in the study 
by being interviewed for the research. This includes both site and industry health and safety representatives, 
mine inspectors, trade union leaders, regulatory policy makers and mine managers. 
 
What do I have to do? 
Taking part in the study involves being interviewed by the research team. The interview will cover a number 
of areas around your work and your experiences of the way in which safety and health are managed in coal 
mines in Queensland. It should take no more than about 40 minutes.  
 
Will my taking part be confidential? 
All interviews carried out during the project will be undertaken on a confidential basis and will be audio-
recorded and subsequently transcribed. As far as possible all comments will be anonymised in any reports, 
papers or other publications that are produced as a result of the research. No individuals will be named in 
any publications about the study and its findings but there is a possibility that some may be identifiable 
through comments that are made. 
 
What will happen to the information that I give? 
All transcripts of recorded interviews will be stored anonymously on University password protected 
computers in strict accordance with the Data Protection Act. These will only be accessible to members of 
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the research team and will be kept securely. An analysis of the information will form part of our report at the 
end of the study which may be published on our own and/or the CFMEU website where anyone will be able 
to access it. At a later stage, the findings may also be reported to academic or professional audiences in 
journals, presentations or a book. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Taking part in the study is entirely voluntary. You can decide whether you would like to be interviewed or 
not and you can choose to withdraw from the study at any time. You can also choose not to answer any 
questions asked at any time. You do not have to give a reason for any of your decisions. 
 
Contact information 
If you would like further information about the study please do not hesitate to contact: 
 
Professor David Walters or Dr Emma Wadsworth 
 
Tel: +44 (0) 29 2087 0013 OR +44 (0) 29 2087 5123 
 
Email: waltersd@cardiff.ac.uk OR wadsworthej@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre 
Cardiff University 
59 Park Place 
Cardiff  
CF10 3AT 
UK 
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Consent Form 
 
The effectiveness of workers’ inspectors: A study of the role of site and industry health and safety 
representatives in coal mines in Queensland 
 
Professor David Walters & Dr Emma Wadsworth 
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University 
waltersd@cardiff.ac.uk    wadsworthej@cardiff.ac.uk  
+44 (0) 29 2087 0013      +44 (0) 29 2087 5123  
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
  
• 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
• 
I am willing to take part in the interview for this study and for the interview to be audio-recorded. 
 
• 
I understand that no-one will have access to the recording beyond the Cardiff University research team. 
 
• 
I understand that as far as possible all comments will be anonymised in any reports, papers or other 
publications that are produced as a result of the research. Individuals’ names will not be included in any 
publications, but I understand that there is a possibility that I may be identifiable through comments that 
I make. 
 
• 
I understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time. 
 
 
 
 
Name of interviewee 
 
 
Signature                                             Date 
 
 
 
 
Name of interviewer 
 
 
Signature                                             Date 
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Non-participant observation plan 
 
Observe : 
(i) What SSHRs are trained in 
(ii) Who delivers the training 
(iii) The quality of the training 
(iv) The training materials 
(v) The interaction between SSHRs; between SSHRs and trainers; and between SSHRs and the 
union 
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